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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT 
AN ERROR OF LAW OR MISAPPLY 
THE LAW? 
IS THE DECISION OF THE LOWER 
COURT TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF 
THE STIPULATION SUPPORTED BY 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVI-
DENCE? 
4 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a petition to modify a divorce decree case. The 
plaintiff appellant, Mrs. Brown, seeks a review of the district 
courts decision to treat an oral stipulation as dispositive of 
all issues. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were divorced in February, 1980. The divorce 
was contested, but settled by stimulation. In the divorce decree 
the appellant was awarded child support in the amount of three 
hundred dollars ($300.00) per month for each of three (3) children, 
and nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per month alimony. The respon-
dant, who is a medical doctor, engaged in private practice as an 
OB-GYN, was earning approximately sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) 
ner year at the time of the divorce. (T12,22) (References to the 
transcript follow the assertion made, and contain both page and 
line number.) 
Three years later, the appellant, believing the respond-
ants income had increased dramatically, and having the increas-
ing financial burdons associated with growing children, caused a 
petition to modify the decree of divorce to be filed. 
The petition to modify was filed February 28th, 1983. In it 
the appellant asked for an increase in both child support and 
alimony, among other things. (T3,4) The respondant answered, and 
filed a counterpetition in which the asked for a reduction in child 
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support, the elimination of alimony, and changes in the visitation, 
among other things. (T3,6) 
Both parties commenced discovery, and extensive discovery was 
scheduled and completed. (T3,8 and 6,8) It appeared from the 
discovery that the appellants beliefs concerning the respondants 
income were correct. Documents supplied by the respondant showed 
his income having risen from approximately sixty thousand dollars 
($60,000.00) per year in 1980, the time of the divorce, to over 
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) per year (this includes 
monies put in a pension and profit sharing plan), at the time of 
the discovery.(T12,22) 
The appellant was told by her then counsel that her position 
had merit, and that she should prevail.(T6,19) Although the 
appellant realized that compromise is always a factor to be 
considered, she concluded, along with her then counsel, to reject 
various settlement proposals made by the respondant during the 
period from filing in February of 1983, to the spring of 1984. (T 
6,19) Sometime between early 1984 and June 5th of 1984, unbe-
knownst to the appellant, something went arwry between her and her 
then counsel in terms of communication. Discussions about various 
options for settlement were still being had. Both appellant and 
respondant were proposing settlement terms to one another. 
The respondant scheduled the deposition of the appellant 
to be taken on June 5th, 1984. (T6,19) The appellant had never 
had her deposition taken before. (T7,18) It appeared at the 
time of scheduling the deposition, that the matter would go to 
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trial. A trial date was set for August 12th, 1994. (T3,12)-
(T6,5) Although there had been considerable discovery^ settlement 
negotiations did not produce a settlement. 
Sometime shortly before the appellants deposition was to 
be taken, the appellants then counsel, either entered into a 
settlement agreement with opposing counsel, or indicated that 
the appellant would be ready to tenter into a stipulation, disposi-
tive of all issues, by the deposition date of June 5th, 1984. (T3,-
16 and T6,l) 
Counsel apparantly agreed with opposing counsel in advance that 
the deposition scheduled for June 5th, 1984, would be used for 
purposes of recording the stipulation only. (T3,17) 
The appellant did not know, was not told by her counsel 
or anyone else, and did not understand that an agreement for 
settlement had been promised by her attorney. She did not know, 
and had no way to know, that the deposition time was going to be 
used to record a stipulation, what the terms of the stipulation 
were, or why her counsel would agree to the terms of a stipula-
tion, which they had previously rejected, until she appeared at 
opposing counsels office for the deposition. (T7,5) 
When the appellant appeared for the deposition, she then, and 
only then, learned from her counsel for the first time that: 
1. He had reached an agreement with opposing counsel 
depositive of all issues, an agreement that he 
thought she should accept; 
2. Although the proposed agreement contained terms 
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appellant and her counsel had previously rejected, 
that she should agree to them; 
3. That although she had always been assured by her 
counsel that they would do better in court than the 
terms the proposed agreement provided for, she 
should accept them because she would do no better in 
court; and 
4, If she would accept the terms of the proposed agree-
ment she could avoid having her deposition taken. 
The appellant, because she had never had her deposition 
taken before, was afraid of it. (T7,19) She was in opposing 
counsels office, (T7,3) and had the respondant, opposing counsel, 
and the court reporter waiting while her counsel informed her of 
the four points listed above. 
The appellant was disappointed, dismayed, confused, and 
felt abandoned. (T7,13) She was disappointed becaue she had 
been assured by her lawyer during the entire proceedings that 
the facts warranted an increase in both child support and alimony, 
and yet, the net effect of the proposed stipulation was to decrease 
her total support and create an ambiguous and unworkable visitation 
schedule. The appellant was dismayed because her attorneys 
position had changed drastically without notice. She was confused 
because she could not understand why a dramatic increase in her 
former husbands income should warrant a decrease in her support, 
and confused because her attorneys assessment of the situation, and 
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advice was almost the opposite of what she had last heard from 
him. The appellant felt abandoned because if she chose not to 
accept the proposed stipulation, she would face deposition, an 
unknown to her, with what she thought would be unsupportive 
counsel. 
Although a college graduate, in the face of her attorneys 
advice, a man she had paid more than two thousand dollars and had 
put all of her faith in for seventeen (17) months, the appellant 
went into an adjoining room where her counsel, opposing counsel, 
and her former husband, the respondant, stated an agreement and 
stipulation dispositive of all issues on the record.(T7,21) The 
appellant said nothing on the record.(T8,2) 
Opposing counsel prepared a written stipulation and sent 
it to appellants counsel.(T8,18) Appellants then counsel did 
not send her a copy or notify her that he had received a proposed 
written stipulation for her to sign until mid to late August of 
1984. Upon receiving a copy, appellant immediately contacted her 
lawyers office. She made an appointment to see him to go over the 
proposed written stipulation at the earliest possible date. That 
appointment, however, was three weeks away. (T9,8) She was 
informed just before the appointment that he had been called out of 
town unexpectedly, and that he would have to cancel the appoint-
ment. (T9,10) The appellant could not get another appointment to 
see her lawyer for approximately a months time due to his busy 
schedule.(T9,11) When the appellant was finally able to meet 
with her attorney, three and one-half (3 1/2) months after the 
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deposition date, late September, 1984, she discovered that there 
was no room for adjustments as she had been led to believe. The 
appellant refused to sign the written stipulation. Her then 
counsel withdrew on November 7th, 1984. (file page 151) 
In the interim period the respondant began paying the appellant 
two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month, which was two hundred 
dollars ($200.00) per month higher than the obligation under the 
original decree. He began paying said amount commencing in July, 
1984. That was the date the stipulation was to take effect. The 
stipulation provided that the decree be amended to provide that 
instead of the appellant receiving nine hundred dollars ($900.00) 
per month child support and nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per 
month alimony, the appellant should receive five hundred dollars 
($500.00) per month, per child for a total child support obligation 
of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00) per month.(T8,2) With 
regard to alimony, the stipulation provided that it be cut immedi-
ately from nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per month to five hundred 
dollars ($500.00) per month, and be eliminated entirely in July, 
1986. The net effect of the stipulation was to increase total 
support two hundred dollars ($200.00) per month for two years and 
to decrease it three hundred dollars ($300.00) per month in 1986 
and thereafter, a net loss to appellant. 
The appellant obtained the services of present counsel and 
after some delay, a copy of the file was obtained. Appellants 
present counsel wrote to respondants counsel requesting delivery of 
formerly requested, but as yet unsupplied documents on the 30th day 
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of November, 1984. This letter called upon respondants counsel to 
make a motion to enforce the stipulation if he was going to. (A 
copy of the letter is attached hereto as part of the addendum as 
Appendix "A".) 
Respondants counsel made a motion to enforce the stipula-
tion of June 5thf 1984, as dispositive of all issues on 14th of 
February, 1985. A hearing was held on April 15th, 1985, at which 
time the appellant objected to the motion. 
Having heard proffers of evidence, Judge James S. Sawaya 
granted respondants motion and signed an order dated May 1st, 1985, 
disposing of, and terminating all issues raised in both the 
petition and counterpetition. Said order adopted the terms of the 
June 5th stipulation. 
It is from that decision and written order of the district 
court the appellant appeals. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court has authority to hear this case. Section 9, Article 
VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah; Section 78-2-2, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amnd) ; Rule 72A, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
There is no Utah Statute on point. Utah Case Law on point is 
summarized in Madsen v. Madsen, 276 P.2d 917, 2 Utah 2d. 423, 
(Utah 1954); Klien v. Klien, 544 P.2d 472, (Utah 1975); First 
Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, (Utah 
1979); and Higley v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, (Utah 1984). 
These Utah cases provide that a person should not be bound to a 
previous settlement agreement or stipulation "if there is any 
justification in law or equity for avoiding or repudiating it, if 
timely made." Klein. [Emphasis Added] In First Denver, the court 
said a stipulation can be set aside "if entered into inadvertantly 
or for justifiable cause." In Higley the court recited a "well 
settled rule" that stipulations are typically conclusive and 
binding "unless upon timely notice, and for good cause shown relief 
is granted therefrom". Certainly the court is not bound by the 
stipulation of the parties in a domestic matter, and can make such 
adjustments as are fair and equitable. Madsen. 
The appellants argument in summary is that the overwhelming 
weight of the credible testimony at the time of hearing was that 
she felt emotionally ambushed on June 5th, 1984, the date the 
stipulation was recorded. If ever there were a set of circum-
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stances that constituted "good cause" under Higley "inadvertance or 
justifiable" cause under First Denver or "any justification in law 
or equity" under Kleiny those circumstances outlined in the 
appellants statement of facts above do. 
The appellant was timely within her power to be timely. The 
respondant knewf or should have known within sixty (60) days of the 
deposition date when the written stipulation did not come back 
signed, that there were problems. Instead, he sent the two 
thousand dollar ($2,000.00) stipulation amount instead of the 
eighteen hundred dollar ($1,800.00) decree amount from July, 1984 
on, ignoring the delays, the withdrawal of his opponents counsel, 
the entry of new counsel, and request for continued discovery, and 
a request for a motion to enforce if there was going to be one.(Ad-
dendum, Appendix "A") The respondant did not reasonably rely on 
the stipulation to his detriment. He continued to send the extra 
two hundred dollars ($200.00) per month despite actual or construc-
tive notice, because it was easy for him to pay, and might provide 
him an estopple argument later.(T12,1) 
The appellant inadvertantly, by mistake, inappropriately, 
through acquiesence in the face of authority figures, and time 
pressure, has gotten caught in the terms of a fundamentally unfair 
stipulation. This was the clear, uncontroverted evidence at the 
time of hearing. The court below, either had too restrictive a 
view of the law on setting aside stipulations, or misunderstood the 
weight of the evidence. 
The appellant should have been relieved from the stipula-
13 
tion instead of having it enforced against her. 
ARGUMENT 
Carol Brownf the plaintiff and appellant, waited three years 
from the date of the decree of divorce to file a petition to 
modify. In those three years, her former husbands income shot up 
dramatically from approximately sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.00) 
per year to over one hundred thousand dollars($100,000.00) per 
year.(T12, 22) Her older children were becomming more expensive, 
and yet the youngest was not yet in school. She would have filed a 
petition to modify earlier, but by stipulation she agreed to wait 
at least 36 months. When she first approached her lawyer she told 
him what she expected discovery would show her ex husbands income 
to be. Both she and her counsel were encouraged by the respondants 
answers to interrogatories and requests for production of documents 
concerninq his income. The appellant was not concerned about the 
respondant filing a counterpetition for reduction of alimony. Her 
previous award was without condition or limitation, and her former 
husbands income had roughly doubled. She did not fear a counter 
petition requesting a change in visitation. She assumed the court 
would hear both sides of the visitation issue at trial and make a 
fair decision. 
It took from February, 1983 to spring of 1984, and more 
than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) in legal fees to get to the 
point where trial was set for August of 1984. As the trial date 
approached, the settlement negotiations began in earnest. To the 
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best of the appellants knowledge, the parties were never close to 
settlement. 
Although a trial date was set in August, 1984, the respondant 
wanted to take the appellants deposition in June, and scheduled a 
deposition for June 5, 1984. 
As respondants counsel mentioned at the time of hearing, 
he exchanged letters with appellants counsel concerning a possible 
stipulation in May, 1984. (T16,1) The uncontradicted proffer of 
testimony at the time of hearing was that the appellant never 
understood, from anything her lawyer said or did, that she would be 
asked to enter into a stipulation at the time of the scheduled 
deposition. The uncontradicted testimony further was that the 
appellant had no knowledge from any source, that she would be asked 
to stipulate or what the terms of the stipulation might be until 
the deposition date, the day she was confronted with it. 
The further uncontradicted proffered testimony of the appellant 
was that she and her counsel had never come close to embracing the 
terms of the June 5th stipulation in thier prior discussions. In 
fact, the proffered testimony was that she and her counsel had 
rejected similar proposals as unfair and as less than they should 
expect as an outcome at trial. 
Judge Sawaya indicates in his written notice to counsel 
of his decision on the motion to enforce that 
"...it would appear that in spite of the plaintiffs protesta-
tions, the settlement agreement was fully negotiated between 
the parties and counsel... and that all parties and counsel 
agreed to its terms". (File page 190, Addendum Appendix "B") 
The only evidence given at the time of hearing on these points 
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was the appellants testimony, which was absolutely contrary to the 
Judges finding. The appellants testimoney was that she had never 
heard the terms of the stipulation until the day of the deposition, 
and did not know she would be asked to enter into such an agreement 
until that day. Judge Sawaya's finding that "all parties and 
counsel consented to the terms" is completely baffling. The 
appellant never said a word when the court reporter took down the 
purported agreement. (T8,2) Bert Dart is recorded as speaking as 
attorney for defendant, Dr. Jerome Brown, the defendant-respondant, 
is recorded as speaking. Paul Laipis is recorded as speaking as 
counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, but no where did the appellant 
agree, consent, or say anything. This was pointed out to the court 
when the motion to enforce was argued.(T8,2) 
At the time of hearing, respondants counsel proffered testimony 
that he counsel would have given if called to testify. On the 
other hand, appellants counsel proffered the testimony appellant 
would have testified to. The testimony of Carol Brown and Bert 
Dart crossed, but it did not collide. Respondants counsel's 
testimony concerns his dealings with appellants then counsel, Paul 
Laipis. The appellants testimony concerns her dealings with Paul 
Liapis. The respondants counsel's perceptions of what had gone on 
were obviously different than the appellants. Neither knew 
the impressions appellants then counsel was giving the other. 
It would have been very unlikely that appellants proffer, and 
respondants proffer given at the time of hearing would contradict 
each other. Neither was privy to the communications the other had 
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with Paul Laipisf appellants former counsel. Hence, the proffers 
do not contradict one another, but rather explain two different 
perceptions of the same events. Hence, the assertion that Carol 
Browns testimony is uncontradicted and should be believed. There 
is not one reason to believe that it is not a completely accurate 
account of her perception of what happened. Mr. Darts testimony is 
worthy of the same belief. 
To be relieved of the binding effect of the settlement agree-
ment, the appellant must demonstrate "good cause" or "any justifi-
cation in law or equity" Klein, for so relieving her, and needs 
to have been timely in bringing up the issue to prevent a claim of 
reasonable reliance to the detriment of the respondant. 
Of the three cases cited earlier in the Summary of Argument 
section above, only Klein is a domestic case. In domestic cases, 
the district court has wide discretion, and the broadest equitable 
powers. In Klein the test imposed on those who would repudiate a 
stipulation is stated. It is stated in forgiving terms. The Klein 
requirement is only that "any justification in law or equity 
be shown". There are cases reported in a number of other states 
concerning when a party can be relieved from a stipulation pre-
viously entered into, whether in writing or in open court. 
Baird v. Baird, 494 P2d. 1387, (Wash 1972)? Cartwright v. Atlas 
Chemical Industries Inc., 593 P.2d 104, (Oakla 1978); Call 
v. Marker, 403 P.2d 588, (Idaho 1965); Harsh Building Company 
v. Bialac, 529 P.2d 1185, (Ariz 1975); Runyon v. City of Neosho 
Rapids, 585 P.2d 1069, (Kansas 1978); and Thompson v. Turner, 558 
17 
P.2d 1071, (Idaho 1977). 
These cases, although on point, are no better at articulating 
what is a good enough reason to set aside a stipulation, than are 
the Utah cases. They all allow a party to be relieved from a 
previous stipulation if there is a good reason, and if the question 
of repudiation arises early enough. 
A petition to modify a decree of divorce is essentially the 
reopening and reconsideration of a divorce, based on new materially 
and substantially changed facts. Although there are contitutional 
provisions, statutes and case law involved, the district court, 
hearing a petition to modify a divorce decree, sits for the most 
part as a court of equity. 
The appellant deserves an equitable outcome to her petition, 
both as to substance and procedure. So does the respondant. 
Although the appellant believes the terms of the stipulation are a 
very bad deal for her, and although your author agrees, the equit-
able question to be decided is not concerning the substance of the 
stipulation. It is simply whether or not, under these specific 
circumstances, the appellant can be relieved from the depositive 
and binding effect of it. 
Judge Sawaya asked of appellants counsel at the time of hearing 
"Did she feel intimidated to the point she 
felt she could not object at that time?"(T9,25) 
Appellants counsel responded 
"I believe she did."(T10,2) 
It is difficult to argue from the known facts exactly how 
disappointed, dismayed, confused, and abandoned the appellant felt 
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while sitting in opposing counsels office June 5th, 1984, waiting 
for a scheduled deposition. What she should have done was tell her 
then counsel she absolutely would not agree, and get up and leave. 
But because of the time invested, the trust relationship developed 
with counsel, the money spent, the authority figure counsel repre-
sented to her, and the obligation she felt to stay and complete a 
scheduled deposition, she stayed. 
She was afraid of the deposition itself, and especially afraid 
to go through it with counsel who obviously did not want to go 
forward. She caved in. She failed to say no. She silently let a 
stipulation be read into the record. 
Clearly, under the circumstances, the appellant meets the Klein 
test of "any justification in law or equity" for setting aside 
stipulations in domestic cases. 
With regard to timeliness, one only need look at the sequence 
of events, to see that that the appellant was timely within her 
powar to be timely, and that the respondant did not reasonably 
rely on the stipulation. Even if he did reasonably rely on the 
stipulation, it was to his benefit, not detriment. 
The stipulation recorded at the scheduled deposition was on 
June 5th, 1984. Shortly thereafter respondants counsel sent a 
written version of the stipulation to appellants then counsel for 
signature. On July 5th, 1984, one month later, the respondant knew 
the stipulation had not been signed and returned. The respondant, 
however, hoped the terms of the stipulation were in effect, and 
sent the appellant two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) instead of 
19 
eiqhteen hundred dollars ($1,800.00) as support. On August 
5th, two months later, respondant still knew the written stipula-
tion was unsigned. His counsel was contacting Paul Laipis concern-
ing it. Respondant, again hoping the stipulation was in effect, 
chose to send the extra two hundred dollars ($200.00). On Septem-
ber 5th, three months since the stipulation was recorded, both the 
respondant and his counsel knew the proposed stipulation was 
unsigned and unreturned. Both should have been concerned. The 
respondant again chose to send the extra two hundred dollars 
($200.00). On October 5th, four months later, the written stipula-
tion was unsigned and unreturned. There should have been serious 
concern on the part of respondant and his counsel. Respondant 
again chose to send the extra two hundred dollars ($200.00). On 
November 7th, 1984, five months later, appellants then counsel 
withdrew as her counsel, sending notice to the respondant. The 
written stipulation had been neither signed nor returned. The 
respondant and his counsel knew or should have known the written 
stipulation would not be signed. The respondant again chose to 
send the extra two hundred dollars ($200.00) in November of 1984. 
On November 30th, 1984, appellants present counsel wrote respon-
dants counsel and asked for items of discovery owed, but undeli-
vered. That letter requested the respondant make a motion to 
enforce the stipulation if one was going to be made. The letter of 
November 30th, 1984 notified the respondant that the appellant did 
not intend to be bound by the stipulation. Again, in December, 
1984, the respondant chose to send two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) 
20 
instead of eighteen hundred dollars ($1,800.00). 
The respondants motion to enforce the terms of the stipulation 
was not heard until April 15th, 1985. In the months of January, 
February, March and April of 1985, the respondant again chose to 
send the extra two hundred dollars ($200.00) each of those months. 
The respondant agrued at the time of hearing on April 15th, 
1985, that he had reasonably relied to his detriment, that the 
stipulation would be signed, and that he had expended eighteen 
hundred ($1,800.00) (nine months at two hundred dollars per month) 
in reliance upon the stipulation.(T16,25) 
Obviously, the respondant wanted to rely on the stipulation, 
w_ante<3 to send and have recieved the extra two hundred dollars 
($200.00) per month, and conciously chose to ignore all indications 
that there would be a dispute about it. It was to the respondants 
great benefit not detriment to send the money each month. The 
terms of the stipulation were most favorable to him, and acceptance 
of the money each month by the appellant might provide him an 
estopple agrument later. 
Of course, the appellant kept the money sent each month. 
Her only source of income was the support. If she had not needed 
more, she would not have petitioned to modify. 
The appellant did all she could, and as soon as she could, 
assuming as she did, that she should work through counsel to 
examine the proposed written stipulation, and to noify the other 
side she would not accept. The respondant, on the other hand, sent 
the extra money each month, without regard to the notice sent him 
21 
actual constructive or implied. It is reasonable to believe he 
did so because of the potential benefit to him. He did not rely on 
the stipulation, but rather hoped it would be accepted. If he did 
rely, it was not reasonable reliance in the face of the notice he 
had recieved. If he did reasonably rely, it was to his benefit, 
not detriment. 
22 
CONCLUSION 
An unusual set of circumstances led to the recording of a 
stipulation in the office of respondants counsel on June 5th, 
1984. For all of the reasons outlined above, the appellant was 
unprepared to enter into a stipulation that day. Those unusual 
circumstances, which led to her being surprised and overwhelmed on 
June 5th, effectively kept her from being able to communicate 
effectively with her lawyer, and from having sufficient time to 
make an informed, prudent decision. 
Any of the unusual circumstances outlined above, if taken 
alone, meet the "any justification in law or equity" [Emphasis 
Added] of the Klein case. When taken in combination, we believe 
they meet the "aood cause" test of any common law case on point 
which the court may choose to apply. Appellant was as timely as 
she could be, and the respondant clearly did not reasonably rely to 
his detriment. 
Both the appellant and respondant were cut off just short of 
trial, with virtually all discovery completed. The decision of the 
lower court should be reversed, as an error of law, misapplication 
of the law, or as a decision not supported by the preponderance of 
the credible evidence. The matter should be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of August, 1985. 
AW6?** 
David A. McPhie, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hererby certify that I hand delivered two copies of the 
foregoing Brief to attorney for respondant, Bert L. Dart, at his 
office located at 310 South Main Street, Suite #1330, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on this 20th day of August, 1985. 
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>*ov*mher ^ 0 , 19R4 
Bert L. Dart 
10 Broadway Bldg . §4^0 
S a l t Lake C i t y , OT M i l l 
Re? Brown v s . Brown - P e t i t i o n t o 
Mol i fy C i v i l Ho. D79-130*! 
Dear B e r t : 
Mrs. Brown h*s contacts m*
 9 anl retained m«> for puroose* 
of representing her in this iriatter. She has recieved your Notice 
to Appoint Counsel, and you'll find enclosed with this letter 
a copy of my Bntry of Apo^srance. 
T have been informed that you're anxious to set a hearing, 
at which tiiie the deposition taken on June 5th will be argued 
by you to be a binding stipulation. Please send me your motion 
and notice of hearing thereon, *nd we will gladly appear. 
f have noticed in going over nam* of the docu*!t»nts suoplied 
by Mr. Liaois that we do not have Dr. Brown's l<»m tjx return 
which was requested by Mr. Liaois prior to withdrawing. Please 
send me copies of that tax return at your earliest convenience. 
T can see that a substantial amount of discovery has already 
b*en don* in thif? case, and T will not attempt to do any new 
discovery that T don't feel is absolutely necessary. T know 
that your client must b* anxious to resolve this matter now, 
T know mine is. Tf T discover an area in which T think further 
discovery is necessary, I hope to be able to contact you 
informally and obtain the information without formal discovery 
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^ot 3 t r i a l «5**tting in t h i s m a t t e r . 
V*ry t r u l v y o u r s , 
n,ivia * . *fr??hip 
DAM:k^ 
cot Cntol ^rown 
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Plaintiff, 
vs 
BRYANT JEROME BROWN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. D 79-3802 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
OAVID A. McPHIE, Attorney at Law, Affleck and McPhie, 
14 7 North Second West, Salt Lake City, Utan 
appearing on behalf cf tne plaintiff. 
SEPT L. DART, Attorney at Law, 313 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
appearing on behalf cf the defendant. 
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Proceedings cefore the Honorable 
Judge Janes S. Sawaya 
on Aonl 15 , 1985 
CATHY GALLEGOS 
Official Court Reporter 
License No. 177 
240 East 400 South 
Room A-5 3 3 Courts Building 
Salt LaKe City, Utah 3 4111 
Appendix "C" 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on this the 15th day of 
April, 1935, the above-entitled and numbered cause came on 
for hearing before said Honorable Court, Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, Judge presiding, in Salt Lake City, Utah, County of 
Salt Lake, whereupon the following proceedings were had, 
to wit: 
w w »» -»_ w • 
Brown ver 
rnynr 
J. u u 
sus 
order approvi 
Mr. Dart, you 
MR. 
representing 
Court had 
in supper 
plaintiff 
reported. 
an 
COURT: 
Bryant 
ng and 
appear 
DART: 
the def 
Back to number one, Carol A.nn Barker 
Jerome Brown, defendant's motion for 
enforcing a settlement agreement. 
for the defendant? 
This is the defendant's motion. I am 
endant and making the motion. Has the 
opportunity to read the motion and affidavit 
t thereof? 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
DART: 
COURT: 
I have to confess I haven't. 
I will lay out the facts very quickly. 
David McPhie appears for the 
, and do you want this reported, counsel? 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
DART: 
McPHIE 
DART: 
I don't think a record is necessary. 
It may be necessary to have it 
Your Honor, the facts are that Mr. and 
Mrs. Brown were formerly married to each other and were 
divorced under the t erms of the decree of divorte, which 
2 
gave to Mrs. Brown custody of three children, provided her 
support, alimony and visitation rights. And in February of 
'33, over two years ago, Paul Liaois representing her, 
filed a modification asking for an increase in alimony and 
child support. On behalf of Mr. Brown, I filed a counter-
petition asking for an elimination of alimony and for 
modification of visitation rights. Through a year and 
quarter's time frame, we engaged in substantial discovery 
in the form of interrogatories, interrogatory answers. I 
had noticed the deposition of the plaintiff on the 5th of 
June and Paul Liaois had filed a request for trial setting. 
We were dealing against I think an August 12 trial date last 
summer. Mr. Liapis and I exchanged letters on that 
settlement. There were several letters that came back and 
forth. On the day before the deposition, which was set for 
June 5th, Paul called me and said, "We are settled. Why 
don't we utilize the deposition time to make an agreement* 
That agreement will then be put into a written form to 
conform with an order." On the 5th of June the court 
reporter, all parties being present, related that we were 
there to set down the agreement that we had reached and did 
so. The agreement effectively put a terminus point on 
alimony. However, it also reduced alimony, however, 
increased support. Instead of paying eighteen hundred 
dollars a month, nine hundred dollars alimony and nine 
3 
hundred dollars support, the doctor's obligation, defendant's 
obligation would be increased to a two thousand dollar 
figure, two hundred dollars a month increase by stepping 
up child support five hundred for a total of fifteen 
hundred in the form of support, five hundred for alimony. 
There is also a comprehensive agreement with 
regards to visitation, what circumstances, holidays. I 
prepared a stipulation based upon that transcript. There's 
no question what the stipulation accurately reflected the 
agreement of the parties. I sent it to Paul Liapis. We 
had some problems in September I talked to him about. The 
stipulation was not signed. He said he would get it signed. 
He sent a letter to his client at that time. In the mean-
time in July it took effect. He started making the 
increased payments of two hundred dollars a month, now, 
ten months paid of two hundred more a month, a total of 
two thousand dollars more than he's paid above what the 
original order was based upon the stipulation, which amounts 
have been received by the plaintiff without objection. 
In addition, the trial date for August was 
stricken. I think the Court would find a letter from myself 
indicating the case nad been settled. In November, I wrote 
to Paul again saying, ,fI need a stipulation so we can close 
this file out." Next thing I received from Paul Liapis was 
a withdrawal. Then the next thing I received was 
4 
communication from Mr, McPhie indicating that he was 1 
representing the plaintiff in this action and he wanted to | 
continue with discovery, and I inferred from that he did j 
not ax: that time—the plaintiff did not at that time acceot < 
j 
• the stipulation. We were five months from the dav we sat ! 
i 
i 
down and agreed, three or four months from the date that a 
written stipulation had been presented, with no objection 
being made, no indication that the stipulation wasn't 
acceptable, with summer visitation based upon the stipula- | 
tion and with the payments, as I say, having been made by 
Mr. Brown having the effect of the two thousand dollar 
increase in the amount paid over what he was ordered to 1 
under the original order, but also a reduction in the amount 
that constituted alimonv. So for this oast ten months, he's 
1 been caving three hundred dollars a month less alimonv that 
he cannot take as a deduction for his taxes. The short and 1 
tall of it is the agreement is not—does not claim to be 
unconscionable, does not claim to be contrary to what was 
discussed and oresented in the presence of the olaintiff. 
I There's only the claim that she doesn't want to at this 
time. Her conduct, sitting on it the last ten months, 
accepting the benefits of it, should be basis for estoppel. 
She should be bound by it. The Court should enter an order. 
j THE COURT: Mr. McPhie. 
MR. McPHIE: Thank you. Mr. Dart's representations 
5 
of the facts essentially are accurate. As far as his 
recitation of facts went, this was commenced a couple years 
ago. There has been extensive discovery. Mr. Liapis did 
formerly represent Mrs. Brown. There was a trial date set 
in the summer of '34, I believe. And prior to that, there 
were in the spring of '84 negotiations for settlement; 
offers being sent back and forth. There was a deposition 
for Mrs. Brown scheduled by Mr. Dart and I have no reason 
to disbelieve Mr. Dart's assertion that Mr. Liapis called 
him prior to the day the deposition was set for, which was 
June 5 of '84, indicating chat he believed there was a 
settlement and that Mr. Dart expected that when Mr. Liapis 
and his client came to that deposition, they would be 
stipulating. That's where the facts diverge, however. Mrs 
Brown would testify—she has an affidavit m the file to 
the effect that aitnough they were discussing settlement 
offers being made by xr. Dart and they were responding to 
them with counteroffers and they were going back and forth, 
she was always being assured by Mr. Liapis that the things 
that she had asked for in her original petition in the way 
of increases in support were justified. This was the basis 
for her retaining him at the outset and that was her 
position throughout, including the spring of '84 when they 
were discussing the possible settlements that were being 
discussed back and forth. 
6 
Her further testimony would be that on the actual 
day of the deposition, June 5th, f34, at his office, being 
Mr. Dart's office, Mrs. Brown learned for the first time 
that her former counsel essentially no longer believed chat 
she would come out as he had led her to believe throughout 
the entire period, that: he not only had received the 
settlement offers from Mr. Dart but that he believed that 
she should accept them. This is the—I suppose the 
disconcerting item to her is it was that day that she first 
learned or came to understand that he not only was reciting 
to her what: they were offering. He had changed his 
position and felt that she should accept it and she did noi; 
understand that until up to that time and was very dismayed 
about: it, felt that she was being pur in the position of 
"If you agree to this, you can avoid having your deposition 
taken." 
Now, you and 1 would not fear having our deposition 
taken. Mrs. Brown had not, I believe, had her deposition 
ever taken before, was afraid of it, did not understand what 
it exactly entailed, apparently, and in the face of having 
spent a lot of time with Mr. Liapis, acquiescing somewhat 
in the face of authority figure to her, being very dismayed, 
being very confused, not knowing what to do, then proceeded 
into a room where this deposition was reported. It is ten 
pages in length. I have read it carefully. Mr. Dart 
7 
speaks on the record. The defendant, Mr. Brown, speaks on 
the record. Paul Liapis speaks on the record. Never does 
Carol Brown, my client, speak on the record. Her testimony 
would be that she did not understand the agreement. She 
wasn't in agreement with it. She felt bushwhacked and 
ambushed on the day of the deposition. She, for the first 
time, had her attorney advising her that she had to do it 
under the pain of having her deposition taking, which she 
didn't understand and she was not in agreement with it and 
said nothing about it on the record. 
Mr. Dart argues that my client has taken the 
benefit of the two hundred dollar increase for ten months 
now and acquiesced and benefited from the stipulation while 
she seeks to get out of it. The facts surrounding chat are 
simply this: Mrs. Brown would testify that after having 
left Mr. Dart's office, it was her understanding that Mr. 
Liapis would be preparing a stipulation, turns cue that it 
was agreed that Mr. Dart would prepare it. Mr. Dart sen: a 
written stipulation, which I have also read and which does 
fairly reflect that which was taken down an the deposition, 
to Mr. Liapis and asked him to have his client sign itQ 
Mrs. Brown was not contacted by Mr. Liapis until two ana a 
half months after the deposition—was the first time she ^as 
ever notified that he had produced a written document of 
what ourported to be the stipulation and that she was to 
8 
sign it. 
he sent h 
read and 
When she got 
er a letter wi 
was di 
i an appointment 
testimony would 
.smayed t 
to see M 
I further 
notice that 
th the copy 
o see what ; 
he had 
which 
Lt said 
it, 
she 
and 
r. Liapis to discuss i 
be for the first time 
it was because 
immediately 
tried to make 
t. Her 
she tried to 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
j 
6 I get in to discuss in she was told she wouldn't get an 
i appointment for three weeks. The next time she went—she 
8 went to go to the appointment three weeks later, she was 
9 told when she got there that they had been trying to get 
10 ahold of her not to come because Mr. Liapis was out of town. 
11 J There was approximately another month or more delays in 
12 getting together with Mr. Liapis. So you are now three and 
13 I a half months from the deposition date when she finally got 
14 I to him with a written copy and discussed it and said she 
15 felt the terms were very unfair and unreasonable. I will 
16 indicate to the Court in a moment what the terms are—is 
17 J when the dispute arose between them. She would not sign. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
He did not want to continue to represent her. 
THE COURT: Wasn't she present when the terms of 
the stipulation were stated for the record? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
why not? Did 
McPHIE: She was. 
COURT: Did she recant or object at that tLme'^  
McPHIE: She said nothing. 
COURT: Well, I suppose what we ought to do-
she feel intimidated to the point she felt 
9 
sae could not object at that time? 
MR. McPHIE: I believe she did. Then is when 
Mr. Liapis withdrew as counsel and that was the first 
notice that Mr. Dart had really that the stipulation would 
never be signed, but you are now talking four months since 
the stipulation was entered into on the record, and in 
fairness to Mr. Dart, he didn't knew for four months. He 
knew—I should say he had reason to suspect when he didn't 
get a signed stipulation from counsel. Since that time it 
is true she's taken the additional two hundred dollars and 
frankly she's asked if she should continue to take that, 
and that's eighteen hundred dollars moved up to two thousand 
dollars, and she may have been advised to hang on to that 
money because the result of this was not yet clear. Vie 
filed a request for additional discovery. Coviously, Mr. 
Dart then discovered that certainly we were not intending 
to sign the stipulation and he mace this motion to confirm 
the stipulation which was previously taken on June 5th, as 
per order of the Court. 
We seek now to avoid that, after two years time 
and many many thousands of dollars on both sides and being 
nearly ready for trial to simply try the case, and there's 
a case, Your Honor, cited by the Utah Supreme Court in 19 75-
Mr. Dart already has a copy and, in fact, may have a copy 
in the file alreadv because I believe Mr. Dart submitted 
10 
a copy of this case when it was argued before the 
Commissioner—it's a divorce case. The facts are not 
exactly the same but: the Supreme Court: of the State managed 
to articulate, in Kline, a number of points of law 
surrounding stipulations, especially in domestic cases. I 
think that some of the things that are pointed out in the 
! 
Kline case are the differences between stipulation of facts j 
and stipulations to outcome i 
essentially equitable in its 
n a domestic case, which is 
nature. The difference between 
jwhether you should let a person out of a stipulation in a 
| domestic matter based 
! who has relied on the 
distinctions in terms 
stipulation is fair. 
this work of domestic 
on reasonable reliance of the party 1 
stipula i tion and timeliness. It makes I 
of whether the Court thinks that a 
One of 
work, t 
stipulation in domestic cases 
{can enter different rulings. 
wants to take too little chil 
to have joint custody 
won't approve. 
Let me just 
a stipulation totally 
fact is stipulated to. 
of the 
address 
the things that I discover in 
he Court is not bound by the 
He can take them as advisory,1 
We see that where a wife 
d support or where parties want 
children and the Court simply 
those for a second. This is 
with regard to outcome, not a single 
There 
about the income of Dr. Brown 
whether it didn't increase. 
was no information in this 
, whether it did increase or 
With regard to him having relied 
11 
to his detriment, it is true he has paid according to the 
stipulation that was entered into ever since July of 1934, 
but he's known since some rime in the late fail of '84 that 
4 ! that was not accepted by Mrs. Brown, yet: he's chosen to 
I 
5 I continue it. Why? Well, he would like to be able to argue 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
day past conduct and in the course of dealing and it's an 
insignificant amount to Dr. Brown. It's eighteen hundred 
dollars moved up to two thousand dollars. Mr. Dart has 
explained the terms of the stipulation. Mr. Brown formerly 
had in the divorce decree nine hundred dollars alimony, 
nine hundred dollars child support. The stipulation provides 
that her alimony decrease immediately four hundred dollars 
and drop off completely to zero in another two years. But 
H i it does provide for an increase of two hundred dollars per 
i 
15 j child in child support. Child support goes up six and 
16 ! alimony goes down four, and she ends up with two hundred 
17 j dollars a month increase but in two years she ends up with 
18 J a four hundred dollars a month decrease. If that's a good 
! 
19 ! outcome for Mrs. Brown, in the face of the discovery that 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
was already in the file when the stipulation was taken or 
recorded, I don't know what a bad outcome would be. 
The documentary evidence is that Dr. Brown's 
income has gone somewhere between fifty and sixty thousand 
dollars at the time of the decree to up between ninety and 
a hundred thousand dollars at present. That's not including 
12 
money he pays into a pension and profit-sharing plan that « 
would kick it up over a hundred thousand dollars. If she j 
came out behind it wasn't a good deal. I don't think this ; 
is binding in the case of equity upon this Court. ! 
With regard to the argument that she wasn't j 
timely, it was four months before she could even get j 
I 
together with Mr. Liapis and find our what the stipulation ] 
that had been sent to her was. She knew as soon as he with- i 
drew, which was as soon as she could talk to him, that she I 
didn't want to be bound by that, that she didn't agree to j 
it. She thought she had been bushwhacked and if they sent I 
the money, additional monies, the Kline case clearly states | 
it is within the discretion of the Court to relieve either J 
of the parties of a domestic matter where just cause exists. I 
I don't think he's relied to his detriment, certainly an j 
adjustment can be made at the time of rrial. Ir's nor hard j 
to make an adjustment if this case is tried rhar will make j 
up to the two hundred dollars a monrh he has senr by simply \ 
reducing ir, will reduce in his favor. We think he will be j 
I 
! 
obligated to pay more. She was timely within her power to j 
be timely. I think that it's unfair because if in the face j 
of a massive increase by Dr. Brown gives her less money 
overall, that's the reverse of what she went to counsel for, | 
not a good deal for her, not fundamentally fair. 
What it boils down to in my opinion is whether or | 
13 
not in a domestic case where the parties are getting 
together for the purpose of stipulating to outcome, where 
this woman is going to get stuck with an agreement ore-made 
between her attorney which she never understood or agreed 
to, now, you can say she was there and she heard. All I 
can say to you is having had many divorce clients try to 
recite back to me what they just agreed to in domestic 
matters and not having them even come close, I can tell you 
that it is very easy to misunderstand for a layman. It is 
very easy to misunderstand your attorney telling you what 
proposed offer and what your own attorney tells you what he 
thinks you should accept. She didn't understand when you ar 
in a case where a great deal of discovery has been done, 
there is almost nothing left to do and she simply should 
have the trial on the merits at this point. 
As a back-up position, let me argue this. The 
stipulation should have some value but it shouldn't have the 
value of her being held to it right now. Let them put it 
on at the time of trial, the evidence of what she was 
willing to agree to on July 5, but if that is taken along 
with the evidence that I would be able to present about 
Dr. Brown's income and if the Court takes the stipulation 
for what it is worth in comparison with all the other evi-
dence, I am not afraid of the outcome. But to simply order 
that she is stuck with that, under the circumstances, I thir 
14 
if 
we have shown some just cause and/the Supreme Court said 
she could be believed from that, I think it simply is 
setting us up to have another petition to modify and putting 
her off for another period of time so that she can come 
5 back and claim some change of circumstances. We are too 
i 
6 J close to -he final outcome to waste everything that's been 
7 done because of what was said in the stipulation. 
8 MR- DART: Very briefly, it needs to be kept in 
9 mind that the settlement was reached in circumstances where 
10 there was an August trial date, where there was a petition 
11 for termination of alimony at that time, where the plaintiff i 
12 | in this action has a college degree, had a teaching 
13 ! certificate at one time, has a real estate license, where 
14 ! the children at the time of the divorce were from three to 
15 ! nine—by the time of the trial last August would be between 
16 
17 
fourteen and eight and that the exposure of termination of 
alimony while she was receiving counsel with Paul Liaois 
18 | baraained for a two-vear alimonv award and two hundred 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
dollars step up, she came into the deposition afraid of the 
deposition and for the first time, in her language, that 
it completely amazed and bedazzled her, that it wasn't 
until she got the stipulation two months later, she didn't 
understand until then- We wrote a letter to Mr. Liaois 
setting down all the issues and our position on all the 
issues. Mr. Liapis sent us a four-page reply letter dated 
15 
May 10 talking about termination of alimony and a time 
frame concerning alimony and support, visitation rights. 
A copy of that letter was sent to Carol Brown on the 10th 
of May. Then sent another letter on the 30th of May with 
some final adjustments. Those letters were in the file and 
apparently in the possession of the plaintiff before the 
time of this deposition. If she was surprised at the time 
of the deposition, I think she had a duty to respond a 
little quicker than she did. She knew what had been said. 
She could have contacted her attorney and let her know of 
her reservation by phone, letter or some manner. She never 
did do that. My last letter to Paul was the 2nd of 
November saying, "Where are we on the stipulation?" It was 
only after that that I received his withdrawal. The Kline 
case does indicate—Mr. McPhie is correct this is an ared 
where the Court has substantial discretion. It is within 
the Court's discretion to accept the stipulation and enforce 
it or set it aside. But in circumstances if this is not an 
unconscionable stipulation, there is a situation that is in 
the interest of justice that it be enforced unless there is 
a justification for avoiding it. As they say in the Kline 
case, if there's any justification in law or equity for 
avoiding or repudiating a stipulation and he timely does so. 
he's entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise not. We 
have ten months of receipt of benefit, five months with not 
16 
a word. We have had the loss of a trial date. Under the 
circumstances, there should be an estoppel. Thank you, 
THE COURT: Let me read this case. It is new to 
me. I will have you a ruling within a day or two. 
MR. DART: Thank you. 
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I, Catherine Gallegos, Official Court Reporter in 
and for the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing type-
written pages contain a full, true and correct transcription 
of my shorthand notes taken upon the occasion set forth in 
the caption hereof, as reduced to typewriting by rr.e or under 
mv direction. 
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MR. BERT L. DART. ESQ, 
21 | Dart, Acais- n, Parken ^ Proc: 
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S T I M U L A T I O N 
MR. DART: For the benefit of the record that 
we're staring, we have been discussing with both clients 
and both attorneys various settlement proposals that: have 
gone back and forth over the past month and a half, two and 
a half months, excuse me, and we now have reached a point 
where we have a settlement understanding that we're all desirous 
of having put down in writing. And to that end we're going 
to read it into the record, and then we'll obtain a transcript 
so that any confusion that might exist in the future can 
be clarified by that transcript and then there will be a 
formal written stipulation and a formal order drafted based 
upon the agreement we reached today. 
The stipulation would be that in connection 
with the currently pending petition for modification, that 
that petition will be resolved by amendments and agreements 
as follows: 
Number 1, the alimony award currently existing 
shall be modified to provide that Mrs. Brown, commencing 
with July of 1984, will have her alimony payment reduced 
from the current level of $900 to the sum of $500, and that 
that payment shall continue for a period of two years, at 
which time it will terminate. And that this payment of alimony 
shall be payable on or before the fifth day of each month. 
It's been expressed that there are difficulties 
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in 
if 
the house payment being paid, and as an accommodation, 
the doctor can make payment before the 5th, he is of an 
awareness 
moc 
by 
SOU 
of 
the 
of 
the 
on 
to 
that there is a desire that that be done. 
I think it also ought to be expressed that the ( 
ification of alimony is made on the contemplation that 
two years from now Mrs. Brown will have been able to have 
ight and obtained employment sufficient to allow a termination 
the alimony award. 
month 
$300 pe 
three 
The support will be modified commencing with 
of July to be increased from the current amount 
r child to the sum of $500 per child for each of 
children. Payments of support are due and payable 
or before the 5th, and the payment of support shall continue 
age 21, 
divorce as 
I t 
mar 
hink th 
ried or 
a mission 
twenty-one 
are 
any 
pai 
, they 
child 
on the same terms that existed in the decree of 
to the conditions of which payment would continue. 
ose were that the children be, unless they became 
emancipated or not continue with their school. 
DLL BROWN: It's eighteen unless they serve 
or go to college, aiid then it continues to age 
MR. DART: Whatever the terms of the decree 
will provide, except with the modification chat 
not living at home will have the payment of support 
d directly to the child after age eighteen. 
MR. LIAPIS: with the proviso that the Plaintiff 
n/\iu\iv.N S M L N D L I ^ W O O R O A N >i TH ACKER 
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will have the right for enforcement of collection if they are 
not paid directly to the child. 
MR. DART: The doctor also will agree to pay for 
orthodontia treatment which has been provided to this time 
by Dr. Gary Stephens, the outstanding bill at this time, and 
I think it also should be expressed that he will have to possibly 
make some arrangements to possibly make some installments, 
but I don't know what it is. 
That he, further, will be responsible so long 
as there is an obligation for support, to pay the children1s 
orthodontia and dentist expenses. He shall further be responsibi 
to continue to maintain the children on his health and accident 
insurance, which has a $100 deductible. Any expenses not describ 
or covered by insurance would be the responsibility of Mrs. 
Brown for her health and treatment. 
The doctor also will continue in force his current 
existing life insurance that has the children as beneficiaries, 
and that obligation will continue so long as there's an obligatio 
for support. He will also continue in force his currently-
existing life insurance on Mrs. Brown so long as he has an 
obligation for alimony. It's my understanding that the policy 
on this, it's a $50,000, and also the children's is a $50,000 
policy. 
MR. LIAPIS: Further, the doctor will pay against 
attorney's fees that have been incurred by Mrs. Brown in 
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this proceeding. The amount of these fees to the sum of $1,500. 
! When? l\ 
MR. DART: Within thirty days of billing. And 
I think that covers all of the financial items that we've discussed] 
If it doesn't, let me know. 
The agreement relating to continuation of health 
insurance should have, as part of it, the understanding that 
Mrs. Brown would have the obligation of providing to Dr. Brown 
the medical and dental and orthodontal bills within a reasonable 
time not to exceed thirty days of when they are received. Paul 
and I discussed this, assuming there is an item that has not 
been discussed and not mentioned here, and so it is an item 
of oversight, that either side would have the right to get 
an agreement on that or have the Court solve ic. | 
MR. LIAPIS: That's correct. 
MR. DART: The next item that has a financial 
component is that the original decree of divorce provided chat 
the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank, Olympus Branch, and Draper 
Bank accounts that were accounus for the children be transferred 
to Mrs. Brown. Dr. Brown thought that he had done that, and 
it's his recall that he had provided you with signature cards 
sufficient to do that and thought that that was an accomplished 
fact. If it is not an accomplished fact, he's willing to, 
of course, do that. 
The stipulation will be that Mrs. Brown will 
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provide to Dr. Brown the account numbers on each of the involved 
accounts and that Dr. Brown will take whatever steps are necessai 
to have his name removed from the accounts so that Mrs. Brown's 
name can be placed on the accounts. 
The next area is the area of Dr. Brown's rights 
of visitation, and the understanding and agreement relating 
to that visitation is that he will have reasonable rights of 
visitation with the minor children, and that his rights of 
visitation, in addition to anything we describe, will include 
anything that the parties can mutually agree upon. 
I put that in so that you're both aware that 
you're not locked into this if you both agree to something 
1 different. But beyond that, his rights of visitation would 
be to have, A, the children with him on alternate weekends 
with that visitation right being altered from its current full 
iweekend period to provide from Friday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
Two, the agreement is that Mrs. Brown will not 
schedule any activites for the children which will in any way 
conflict with Dr. Brown's visitation time without first consultir 
with Dr. 3rcwn, and in the event that the parties are not able 
to agree on such an activity being scheduled for Dr. Brown's 
visitation time, then either party would have the right to 
bring the matter before the Court for a determination. 
Upon scheduling activities occurring at Dr. 
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Brown's visitation time that 
is necessary to see that the 
he agrees that he will do whatever 
children participate in that 
1 activity. And another element of that, Mrs. Brown will provide 
reasonable advance notice of 
children are involved in, and 
any of the activities that the 
that there be at least some 
advance notice, as much as possible, of any of the activities j 
the children are participating in in which they are performing 
in a competitive activity or 
in front of an audience that 
Dr. Brown would 
on alternate holidays, and I 
decree of divorce. And when 
which come on the weekend he 
full weekend for three days, 
in which they are participating 
includes adults or other parents. 
have the right to have the children 
think that's scheduled in the 
those holidays are Monday holidays 
has visitation, he'd have the 
including Sunday. So he'll 
have visitation on those weekends would be from Friday at 
6:00 until Monday at 6:00 p.m. 
He would have the right to have the children 
each New Year and during the Christmas holiday commencing 
Christmas Day at 1:00 o'clock, that that visitation will 
continue through the remainder of the Christmas vacation 
unless there are less than five da3/s of Christmas vacation 
before Christmas, and in that event, then the time will have j 
to be worked out so that she 
the Christmas break. 
has at least five days during 
That in the summer he will have the right to 
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have them with him for a 
the month of July. That 
provide an 
month, and this year that will be 
while he is out of town he 
itinerary, and a reciprocal is that when 
Brown takes the children out of town, she will also 
an itinerary for Dr. Brown. 
town Mrs. 
That during the month of July while he 
Brown will have the right to contact the 
by phone and they will have the right to contact hei 
and she'11 
thac 
with 
time. 
will 
Mrs. 
provide 
is in 
children 
" by phone, 
be entitled to have one visit with them during 
The visitation each summer will be agr< 
Dr. Brown to notify 
of when he 
time 
that 
would like to 
you and he work out 
you at least sixty days in 
have the month, and at the 
an agreement as to one day 
Eied upon 
advance 
same 
during 
period chat you would have the right to have them. And 
the same understanding on the right to converse with them 
while they' 
need 
re in town by 
to provide you with 
telephone would exist and < =.lso the 
an itinerary would also exist. 
The understanding is that the parties will consult 
at least ninety days before the beginning of the summer of 
their anticipated schedules to make sure that there are no 
conflicts and to try and flex around potential conflicts 
that might exist. If there is a conflict, either party would 
have the right to ask the Court to resolve it if it gets 
to that point. 
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as 
And further, Dr. Brown would represent that 
soon as he knows when he might be going, even if it's 
five or six months in advance, he'll provide you with that 
notice. Also, if the children are going to be offered an | 
opp 
an 
let 
And 
to 
tho 
wit 
or 
in 
up, 
the 
ortunity to register for summer activity that requires 
early registration, you'll notify the doctor so he can 
you know whether that might conflict with his plans. 
again, the hope is there will be mutual accommodation. ! 
The next item is the doctor will have the right 
visit with the children frequently at times other than 
se outlined provided that the visitation does not conflict 
h important activities in which the children are involved. 
The next, Mrs. Brown will allow either Dr. Brown 
his present wife to pick up and return the children, but 
the event that it's the current Mrs. Brown picking them 
that she will honk for the children and drive away. If ! 
children do not come or she's notified when the children 
will be there within five minutes, then she'll have the right i 
to 
on 
go to the door and get that information. 
We'll provide, relative to the life insurance 
the children, that the three children will remain as 
beneficiaries on that policy so long as there's an obligation 
for 
for 
support of any child. As soon as there's no obligation 
support, then the obligation to maintain the policy will | 
terminate. 
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2 of the children are no longer supported, Mrs. Brown would 
3 have the right to notify Dr. Brown of her desire to elect 
4 that the policy have the names of the non-supported child 
5 removed from the policy so it enters the benefit of only 
6 the supported children. 
7 The doctor will provide evidence that both of 
8 his life insurance policies are currently in force. 
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C E 
STATE OF UTAH § 
i § 
j COUNTY OF SALT LAKE § 
I, Cecilee 
R T I F I C 
ss. 
Gruendell, 
I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
the State of Utah; that 
of the foregoing matter 
as such Rep 
A T E 
do hereby certify 
and Notary Public 
that 
in 
orter I attended the hearing 
, and thereat reported in stenotype 
all the statements and proceedings 
I caused to be transcribed my said 
had therein; that 
stenographic notes 
typewriting, and the foregoing pages numbered from 2 
thereafter 
into 
to 10 , 
inclusive, constitute a full, true, and correct report of 
the same. 
Dated at Salt Lake Ciuy, Utah, this 15th day 
of June, J 984. 
Cecilee Gruendell 
C.S.R. License No. 167 
My commission expires: 
March 10, 1986. 
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BAIRD ' 
Cite a^ \\ a&h A| 
of any material fact, cannot change his 
relationship to the coiporation and to 
appellants. The objection which appel-
lants may urge to respondent's position is 
not that respondent wrongfully assigned 
the lease to Ansonia, but that he now con-
tends that, because of such assignment, 
he is, from the date of the assignment, 
free from the obligation to pav rent 
The court held the assignor was obligated 
to pay rent up until the time he divested 
himself of the ownership of the assignee's 
stock. 
A uniquely comparable situation exists 
fiere. It is obvious the sole purpose oi 
Gregory's assignment to the corporation 
was to escape his personal responsibility 
and liability under the lease. This clearly 
is precluded under National Bank of Com-
merce v Dunn, sup}a. The onl> distin-
guishing feature would be the 55,000 pay-
ment provision. Since the assignment is 
noperatue so long as defendant (Iregorv 
•etains controlling interest in Gra> Build-
ing, Inc there is no occasion for the de-
fendant to pay the $5,000 pursuant to the 
ease provision. The fact that he paid 
.he $5 000 does not make the assignment 
operative 
fudgrnent is ievened md the case is re-
nanded to the trial court to enter judg-
ment in accordance with this opinion 
EVANS and GREEN, J J , concur 
O I *£Y HU«131R SYSTEM 
*> W i*h App 5<M 
Heipn R I3AIRD A p p H h n * 
v 
A lexander SAIRD, Respondent. 
No. 1067-1. 
Comt ot Vppoils of \V tshutifton. 
Div Mini 1, IMiu'l One 
M.ucli JO 107J. 
[Divorced wite moved to vacate decree 
is it pertained to division of property 
The "Miperor Lourt K ng ( ountv B [ 
vfeLean } , denied motion and piamt'tf ip-
\ BAIED Wabii J {N7 
>l> 494 P 2d l t ^ 7 
pealetl The Court of \ppeals. Callow, 1 , 
held that evidence supported tmding that 
stipulation concerning property had been 
entered into with understanding of parties 
Affirmed. 
1. Stipulations C»6, 7 
Stipulation is binding on parties if it is 
arrived at pursuant to rule requiring 
agreement between parties to be made and 
consented to m open court before court re-
portei and statute granting attorney au-
thority to bind his client by his agreement 
dul\ made, but providing that court should 
disregard stipulation unless it is made in 
open court or signed by part) against 
whom it is sought to be enforced or his at-
tornev RCWA 2.44.010. CR 2A. 
2. Appeal and Error G=»i25 
Onl> if fraud, mistake, misunderstan-
ding or lack or jurisdiction is shown will a 
judgment in consent be reviewed on ap-
peal. RCW \ 2 44 010, C R 2 \ 
3. Stipulations 0=^5 
With tespect to stipulation, function of 
trial court is to ascertain that parties and 
counsel understand it and to implement it 
RCW \ 2 44010, CR2A. 
4. Stipulations C=M3 
A trial court's decision that a stipula-
tion was entered into with understanding 
and agreement of parties will not be dis-
turbed where it is supported b\ evidence 
RCW \ 2 44 010 CR2A 
5. Stipulations C»I3 
\ trial court has discretion to relieve 
a party from a stipulation when it is 
shown that relief is nece^an. 'o pi event 
in justice and that granting of relict will 
not place adverse party at disadvantage bv 
having acted in reliance upon the stipula-
tion RCW \ 2 44 010 CR 2 \ 
6. Divorce C=249(2) 
\ stipulation disposing of propcrtv in 
t divorce case is subject to court ipproval. 
RCW \ 2 44010, CR 2 \ 
7. Oivorce 0249(2) 
Tni l courts approval or stipulation 
disposing ot propertv in divorce ca^e will 
Appendix 
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not be disturbed unless there is a clear and 
manifest abuse of discretion. RCWA 2.-
44.010; CR 2A. 
8. Stipulations C=>2I 
Evidence supported finding" that stipu-
lation concerning property had been en-
tered into with understanding of parties 
Stern, Gayton, Neubauer & Brucker, 
Robert E. Prince, Seattle, for appellant. 
K. David Lindner, Seattle, for respon-
dent. 
CALLOW, Judge. 
In October 1968, the plaintiff wife fiied 
suit for divorce and shortly thereafter the 
defendant husband filed an answer and 
counterclaim. There was a settlement con-
ference in April 1970, which did not culmi-
nate in a written agreement, ana the mat-
ter came on for trial in August 1970, with 
both parties represented by the counsel that 
had represented them since the commence-
ment of the action. Counsel informed the 
court that attempts had been made at set-
tlement without success, and fhe court in-
quired of the plaintiff if sne would hke ad-
ditional t*me to attempt settlement. She 
agreed 
Following a recess through the morning, 
counsel for plaintiff stated that an agree-
ment had been reached, and he called the 
plaintiff to the stand She testitied in part 
as follows 
Q Have the two of \cu, Mrs Baird, ar-
m e d at a diviston ot the property, 
both separate and community that is 
satisfactory to you' 
A I am sorry, I don't—still don't know 
what ,t is. I thought it was $80,000 
and now I see the figure is $66,000, 
and I just don't— 
0 Let me ask vou the question- Under 
the terms of the settlement that we 
have worked out is Mr Baird to re-
ceive the apartment house that s re-
ferred to as the F redenck \partment 
house? 
A Yes. 
Then followed Questions and answers 
concerning the agreements regarding the 
dwelling house, certain securities and pen-
sion rights Then plaintiff was asked-
O You want to receive from Mr. Baird 
$51,672 in cash, is that correct, with 
one exception, that from the $51,672 
Mr. Baird, in order to have some 
cash on hand, vvill give >ou a 6% 18-
month promissory note for $5,000 so 
that in effect rather than to get 
$51,672 in cash vou will receive ini-
tially $46,672 plus the $54)00 note, is 
that correct? 
A Yes. That's right. 
After questioning immaterial to this ap-
peal, the counsel further inquired. 
0 And the $51,672 and the $18,000 totals 
$69,672 and the one-half interest in 
the house when t is ^old would bring 
your share up virtually above 
$80,000 > 
\ Yes 
Q Now, Mr Baird s *o, is I ^a\, *e-
ceive the Fredenck \partment house 
and that vou would then execute to 
him a deed, quit claim vou to him 
vour interest in the apartment house5 
A Yes 
O And Mr Baird would receive the 
stocks and bonds that ire currenth 
held by the two of vou with a market 
value as of a da\ or so ago of 
$30,316* 
\ Uh-huh. 
Q So that his share, based on an evalua-
tion of the apartment of $42,000 net 
would bring his share also to $69 672 
plus one-half interest in the house' 
V Yes. 
This iS the essence of the recitation It 
reflects that the plamtitf understood the 
terms of the agreement. She retired from 
the stand without comment or objection. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
a Decree ot Divorce were entered on Au-
gust 28. 1970, with both counsel present 
BAIRD v BAIRD 
( ito i s Wash Apj> t91 V 2d H 
Wash 1389 
and with plaintiffs counsel acknowledging 
receipt ot copies on the documents 
\ motion to \acate the decree as it per 
tamed **o the division of properties was 
filed by newly renamed counsel beptember 
28, 1970 The plamttft claimed the stipula-
tion was a surprise and that she did not 
understand the proceedings 
Plaintiff claims as error the denial of 
the motion to vacate as it pertained to the 
property settlement and tailure to do sub-
stantial justice bv allowing the stipulation 
to stand as it pertains to propertv rights 
CR 2A regarding stipulations requires an 
agreement between parties to be made and 
consented fo in open court before a court 
reporter RCW 2 44 010 grants an attor-
ney authont> to bind his client bv his 
agreement dulv made but states in part, 
that the court shall disregard a stipulation 
unless it is made in open court or signed 
b> the party against whom the same is al-
leged or his attorne> 
[1 2] A stipulation a r m e d at in this 
manner is binding on the parties Cook v 
Venmgerhoiz 44 \\ ash 2d 612 269 P 2d 
824 1954) QnK it tranri. mistake, misun-
derstanding or lack of unsdiction is 
snown will a judgment bv consent pe j:e-
Washington Asphalt 
i Wash 2d 89 
appeal viewed on 
Co "v Harold Kaeser Co 
316 P2d 126 (1^57) 
[3] The tunction ot the tnai court is to 
ascertain that the oarties and counsel un-
derstand *"he stipulation Jones v Jones 23 
Wash 2d o57, 161 P 2d 8^0 (1945), and to 
implement that agreement 
[4] \ trial court s decision fhat a stipu-
lation was entered with the understanding 
and agreement of the partes will not be 
disturbed where it is supported b> the evi-
dence In Deer v Deer 29 Wash 2d 202 
186 P2d 610 ^947) >he court reviewed 
the record concerning in order denying 
modmcat on ot i propert\ settlement 
reached bv stipulation ind retused to inter-
fere with the trial courts decision that the 
stipulation wis understood by the parties 
Halvorsen v Halvorsen, 3 Wash App 827 
479 P2d lol (1^70) was concerned with 
whether a plaintiff wife w is mcntilly ca 
pable of making a knowing decision re-
garding pioperty rights The trial court 
was upheld in its finding that plaintiff had 
adequate representation and was cipable ot 
making a knowing decision Substantial 
evidence was in the record to support such 
a finding, and the party was bound by ner 
action 
[5] j \ trial court has discretion to re-_ 
he\e a party from a stipulation when it is 
shown that relief s necessary to prevent 
injustice and fhe granting of the reliet will 
not place the adverse party at i disadvan-
tage bv having acted in reliance iponjhe 
stipulation State v Wehinger 182 Wash 
JST47"P2d 35 (1935) Stevenson v Haz-
ard, 152 Wash 104, 277 P 450 (1927) 
In Schmidt v Schmidt, 40 Wis 2d 649 
162 N \ \ 2d 618 (1968), it was apparent 
t rom the record that the parties and their 
attorneys discussed at length with the trial 
ludge the value ot the property involved 
The rinding that the parties stipulated ind 
agreed on the value ot tne properties and 
the property settlement was upheld The 
court stated in part as tollows at o21 
Stipulations in divorce actions are in 
"he nature ot a contract rotations 
omitted] Knd oral stipulations made in 
ooen court during trial taken down by 
••he reporter and acted upon bv the par-
ties and the court ire valid and binding 
[citations omitted] The discretion ot 
the trial court to relieve parties trom 
stipulations when improvident or induced 
by traud misunderstanding or mistake 
or rendered inequitable by fhe dex elop 
ment ot a new situation is \ egil dis 
cretion to be exercised in the promotion 
ot justice ind equitv and here must be 
a platn case ot traud misunderstanding 
or mistake to ustitv re! et [citation 
omitted] 
[6 7] \ stipulation disposing ot proo 
ertv m a divorce case is subject to court 
ipproval Munroe v Munroe 27 Wish 2d 
^ 6 178 P2d 983 (1947) and such ipprov 
il ot i propertv division will not >e dis 
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turbed unless there is a clear and manifest 
abuse of discretion. Mayo v. Mayo, 75 
Wash.2d 36, 448 P.2d 926 < 1968); State ex 
rel. Gould v. Superior Court, 151 Wash. 
413, 276 P. 98 (1929); Lynn v. Lynn, 4 
Wash.App. 171, 480 P.2d 789 (1971); Re-
hak v. Rehak, 1 Wash.App. 963, 465 P.2d 
687 (1970). 
[8] The record reflects sufficient evi-
dence to support the finding that the stipu-
lation concerning the property was entered 
with the understanding of the parties. An 
examination of the record also discloses 
that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by initially and ultimately approving 
the disposition of the property. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
WILLIAMS and JAMES, J].f concur. 
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April 18, 1978. 
Rehearing Denied May 23, 1978. 
Certiorari Denied March 19. 1979. 
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Coadministrators of estate of worker 
who was fatally injured in explosion 
brought action against manufacturer of 
blasting caps alleging survival cause o( ac-
tion for benefit of estate seeking damages 
for pain and suffering and reimbursement 
of medical expenses and wrongful death 
action The District Court, Creek County, 
Charles S. Woodson, J , entered judgment 
in favor of coadministrators on jury verdict, 
and manufacturer appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Box, P J , held that (1) evidence 
was sufficient to establish prima facie case 
of manufacturer's product liability, (2) 
manufacturer failed to properly preserve 
objections that hypothetical questions asked 
by coadministrators contained facts not m 
evidence, (3) court did not abuse discretion 
in qualification of witnesses as experts in 
explosives and packaging; (4) statement of 
worker to attending physician concerning 
accident was properly admitted under res 
gestae exception to hearsay rule, (5) where 
pathologist testified concerning autopsy 
findings insofar as they bore upon life ex-
pectancy of worker, refusal to admit autop-
sy report was not error; (6) refusal to allow 
withdrawal of stipulation by manufacturer 
was not abuse of discretion. (7) award of 
$50,000 for nam and suffering was ^up-
ported by evidence and was not induced by 
bias or prejudice of jury; (8) award of 
$200,000 to widow for pecuniary losses and 
loss of services was not excessive; (9) evi-
dence was sufficient to establish that work-
er contributed money, aid and services of 
pecuniary value to daughters for purposes 
of supporting award to daughters, and (10) 
prejudgment interest was properly awarded 
on amounts recovered under survivorship 
and wrongful death causes of action. 
Affirmed. 
1. Explosives $=»12 
In order to establish onma facie case of 
manufacturer's products liability, plaintiffs 
must prove: (1) that product was cause of 
injury, (2) that defect existed in product at 
time it left possession and control of manu-
facturer, and (3) that defect made product 
unreasonably dangerous to user or his prop-
erty 
2. Explosives o=>l2 
In action against manufacturer of 
blasting caps for death of individual who 
allegedly dropped box of caps, evidence was 
sufficient to establish prima facie case of 
manufacturers products liability in that in-
ferences could be drawn that product as 
packaged made it unreasonably dangerous 
to user and product was cause of injury. 
3. Trial c»178 
In determining whether evidence is 
sufficient to establish prima facie case of 
manufacturer's product liability, evidence 
must be viewed in light most favoraDte to 
plaintiffs and all evidence tending to dero-
gate plaintiffs' position must be disregard-
ed. 
4. Products Liability o=>82 
Circumstantial evidence may be relied 
upon in manufacturer's product liability 
case. 
5. Trial o » 139.1(7) 
Motion for directed verdict should not 
be sustained unless there is entire absence 
of proof showing plaintiff's ngnt to recov-
ery-
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6. Explosives c=»12 
Where evidence of both sides in prod-
ucts liability action against manufacturer of 
blasting caps was conflicting, it was func-
tion of jury to determine rights and liabili-
ties of parties 
7. Appeal and Error <s» 1001(1) 
Where there was competent evidence 
which reasonably tended to support jury 
verdict against manufacturer of blasting 
caps in products liability action, verdict 
would not be disturoed on appeal 
8. Evidence c=» 553(4) 
Hypothetical questions must be based 
upon facts as to which there is such evi-
dence that jury might reasonably find that 
such facts are established. 
9. Evidence o=» 553(2) 
Only omission of material facts which 
are essential to formation of intelligent 
opinion on matter will be fatal to hypotheti-
cal question. 
10. Appeal and Error o=>231(6) 
To preserve eiror on appeal, opposing 
counsel must specifically ooject that hypo-
thetical question includes facts not m evi-
dence, or error, if anv, cannot be raised on 
appeal; such objection should point out the 
facts improperly mcluded or omitted. 
11. Appeal and Error c=>206(2) 
Objection that hypothetical question 
omitted material data cannot be raised for 
first time on appeal 
12. Appeal and Error c=> 231(6) 
Where manufacturer^ objections went 
to expertise ot four witnesses or were mere-
ly general objections, manufacturer failed 
to properly preserve objections that hypo-
thetical questions asked of witnesses con-
tained facts not in evidence in products 
liability action against manufacturer of 
blasting taps 
13. Evidence c=>546 
Question ol whether witness is suffi-
ciently qualified to testify as expert is pre-
liminary question fo be determined by trial 
court and qualification of witness is c\pert 
is matter addressed to sound duscrttion of 
the court 
14 Evidence G=>542 
As expert in field of chemical engineer-
ing, witness could properly give his opinion 
as to chemical reactions of three explosives 
contained Within blasting cap for purposes 
of products liability action against manu-
facturer of blasting cap 
15. Evidence s=»542 
Ruling that witness was unqualified to 
give opinion as to exact amount of impact 
necessary to cause detonation of blasting 
cap did not mean that witness, who was 
chemist familiar with explosives, could not 
express opinion that detonation could occur 
given sufficient quantity of impact. 
16. Evidence c=»536 
Where packaging engineers were suffi 
ciently qualified to testify regarding custom 
packaging, engineers could give opinion as 
to packaging of blasting caps, notwith-
standing that neither engineer had pack-
aged explosives 
17. Evidence o=*128 
Where worker was subjected to violent 
explosion which tore both his lower legs 
from his body as well as causing other 
severe injuries, worker was conscious at all 
times, was m severe pain and was within 
hours of his death, statement by worker to 
physician concerning accident vas sponta-
neous, not deliberative, and was provoked 
or influenced by Happening of accident so as 
to become a part thereof, thus, doctor s 
testimony concerning worker's statement 
was admissible under res gestae exception 
to nearsay rule 
18. E\idence o=> 123(1) 
Time span between event and declar-
ant s later expressions is simply element for 
consideration, but is not controlling, in de-
termining whether expressions are admissi-
ble unuer **es gestae exception to nearsay 
rule 
19. Evidence o=>US 
Admissibilitv of statements under res 
gestae exception to hearsay rule is largely 
determined bv facts and circumstances of 
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each case and should be left to discretion of 
trial court. 
20. Evidence o» 333(1) 
In light of statements in autopsy report 
which were outside expertise of pathologist 
who performed autopsy, which were not 
probative on issue which they were offered 
to show, or which were speculative, autopsy 
report was not admissible in its entirety in 
products liability action against manufac-
turer of blasting caps where report was 
offered by manufacturer to show that 
worker who was killed in explosion was 
suffering from disease processes which 
would have shortened his normal life ex-
pectancy. 
21. Trial <s»48 
If document contains evidence which is 
inadmissible, party offering document may 
omit the inadmissible part and offer those 
portions which are admissible. 
22. Evidence c » 333(1) 
Where pathologist testified concerning 
autopsy findings insofar as such findings 
bore upon life expectancy of worker killed 
in explosion, refusal to admit autopsy re-
port in evidence to show that worker suf-
fered from conditions which would have 
materially shortened his work and life ex-
pectancies was not error in products liabili-
ty action against manufacturer of blasting 
caps. 
23. Stipulations c=»12 
Standards for allowing withdrawal of 
stipulation are: (1) ciear showing that fact 
stipulated to is untrue; (2) motion to with-
draw must be timely made; (3) good cause 
must be shown for relief; (4) stipulated 
fact must be one of material character 
which changes rights of parties; (5) oppos-
ing party must not have detrimentally re-
lied and changed his position; (6) failure to 
allow stipulation will result in injustice to 
one of parties, and (7) whether court abused 
discretion. 
24. Stipulations c=»l3 
There are no grounds for relief from 
stipulation if lack of knowledge is due to 
failure to exercise due diligence. 
25. Stipulations c=>12 
Where motion by manufacturer in 
products liability action to withdraw stipu-
lation was not timely, fact of whether man-
ufacturer did or did not manufacture blast-
ing caps could have been ascertained with 
due diligence prior to stipulation, and plain-
tiffs detrimentally relied on stipulation, 
court did not abuse discretion in refusing to 
allow manufacturer to withdraw stipulation 
that manufacturer was engaged in business 
of manufacturing, packaging and selling 
blasting fuse caps. 
26. Appeal and Error <»999(1) 
Verdicts will not be interfered with in 
appellate court if issues have been fairly 
submitted under proper instructions. 
27. Appeal and Error o=> 1004.1(1, 4) 
Reviewing court has no right to place 
limitations on amount of damages returned 
by jury unless it is convinced amount of 
recovery bears no relation whatever to evi-
dence, or that it was induced by bias or 
prejudice on part of the jury. 
28. Damages <*=>96 
Compensation for pain and suffering 
rests in sound discretion of jury as there is 
no market where pain and suffering are 
bought and sold, nor any standard by which 
compensation for it can be definitely as-
certained, or the amount actually endured 
determined. 
29. Death c=>97 
Where injuries sustained by worker 
due to explosion included multiple blast 
wounds to the face, chest and abdomen, 
both of his lower legs were biown away, his 
right hand was gone with near amputation 
of his left hand and both eyes were severely 
injured, worker was conscious during ambu-
lance ride, and physician could not give 
worker adequate pain medication, award of 
$50,000 for pain and suffering was ade-
quately supported by evidence and not in-
duced by bias or prejudice on part of jury. 
30. Death c=»99(4) 
Award of $200,000 to widow for pecuni-
ary loss and loss of services resulting from 
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death of husband was not excessive where 
widow was 56 vears of age, had been mar-
ried to husband 32 and one-half years and 
before he retired husband would have 
earned approximately $60,000 
31. Death e=>95(3) 
Adult children can recover in wrongful 
death action for death of father, for such 
purposes, correct measure of damages is 
pecuniary loss suffered by reason of death 
of father. 
32. Death c=>77 
Evidence was sufficient to establish 
that father had contributed monev, aid and 
services with pecuniary value to adult 
daughters for purposes of recovery by 
daughters in action for wrongful death of 
father 
33. Appeal and Error =^> 1004.1(1) 
On appeal, matter is not vnether ap-
pellate court would have reached different 
conclusion as to amount of damages suf-
fered, only question which is presented on 
appeal is whether there is competent evi-
dence to sustain verdict 
34. Appeal and Error c=> 1004.1(8) 
Where jury was property instructed as 
to measure of damages, there was compe-
tent evidence reasonaoly tending to support 
verdict and it did not appear that jur\ was 
swaved with passion or prejudice verdict n 
wrongful death action would not oe dis-
turbed on appeal 
35. Trial o=>116 
Rule that use of blackboards during 
closing argument is matter within discre-
tion of trial court applies w hether counsel 
places figures on oiackboara prior to or 
aurmg argument to jury 
36. Trial s=>116 
Use of blackboard containing damage 
analysis as aid during: closing argument bv 
coadministrators of decedents estate was 
not abuse of discretion <n products liability 
action 
37. Interest 0=^9(2) 
Since causes of action for personal inju-
ries survives death ot injured paitv, pre-
judgment interest awarded when verdict 
for damages by reason of personal injuries 
is accepted is properlv allowable in survival 
action 12 O S 1971, §§ 727, 1051. 
38. Death &=> 104(6) 
Interest <3=»39(2) 
Prejudgment interest was not required 
to be included in jury instructions and 
merged in final verdict in survival cause of 
action for benefit of estate seeking dam-
ages for pain and suffering, statute gov-
erning such prejudgment interest specifical-
ly required court to add interest onto the 
verdict 12 O S 1971, §§ 727, 1051. 
39. Interest s=>39(2) 
Statute governing prejudgment inter-
est allows interest if verdict is returned for 
damages by reason of personal injuries, 
thus, language of statute is broad enough to 
include recovery of prejudgment interest 
for wrongful death by reason of personal 
injuries if action is brought by someone 
other than person who sustained injuries. 
12 O S 1971, §§ 727, 1053 
Appeal from the District Court of Creek 
Countv, Charles S Woodson, Judge 
AFFIRMED 
Jack B Sellers Law Associates, Inc by 
Jack B Sellers, Sapuipa, tor appellees 
Dan \ Rogers, W Michael Hill, Tulsa, 
for appellant 
BOX Presiding Judge 
An appeal bv Atlas Chemical Industries, 
Inc (Atlas), deiendant in the trial court, 
from a manufacturers product liability 
case P'amtiffs-apoeilees are the co-admin-
istrators of the estate of Ira L Lauderdale, 
deceased, A ho brought a survival cause of 
action for the oenefit of the estate seeking 
damages for pain and suffering and reim-
bursement for meaicil expenditures and a 
wrongful death action for the pecuniary 
loss sufcred bv the beneticianes by reason 
of the death of decedent The beneficiaries 
consist of >he widow and two adult daugh-
ters 
108 Okl. 593 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Decedent was a sixty-one \ear old welder 
who was employed by Cimarron Pipeline 
Company (Cimarron). On September 8, 
1971, decedent was in the process of moving 
dynamite fuse caps when he allegedly 
dropped a partially filled container causing 
one or more of the caps to explode which, in 
turn, caused detonation of the remaining 
caps. Decedent died as a result of injuries 
sustained in the explosion. The caps in-
volved in the explosion were allegedly man-
ufactured by Atlas. Plaintiffs brought 
both the wrongful death and survivorship 
causes of action based upon manufacturers' 
product liability. Plaintiffs' main conten-
tion was that Atlas caps were high explo-
sives capable of detonation when subjected 
to impact force. Given this susceptibility, 
the packaging of the caps was defective 
inasmuch as the caps were not cushioned 
from one another and would strike against 
each other if dropped which made the prod-
uct unreasonably dangerous to the consum-
er. 
Plaintiffs initially sued American C\an-
amid Company (American C>anamid) and 
Deupree Distributing Co , Inc. (Deupree) as 
co-defendants However, plaintiffs dis-
missed their causes of action against these 
defendants without prejudice 
Upon submission of the case to the jury, a 
verdict was returned in favor of plaintiffs 
in the total amount of $272,045 28 On 
appeal, Atlas asserts nine propositions of 
error which will be discussed under beparate 
headings This court commends the parties 
for the excellent briefs provided. 
I Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Atlas' first contention is that plaintiffs 
failed to establish a prima facie case inas-
much as the evidence failed to establish a 
defect existed or that the defect caused the 
accident and the trial court erred tn re-
fusing to direct a verdict in favor of Atlas 
[1] In order to establish a prima facie 
case tn manufacturers' products habiltU un-
der Kirkland \ General Motors Corv , Okl . 
521 P2d 1353, plaintiffs mikst prme (1) 
that the product v\as the cause ot the inju-
ry, (2) that the dU'ect existed in the prod-
uct at the time it left the possession and 
control of the manufacturer; and (3) that 
the defect made the prcxiuct unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or his property. Un-
reasonably dangerous is defined at pages 
1362-63 of Kirkland, as follows 
"The article sold must be dangerous to an 
extent beyond that which would be con-
templated by the ordinary consumer who 
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community as to its char-
acteristics." 
Plaintiffs contend that the defect existed in 
the packaging of the dynamite caps. 
The parties entered into numerous stipu-
lations, all of which are not necessary to 
enumerate at this time. Stipulations 8 and 
9 read as follows* 
8 That it was intended by Atlas in 
the manufacture and packaging and sale 
and distribution of the caps it made dur-
ing the time material to this case that the 
caps would reach tne ultimate user or 
consumer in the same and unchanged 
condition was made and packaged by 
them. 
9 That it is agreed in this case such 
Atlas caps as were sold to Cimarron Pipe-
line by Deupree, or if any, from Ameri-
can Cvanamid, were delivered to Cimar-
ron in the same condition as when manu-
factured, packaged and sold by Atlas. 
These two stipulations were sufficient to 
establish element number two of plaintiffs 
prima facie case Thus, plaintiffs had only 
to prove a defect existed in the product 
which caused the injury and the defect 
made the product unreasonably dangerous 
to the user 
The parties further stipulated that it was 
foreseeable to Atlas that dynamite caps 
might be dropped by the user from heights 
of four feet ana that Atlas nad the control 
and discretion of choice of packaging mate-
rials, suoject to governmental regulations, 
if any 
In order to rule <>n Uias' first contention, 
it becomes necessary to summarize the evi-
dence presented bv the parties The tran-
script of evidence encompasses 687 pages. 
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For this reason, the summary is not meant 
to include a detailed account of each wit-
ness' testimony. The objections to various 
portions of plaintiffs' evidence will be dis-
cussed under separate headings. 
Plaintiffs' first witness was Lawson Dan 
Glenn, a welder for Cimarron, who was 
working with decedent on the date of the 
explosion, September 8, 1971, between 7:30 
and 8:00 A.M. Mr. Glenn and decedent 
went to the shed to put protective covers 
over the locks of the storage magazine. 
They took no welding equipment in the 
shed and nothing was present which could 
have produced a spark. In order to put the 
protective covers over the locks of the mag-
azine, it was necessary to move the dyna-
mite caps that were located therein. There 
were two full cartons oi caps plus one par-
tially filled carton with loose caps without a 
lid (referred to as a tray). Mr. Glenn re-
moved the first full box and handed it to 
decedent. Decedent carried the box and set 
it on the floor, 15 or 20 feet from the 
magazine. Mr. Glenn reached to remove 
the second full box while decedent was in 
the process of setting the first upon fhe 
floor. The same procedure was followed 
for the second full box of caps. The third 
box was a partial carton with several boxes 
removed so the remainder were loose. Mr. 
Glenn handed decedent the partially opened 
carton who proceeded to carry the bo\ to 
set it on the floor. Mr Glenn squatted 
down in front of the magazine to measure 
the lock and then decedent said "Dan" in a 
normal voice. Mr. Glenn raised and turned 
toward decedent but all he saw was the 
blast. 
CIovis Dale Hester, president ol Cimar-
ron, testified he bougnt all his caps from 
Deupree and all the caps were stored in the 
magazine. 
Willis Dyer, Jr. was the office manager 
for Cimarron for eighteen years and had 
custody and control over the magazine box. 
Mr. Dyer testified that the magazine con-
tained two cartons* and one tray The last 
6,000 caps purchased by Cimarron came 
from Deupree dnd Cimarron nc\ur pur-
chased elsewhere. No other brand besides 
Atlab caps was in the magazine. The morn-
ing of the accident, Mr. Dyer had put the 
tray back in the magazine. The tray was 
partially filled with Atlas caps, some caps 
had been removed and a rag had been 
placed around it. 
Willis Cummisky was the magazine keep-
er and manager for Deupree, an explosive 
distributor. After June, 1965, Deupree only 
received Atlas fuse caps and the oldest were 
soid first. 
Joseph E. Deupree testified during plain-
tiffs' rebuttal. Mr. Deupree was associated 
with Deupree and supervised the record 
keeping. Since 1965, Deupree delivered 
only Atlas Number 6 caps and had never 
sold Dupont fuse caps. 
Dr. John D. Hesson treated decedent in 
the emergency room. Dr. Hesson asked 
decedent what happened and "he was mov-
ing some dynamite caps and he thought he 
may have dropped them, and he said they 
exploded." 
Plaintiffs called as their first expert wit-
ness Robert J. Grubb. chief chemist of the 
Warner Plant oi American Cyanamid Com-
pany who was familiar with the general 
types of explosives manufactured in the 
United States. Two chemicals contained 
within the Atlas caps are HNM (Hexanitro-
mannite) and Diazo (Diazodinitrophenyl) 
and botn -vere considered by Mr. Grubb as 
high explosives. He stated that impact or 
shock energyr of sufficient quantity can det-
onate these explosives. There is a level of 
impact above which all caps will detonate 
and below which none will. There is also a 
level of impact where some caps will deto-
nate and others will not. On cross-exami-
nation, it was determined Mr. Grubb was 
not qualified to testify on the exact amount 
of force necessary to detonate a cap inas-
much as he had never performed drop tests 
on Atlas caps, [f one cap in an Atlas tray, 
containing 100 caps, exploded there is a 
very high probability they all would deto-
nate. In the explosion, the metal contained 
in the shed would be torn into shrapnel and 
thrown at hitrh velocity. The presence of 
L,rnt or impurities in the cap increases lis 
sensitiuU Mr Grubb's opinion was that 
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caps that were afforded no cushion from 
one another with grit present in the caps 
and dropped four feet would be unreasona-
bly dangerous to the consumer. 
Robert E. Fearon, a chemical engineer 
educated in the fields of physics, chemistry 
and mathematics who has detonated and 
dissected caps to examine and analyze 
them, was called as plaintiffs' second expert 
witness. Atlas caps contain PETN (Pen-
taerythitol Tetranitrate), a very powerful 
and quite sensitive explosive. Mr. Fearon 
considers PETN more sensitive than nitro-
glycerin as to impact. Impurities which 
make PETN more sensitive are grit and 
void spaces filled with air. If PETN was 
dropped four feet onto the floor with a 
bubble of air contained therein and there 
was no cushioning, Mr. Fearon felt one of 
the caps might get hurt and explode. It 
was his opinion that there is a probability of 
any high explosive exploding if it suffers an 
impact. Mr. Fearon testified HNM was a 
high explosive, quite sensitive to shock and 
very dangerous to put any impact on. 
According to Mr. Fearon, time, tempera-
ture and relative humidity are the things 
that do harm to explosives, such as being 
placed for a long time in a warm place with 
high humidity In Oklahoma, there would 
be some damage after a long period of 
storage. Assuming the Atlas caps had been 
stored in the shed at Cimarron for fifteen 
months up to two years, Mr. Fearon's opin-
ion was that when tne caps were dropped, 
one exceeded its toleration limit. The fact 
that the caps were not cushioned from one 
another made Mr. Fearon feel they were 
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. 
Mr. Fearon also expressed the following 
opinion: 
It is my opinion that the provision of 
metallic contact, that is, the contact of 
these metal cases with one another is an 
unnecessary invitation to a hard jolt be-
cause metal is striking on metal if any-
thing happens, and it's also—that relates 
to the manner of packaging. And it's 
also my opinion that there could have 
been \uthtn the statistics of the manufac-
turer >ome variation that would result 
and probably did result in some of the 
caps being much more sensitive than the 
other ones were. 
Mr. Fearon has never been employed by a 
manufacturer of explosives and had disas-
sembled an electric cap containing lead 
azide which is more dangerous than an At-
las fuse cap which does not contain lead 
azide. 
Robert E. Hebert, a packaging engineer, 
was called as an expert for plaintiffs. In 
response to a hypothetical question, Mr. He-
bert testified that a proper package for 
caps sensitive to impact would be to restrict 
the movement in the container of the indi-
vidual blasting caps and then to cushion 
them from impact from one another. Bar-
rier bags could prevent exposure to mois-
ture and air. Materials such as molded 
s tyro foam or slotted chipboard for parti-
tions could be used as cushioning at a very 
minimal cost to the manufacturer. Mr. He-
bert felt it was quite feasible from an engi-
neering and economic standpoint to pack-
age caps to absorb the shock of a four foot 
drop in both the primary and intermediate 
container. Mr Hebert stated the package 
used by Atlas provided no protection on the 
interior; the caps are not protected on im-
pact from one another. If one cap is re-
moved, the remaining caps roll about 
knocking against each other. The exterior 
box is thin chipboard which will transmit 
impact to the caps inside providing very 
little cushioning. Because the caps could 
move about, they would hit on the more 
susceptible part to explosion if dropped (the 
heavier end). Military specifications call 
for paperboard partitioning the caps with 
the box placed in a barrier bag. 
Ralph Lash has been a packaging engi-
neer for thirty years. He testified to the 
use of rolls of polyethylene (plastic) to cush-
ion caps from one another at a cost of 
two-tenths of a cent to separate a hundred 
fuse caps. (The packaging would be similar 
to that of Contact Cold Capsules.) Mr. 
Lash also prepared a package made of cor-
rugated chipboard so the caps could not 
strike each other if dropped. Mr Lash's 
opinion was the package used by Atlas had 
no cushioning value whatsoever. 
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Atlas called as its first defense witness 
Anna K. Orlosky, who works on the cap line 
at Atlas Ms Orloskv's job is to rumble the 
caps The caps are placed in the rumbler 
bag which cleans the excess powder off the 
shells with damp sawdust Ms Orlosky 
does position herself behind builet proof 
glass and wears special clothing to rumble 
There is only a visual inspection without 
any optical aids to determine if there are 
any bad caps or if the caps are clean, no 
powder or foreign bodies remaining on the 
caps. 
Arthur Boman, a research chemist for 
Atlas, testified that several months expo-
sure to high humidity and temperature de-
sensitizes the caps, they become less likely 
to explode Mr Boman had performed 
drop tests from thirty feet on Atlas caps 
and had also placed the caps on a steel anvil 
and dropped a ten pound weight upon them 
No explosion resulted in either case 
Paul Miller is the Director of Governmen-
tal Affairs for Atlas He testified the rea-
son for the military specifications vUi be-
cause the caps were dropped h) paracnute 
and there was need for more protection 
during clandestine work behind enemy 
lines Mr Miller stated the use of plastic in 
packaging as testified to by Mr Lash A as 
incorrect The plastic generates or stores 
static electricity which represents i hazard 
to explosives Mr Miller did not oeheve it 
was possible to drop Atlas caps iour ieet 
and have them detonate On cross-exami-
nation, Mr Miller stated that before the 
caps leave the plant chev are cushioned 
from shock through the use of two inches of 
sawdust between the intermediate carton 
and outside shipping carton 
George Keenum, the area manager for 
Atlas, searched the scene ot the accident 
the day after the explosion and found sev-
eral unexploded caps Atiac> caps have a 
round bottom Some of the caps found nad 
indentatons on fhe bottom and vere one-
eighth
 tnch shorter than Ulas c ips They 
were shown to be Dupont, not All is cap's 
upon X-Rav However in ms k position, 
Mr Ketnum stated the cans he lound wei<i 
the genual color M/e ind app< n a n a M>la 
bv \ t las It was stipulated Mr Burnett 
would have testified he investigated the 
accident and he found unexploded caps and 
gave them to Mr Keenum, but he did not 
and was not asked to mark them 
Melvm A Cook, a consultant m the "leld 
of explosives, was called as an expert wit-
ness for Atlas It was his opinion caps are 
not affected by the temperature in Oklaho-
ma High humidity and mo'sture make the 
caps less sensitive Caps are most sensitive 
when brand new and do not become more 
sensitive in normal use Mr Cook ex-
pressed the opinion that caps dropped four 
feet in a partiallv filled box would not 
detonate 
[2-4] Although the evidence presented 
oy the parties was conflicting, this court 
believes the evidence offered by plaintiffs 
was sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case in manufacturers product liability In 
passing upon this contention, the evidence 
must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiffs and all evidence tending to 
derogate piaintiffs' position must be disre-
garded Jackson v Cubbing Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. Okl, 445 P2d 797, Wihon v 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific RR Co, 
Okl, 429 P 2d 763 Taken in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence tended 
to show that caps manufactured by Atlas, 
not Dupont, caused the explosion and that 
A* las raps A ere a combination of high ex-
plosives that could be detonated by mpact 
force Atlas voluntarily packaged the caps 
in such a wa\ that the caps in the interme-
diate package would strike against one an-
)ther ifter one cap had been removed if 
dropped from four feet Plaintiffs experts 
testified the packaging was defective in 
that it did not protect the caps from exter-
nal trauma when proper packaging was 
readilv available and feasible from an engi-
neering and cost standpoint While moving 
i partiallv fcilled carton, decedent dropped 
the caps which the parties stipulated was 
foreseeable When dropped, tne caps ex-
ploded Proper inierences could be drawn 
that the product is packaged made it un-
reasonablv dangerous to the consumer and 
the product was he cause of the injury 
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Circumstantial evidence ma) be relied upon 
by plaintiffs in a manufacturers' product 
liability case The Supreme Court in Kirk-
land, supra at 1355, held: 
Syllabus by the Court. 
5. The plaintiff may prove his cause 
of action in Manufacturers' Products Lia-
bility by circumstantial evidence and 
proper inferences drawn therefrom, since 
actual or absolute proof of the defect in a 
sophisticated product may be within the 
peculiar knowledge or possession of the 
defendant. 
See also Sadler v T, J. Hughes Lumber Co, 
Inc., Oki.App., 53T P2d 454; see generally 
Highway Const. Co. v Shue, 173 Okl. 456, 
49 P2d 203. This court holds plaintiffs' 
proof, along with Stipulations 3 and 9, was 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case in 
manufacturers' products liability. 
[5-7] Atlas also contends the trial court 
should have directed a verdict m its behalf 
We disagree. A motion for directed verdict 
should not be sustained unless there is an 
entire absence of proof showing plaintiffs' 
right to recover Sadler v T J Hughes 
Lumber Co, Inc, supra, citing Austin v 
Wdkerson, inc, Okl, 519 P 2d 899 Fur-
thermore, the evidence of both sides to this 
controversy was conflicting and it is the 
function of the jurv under these circum-
stances to determine the rights and liabili-
ties of the parties There being competent 
evidence which reasonably tends to support 
the jury verdict for plaintiffs, the verdict 
will not be disturbed on appeal Sunray 
DX Oil Co v Brown. Okl., 477 P 2d 67, 
Miller Construction Co v Wenthold, Okl, 
458 P 2d 637 
II Hypothetical Questions Based on 
Facts Not in Evidence 
In proof of their case, plaintiffs utilized 
four expert witnesses \ t las contends re-
versible error was created bv Ulowing 
plaintiffs' experts to answer hvpothetieal 
questions based on facts unsupported bv the 
evidence 
[8-11] H}potheticai questions must be 
based upon facts as to which there is such 
evidence that a jury might reasonably find 
that they are established Goodlett v Wil-
hamston, 179 Okl 238, 65 P 2d 472. Only 
the omission of material facts which are 
essential to the formation of an intelligent 
opinion on the matter will be fatal to a 
hypothetical question K P Construction 
Co v Death of Parrent, Okl., 562 P2d 501; 
In the Matter of the Death of Deere, Okl., 
557 P2d 891. However, to preserve the 
error on appeal, the opposing counsel must 
specifically object that the question includes 
facts not in evidence or the error, if any, 
cannot be raised on appeal. This rule is 
well stated in 31 AmJur2d Expert and 
Opinion Evidence, § 64 p. 572-73 (1967), as 
follows. 
In objecting to a hypothetical question, 
counsel must be reasonably specific as to 
the grounds of the objection. Thus, if 
counsel relies upon the point that the 
question invades the province of the jury, 
his objection should call the trial court's 
attention to such point, a mere general 
objection to the question, in which there 
is no intimation that counsel regarded the 
question as an invasion of the province of 
the jury, will not suffice An objection 
made on the ground that the question 
includes facts not in exidenee 
should point out the facts improperly in-
cluded or omitted The pur-
pose of requiring counsel to specily 
grounds of objection to a hvpothetieal 
question is not onl} to assist the court in 
ruling on the oojection, but also to enable 
opposing counsel to eliminate objectiona-
ble parts or characteristics of the ques-
tion by changing its form or content. 
* * * * * * 
In accordance \nth the general prmci» 
pie of appellate re\iew, an objection that 
a hypothetical (juestion omitted material 
data (annot be raised for the first time 
on appeal (Emphasis added Footnotes 
omitted ) 
See also 12 0 S 1971, ^ 424. Da\is \ Town 
of Cannon. Okl, 562 P2d 854, Cook i 
Sheffield. 181 Okl. 635. 75 P 2d 1101, Wor-
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rell v. Allen, 93 Oki. 3, 219 P. 367; Fender 
v. Segro, 41 Okl. 318, 137 P. 103. 
[12] Rather than give a detail account 
of the numerous and lengthy hypothetical 
questions and objections thereto, suffice it 
to say Atlas' objections went to the exper-
tise of the four witnesses or were merely 
general objections. In making his general 
objections, counsel for Atlas, Mr. Rogers, 
usually used the phrase "Note my (our) 
objection" with no grounds for the objec-
tion recited. 
In regard to the expert witness, Robert 
E. Hebert, proceedings were neld at the 
bench outside the presence of the jury at 
which time Mr. Rogers objected that Mr. 
Hebert was not an expert in packaging 
explosives and should not be allowed to give 
his opinion on the matter. This objection 
was overruled. Thereafter, Mr. Rogers ob-
jected after a hypothetical question was 
asked stating: 
Note my objection, Your Honor. . 
I won't be required to give my reason as 
long as I make my objection; is that 
sufficient, Your Honor. . I want 
to be sure I save the record. 
It's agreed / don't have to give my rea-
son, counsel knows what they are. (Em-
phasis added.) 
It was agreed to by both parties and the 
trial judge. However, from reading the 
transcript, it is apparent this was an exten-
sion of the objection of the expertise of Mr. 
Hebert and was not an objection to the 
hypothetical question containing facts not 
in evidence. On the next page of the tran-
script appears the following language: 
[H]ave I saved my objection as to the 
opinions of this person as an expert in 
this field of packaging dynamite caps? It 
is agreed I have saved my record? 
MR. SELLERS: I have so agreed for this 
particular witness and this particular in-
quiry. (Emphasis added.) 
THE COURT: All right. 
A proper objection was entered as to one 
hypothetical question asked of Mr. Hebert; 
however, this particular question u as not 
complained of in Atlas' brief as containing 
facts not in evidence. Mr. Rogers request-
ed and was allowed a running objection to 
the expertise of Mr. Ralph Lash. No other 
objection was made other than "Note my 
objection." 
Atlas failed to properly preserve its ob-
jections that the hypothetical questions 
asked by plaintiffs contained facts not in 
evidence. Thus, Atlas' second proposition 
of error is without merit. 
III. Qualifications of Expert Witnesses 
[13] Plaintiffs presented four expert 
witnesses: Messrs. Grubb, Fearon, Hebert 
and Lash. Atlas contends these witnesses 
were not qualified to express the opinions 
elicited during their examination and as a 
result Atlas should be granted a new trial 
under Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norton, 
189 Oki. 252, 116 P.2d 893. The question 
whether a witness is sufficiently qualified 
to testify as an expert is a preliminary 
question to be determined by the trial court 
and the qualification of a witness as an 
expert is a matter addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Gold Kist Pea-
nut Growers Ass'n v. Waldman, Okl., 377 
P.2d 807. The Supreme Court in City of 
Hoidenviile v. Griggs, Okl., 411 P.2d 521, 
525, stated: 
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Mag-
gi, Okl., 409 P2d 369, this Court said: 
"Qualification of expert witness is ad-
dressed to sound discretion of tnal 
court whose ruling that a witness is 
sufficiently qualified will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless it clearly ap-
pears that the discretion has been 
abused.''' (Emphasis added.) 
See also Continental Oil Co. v. Ryan, Okl., 
392 P 2d 492, citing Tuck v. Buller, Okl., 311 
P.2d 212. We find no abuse of discretion by 
the trial court. 
[14] Atlas contends Mr. Fearon was not 
qualified to testify in regard to fuse caps 
because he had disassembled an electric cap 
containing lead azuie which is more danger-
ous than Atlas caps. There are similarities 
between the Lwo forms of explosives and as 
an expert in the field of chemical engineer-
ing, Mr. Fearon could property give his 
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opinion as to the chemical reactions of the 
three explosives contained within an Atlas 
cap. 
[15] Mr. Grubb testified impact could 
detonate an Atlas cap. The trial court 
ruled that he was not qualified to testify on 
the exact amount of force necessary to det-
onate a cap inasmuch as he had never per-
formed drop tests on Atlas caps. Atlas 
contends that the trial court, having ruled 
the witness unqualified, clearly abused its 
discretion by not granting Atlas' motion to 
strike and allowing Mr. Grubb's opinion to 
stand. The trial court only ruled the wit-
ness was unqualified as to the exact amount 
of force necessary to cause detonation. 
This does not mean that a chemist familiar 
with explosives could not express an opinion 
that detonation could occur given sufficient 
quantity of impact even though he couid 
not testify as to the exact amount of impact 
needed. 
[16] Messrs. Hebert and Lash were 
packaging engineers and Atlas asserts both 
were not qualified because neither had 
packaged explosives. However, the evi-
dence shows both men were sufficiently 
qualified to testify regarding custom pack-
aging. As with all the experts presented 
by plaintiffs, the weaknesses, if any, in 
their qualifications were adequately tested 
by cross-examination and the value of their 
opinions determined by the jury. Magnolia 
Petroleum Co. v. Norton, supra; 31 Am. 
Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 30 at 
p. 530 (1967). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in the qualification of these witnesses as 
experts. 
IV Res Gestae Exception 
[17] Atlas next asserts error on the part 
of the trial court in overruling its objection 
to hearsay testimony given by Dr John D. 
Hesson, the attending physician when dece-
dent was brought into the emergency room 
at Drumnght Memorial Hospital. The tes-
timony complained o( reads as follows: 
So I asked him what happened, and he 
was moving some dynamite caps and he 
thought he may have dropped them, and 
he said they exploded. I asked was he 
standing close by and he said right irr 
front of them when they went off . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Atlas asserts the admission of this hearsay 
evidence is reversible error. Plaintiffs con-
tend the hearsay testimony was admissible 
under the res gestae exception to the hear-
say rule or as a declaration included within 
the medical history given by the decedent 
to his treating physician as an aid to diag-
nosis and treatment* 
The Supreme Court in Silver Seal Prod-
ucts Co. v. Owens, Okl., 523 P.2d 1091, 1096, 
reaffirmed in In re Death of Cleveland, 
Okl., 531 P.2d 1396, 1399, defined the res 
gestae exception, as follows: 
In Piggee [Sand Springs Ry. Co. v. 
Piggee, 196 Okl. 136, 163 P.2d 545] we 
said statements are admissible as part of 
the res gestae: (1) when made at or near 
time of the occurrence; (2) when sponta-
neously made; (3) when provoked or in-
fluenced by happening of the accident 
itself so as to become a part thereof. The 
Taylor [Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor, 
188 Okl. 380, 108 P 2d 1024] case declared 
admission of res gestae statements was 
justified by spontaneous nature of the 
statement, which provides sufficient 
guarantee of trustworthiness to render 
declarations admissible in evidence. Also 
see, Wigmore on Evidence 2nd, § 1749, 
that spontaneous or instinctive utterance 
made under circumstances calculated to 
provide a degree of trustworthiness, de-
rive some credit independently of the dec-
laration. We are of the opinion the basis 
for decision in these cases correctly define 
principles which govern admissibility of 
res gestae statements. 
See also Smith v. Munger, Ok LA pp., 532 
P.2d 1202. 
Under the facts of this case, Dr. Hesson's 
testimony was admissible under the res ges-
tae exception. Decedent was subjected to a 
violent explosion which tore both his lower 
legs from his body as well as causing other 
severe injuries. He was removed by ambu-
lance to the emergency room where the 
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statement was made to Dr Hesson Dece-
dent was conscious at all times but in severe 
pain and within hours of his death This 
court holds the statement bv decedent was 
spontaneous, not deliberative, and was pro-
voked or influenced by the happening of the 
accident so as to become a part thereof 
The disturbing event in this case would so 
pervade the mental processes of the dece-
dent that it would be unlikely the state-
ment was made in a premeditated, calculat-
ing or self-serving sense 
[18] The statement was not made at the 
time of the explosion, but sometime there-
after (The record is not clear as to the 
time lapse, however, decedent only sur-
vived for three hours after the accident and 
during this time he was transported to Tul-
sa where he died) The time span between 
the event and the declarant's later expres-
sions is simply an element for consideration, 
but is not controlling Sooner Construction 
Co v Brown, Okl, 544 P2d 500, Sinclair 
Oil & Gas Co v Cheatwood, Okl, 350 P 2d 
944 In Henry Chevrolet Co v Taylor 188 
Okl 380, 108 P 2d 1024, 1027, the Supreme 
Court stated 
It is sufficient to say that admission of 
such statements is justified by the spon-
taneous nature of the statement which s 
m itself a sufficient guarantee of the 
trustworthiness of such declarations to 
render them admissible, if thev are made 
under the immediate influence of the oc-
currence to which they relate, and it is 
not necessary that the declarations oe so 
strictly contemporaneous with the occur-
rence to which thev relate as to be admis-
sible under the so-called Verbal act ' doc-
trine the element of time be'ng impor-
tant only for the purpose of determining 
whether the declaration was made when 
the speaker *as unaer the stress of nerv-
ous excitement as a result of the occur-
rence to the extent that the reflettne 
faculties were stilled and the utterance 
therefore a sincere expression oi h s actu-
al impressions and belief (Emphasis 
added Citations omitted ) 
See also Sand Springs R\ Co \ P^gte, 19b 
Okl 136, 163 P 2d ^45 
[19] Decedent's statement falls within 
the purview of the Taylor case Further-
more, the admissibility of such statements 
is largely determined by the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case and should be left 
to the discretion of the trial court Indian 
Oil Tool Co v Thompson, Okl, 405 P2d 
104, Wray v Garrett, 185 Okl 138, 90 P 2d 
1050 We find no abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court m admitting the 
statement 
Inasmuch as the statement made by dece-
dent to Dr Hesson was properly admissible 
under the res gestae exception we need not 
determine whether the statement would 
fall within the medical history exception 
V Admissibility of Autopsy Report 
[20] Dr Leo Lowbeer, the pathologist 
who performed the autopsy upon decedent, 
was called to the stand by Atlas to testify 
decedent was suffering from disease 
processes at the time of the accident which 
would have shortened his normal life ex-
pectancy After Dr Lowbeer testified, At-
las moved to have fhe autops} reoort admit-
ted into evidence The trial court ruled 
that the autops) report vvas inadmissible 
and Atlas contends the trial court commit-
ted reversible error m refusing to allow the 
report into evidence We disagree 
The Supreme Court in its Supplemental 
Opinion on Rehearing in Horn v Sturm, 
Okl , 408 P 2d 541, 549-50, recognized that 
autopsy reports could be made to obtain 
information useful m defending a damage 
suit and held thev should not be placed in 
the categorv of hospital records for eviden-
tiary purposes Further, the court stated 
that the report was admissible after proper 
identification and after the doctor vvho per-
formed the autopsv vas called to identify 
the report and testify in regard thereto 
Although Atlas did follow the procedure 
outlined in Sturm tnis does not mean that 
the contents of 'he autopsy reoort did not 
nave o^ be examined bv the trial court to 
determine f there were statements con-
tained therein which were not admissible 
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The autopsy report contained many state-
ments prejudicial to plaintiffs and which 
had little, if any, probative value on the 
issue which Atlas sought to establish by 
introduction of the report, i. e., that dece-
dent suffered from physical conditions 
which would have shortened his life expect-
ancy. Many other statements were beyond 
the expertise of a pathologist and, as such, 
a pathologist's opinion thereon would be 
inadmissible. Other recitals were pure 
speculation on the part of Dr. Lowbeer. 
This court does not deem it necessary to 
summarize ail the statements which would 
have been inadmissible, rather only a few 
will be reproduced to illustrate the problem. 
The report recited: 
[T]he velocity in this case may well have 
approached 5000 feet per second and 
more. 
It appears, that any protective clothing of 
any thickness or resistance would be a 
great help in eliminating flashburns and 
minimizing splinter perforations. 
Exactly how the explosion occurred is 
only a matter of speculation. 
For some reason, he must have put down 
the two boxes with the loose caps with 
too much force; or else they slipped 
slightly out of his hands; or else he 
slipped on the sandy floor. It appears 
fairly certain that the explosion occurred 
first in one of the two boxes with the 
loose caps, which perhaps raises the ques-
tion of handling such boxes even more 
delicately than necessary even in a tight-
ly packed box. (Emphasis original.) 
[H]e may have dropped the box during 
such sudden episode of chestpain; this of 
course is purely speculative. 
The man could have had a sudden episode 
of dizziness as is often found in such 
anatomic conditions and for that reason 
slipped or dropped the box or boxes. This 
also is a matter of speculation; but it 
does raise the question, whether not ev-
erybody engaged in such potentially dan-
gerous work, shouid have periodic thor-
ough physical examination and knowl-
edge of their health status, particularly 
over the age of 60 
But it also should be known of anyone in 
a dangerous occupation whether or not he 
indulges in alcohol, constantly or periodi-
ca))y. Again this is a matter of sheer 
conjecture. 
Because many of the statements in the au-
topsy were outside the expertise of Dr. 
Lowbeer, not probative on the issue which 
they were offered to show, or speculative, 
the autopsy report was not admissible in its 
entirety. 
[21] Where a document contains evi-
dence which is inadmissible, the party offer-
ing the document may omit the inadmissi-
ble part and offer those portions which are 
admissible. New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Gibbs, 176 Okl. 535, 56 P.2d 1179. However, 
nowhere in the record did Atlas move to 
have only the admissible portions of the 
autopsy report introduced into evidence. 
[22] Furthermore, Atlas contends the 
autopsy report "would have demonstrated 
that decedent suffered from conditions 
which would have materially shortened his 
work and life expectancies." However, Dr. 
Lowbeer testified concerning his autopsy 
findings insofar as they bore upon the life 
expectancy of decedent. 
We find no error in the trial court's re-
fusal to admit the autopsy report into evi-
dence. 
VI. Withdrawal of Pre-Tnal Stipulation 
Atlas contends the trial court committed 
reversible error by denying Atlas' counsel 
the nght to amend or withdraw a stipula-
tion agreed to by the parties before trial. 
The stipulation reads as follows: 
10. That at ail times material to this 
case, Atlas was engaged in the business 
of manufacturing, packaging and selling 
fuse caps. 
Defendant-Atlas is a Rhode Island corpora-
tion. On the fourth day of trial, Atlas tried 
to withdraw Stipulation Number 10 assert-
ing the Rhode Island corporation had never 
manufactured, distributed or sold dynamite 
caps. Rather, a Delaware corporation with 
the same name was the cap manufacturer. 
The attorney for the Delaware corporation, 
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Mr Quinhn, was present when the pre-trial 
stipulation was entered into Both corporx-
tions are wholly owned subsidiaries of the 
Tyler Corporation 
Defendant-Atlas sought to withdraw this 
stipulation after three full davs of a jury 
trial and the majority of plaintiffs case had 
already been presented, plaintiffs nad al-
ready presented eight of their fourteen wit-
nesses Defendant-Atlas stated the\ did 
not intend to defend on the basis that the 
wrong corporation was sued and plaintiffs 
had not attempted to secure evidence on 
this point and proceeded to trial without 
concern for the required elements ot proof 
In denying defendant-Atlas motion to 
withdraw, the trial court stated 
THE COURT Well, I want to ask some 
questions too 
First of all, for the record Mr Rogers, 
the Court is snocked that you would 
come m here on the fourth day after 
this case was started, and after we 
spent three and a half hours on stipula-
tions, one of which you now ask the 
Court to allow \ou to withdraw If the 
Court's memory is right Mr Quinhn 
was present with you at all times dur-
ing this conversation Is this not cor-
rect0 
MR ROGERS That is correct 
THE COURT And he bat here ind al-
lowed sou to make the stipulations I 
don t know wnat has happened in this 
case since I saw you \esterdav morn-
ing, I have no idea, but tne Court cer-
tainly takes a dim view of a t torney 
who want to piav games like this with 
the Court I am not too receptive to 
your motion, tranki) 
MR ROGERS I appreciate 'hat \ o u r 
Honor but I will tell sou I did not lav 
behind a log on it intentionalU it did 
not come to my attention that this 
was— 
THE COURT I don t know if \ou did or 
not but I fhink this is a matte** tor the 
\ppelhte Court to determine He are 
m the middle ot trial and I think \ou 
have wamd \ou /live tin id\ mad*, 
opening statement and hi\t told th s 
jury who you are ind who you rep-
resent and not one thing has peeped in 
an opening statement to this jury that 
you are the wrong corporation I think 
it's— 
MR ROGERS No, we did not intend to 
defend it on that basis 
THE COURT Well I don't care if you 
did or not, but if vou had a defense to 
it that was the time to do it and not 
take more of the Court s time with it 
MR ROGERS This as I say has come to 
light insofar as I m concerned right 
now 
THE COURT I think that is something 
you will have to take care of on down 
the line I am going to overrule /"our 
request and allow you an exception 
(Emphasis added) 
[23] The Supreme Court in McFarhng v 
Demco Inc, Okl 546 P2d 625 630-31, 
discussed standards tor allowing the with-
drawal ol a stipulation First there must 
be a clear showing that the fact stipulated 
to s untrue Second, the motion to vith-
driw the stipulation must be timelv made 
Second the motion to withdraw the stipula-
tion must be timely made The motion to 
withdraw was not timely Defendant-Atlas 
attempted to withdraw the stipulation four 
da\s into the jury trial In McFarhng, the 
motion to withdraw was entered a day be-
lore tne trial date 
L24] The third standard is good cause 
must be shown lor r^i ef The McFzrhng 
court considered lack of negligence as a 
factor showing good cause We feel lick of 
negligence
 As not present in this case Mr 
Quinhn ihe attorne\ for the Delaware cor-
poration was present when the stipulation 
was entered into We believe with due 
diligence the fact Defendant-Atlas did or 
did not manufacture caps could have been 
ascertained by defendants counsel prior to 
agreeing a> the stipulation There are no 
grounds lor rehti vnere lack ot Knowledge 
s due to the failure to exercise die dih-
£cnu. 33 C J S Stipulations fc 35b(2) at p 
91 (195 *) 73 Am Jur 2d Stipulations & 14 at 
p 551 (1974) 
•f i k 
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[25] Fourth, the fact must be one of 
material character which changes the rights 
of the parties. Fifth, the opposing party 
must not have detrimentally relied and 
changed his position. The McFarling court 
considered this to be the crucial question. 
Although we find no specific ruling by the 
trial court upon this question, the evidence 
sufficiently reveals plaintiffs did detrimen-
tally rely on the stipulation. In view of the 
stipulation, plaintiffs had not secured evi-
dence on the issue and proceeded to trial 
under the assumption that the party sued 
was the manufacturer. Plaintiffs had al-
ready presented much of their case to the 
jury when the motion to withdraw was 
made. The sixth factor is that the failure 
to allow the stipulation will result in mani-
fest injustice to one of the parties. The last 
consideration is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion. Under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, we can not say 
the trial court abused its discretion. 
Accordingly, the trial court's refusal to 
allow the withdrawal of Stipulation Num-
ber 10 is affirmed. 
VII. Excessive Verdict 
[26, 27] Atlas contends the verdict was 
excessive due to improper instructions and 
passion, prejudice and bias on the part of 
the jury. Atlas complains of Instructions 
17 and 18; however, both adequately de-
scribe the various recoverable items and we 
find no prejudicial error contained within 
either. A verdict will not be interfered 
with by an appellate court where the issues 
have been fairly submitted under proper 
instructions. Hampton v. Danks, Okl., 387 
P.2d 609. A reviewing court has no right to 
place limitations upon the amount of dam-
ages returned by the jury unless it is con-
vinced that the amount of recovery bears 
no relation whatever to the evidence, or 
that it was induced by bias or prejudice on 
the part of the jury. Tulsa City Lines v. 
Geiger, Okl., 275 P.2d 325. See also First 
Natl Bank of Amarillo v. LaJoit\ Oki.. 537 
P.2d 1207; Vickers v. Ittner, Oki., 418 P.2d 
700. 
The jury returned the following verdict: 
Pain and Suffering 
Medical 
Widow 
Iris (Decedent's daughter) 
Joyce (Decedent's daughter) 
Funeral 
Total 
$ 50,000.00 
504.20 
200,000.00 
10,000.00 
10,000.00 
1,541.08 
$272,045.28 
There is no dispute as to the amounts 
awarded for the funeral expenses and medi-
cal bills. 
[28] In regard to^ the $50,000.00 pain 
and suffering award, Atlas contends the 
jury awarding this sum shows passion and 
prejudice because the pain and suffering 
"admittedly lasted no more than two or 
three hours." There is no fixed rule where-
by damages for pain and suffering alone 
can be measured. Compensation for pain 
and suffering rests in the sound discretion 
of the jury, because "there is no 'market 
where pain and suffering are bought and 
sold, nor any standard by which compensa-
tion for it can be definitely ascertained, or 
the amount actually endured determined.' " 
Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, 204 Okl. 339, 
229 P.2d 560, 563, quoting St. Louis S. W. R. 
Co. v. Kendall 114 Ark. 224, 169 S.W. 822, 
824. See also Chicago, Rock Island <& Pacif-
ic R. R. Co. v. Hawes, Okl., 424 P.2d 6; 
Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpa trick, Oki., 
418 P.2d 900. 
[29] The injuries decedent received due 
to the explosion included multiple blast 
wounds to the face, chest and abdomen, 
both of his lower legs had been blown away, 
his right hand was gone with near amputa-
tion of his left hand and both eyes were 
severely injured. According to the ambu-
lance driver, decedent was conscious during 
the ride to the emergency room and during 
the trip to Tulsa. The driver believed dece-
dent was suffering quite a lot of pain. The 
treating physician at the emergency room, 
Dr. Hesson, testified decedent was con-
scious and in pain. Dr. Hesson couid not 
give him adequate pain medication. Be-
cause decedent's arms had been blown 
apart, Dr. Hesson was not abie to ascertain 
a blood pressure. Although morphine or 
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demerol would normally have been used, 
Dr Hesson only administered Talwin which 
only "takes the edge off" without lowering 
blood pressure 
We find that the award for pain and 
suffering was adequately supported by the 
evidence and not induced by bias or preju-
dice on the part of the jury 
[30] Vivian Lauderdale, the widow of 
decedent, received an award of $200,000 00 
for pecuniary loss and loss of services Mrs 
Lauderdale is 56 years of age and was mar-
ried to decedent 32 and a half years Be-
fore he retired, decedent would have earned 
approximately $60,000 Mrs Lauderdale 
was also entitled to be compensated for loss 
of consortium, including loss of advice, com-
fort, companionship and services The jury 
was in a better position to determine the 
dollar amount of Mrs. Lauderdale's pecuni-
ary loss We feel the evidence was ade-
quate to support their verdict Although 
Dr Lowbeer testified decedent would have 
had a shorter than normal life expectancy, 
Dr Hesson stated the findings of Dr Low-
beer were not unusual ana decedent could 
have survived an average life span with 
reasonable medical care The jury s duty is 
to determine facts from conflicting evi-
dence This court finds that the award to 
Mrs Lauderdale was not excessive 
[31] The two married adult daughters 
of decedent were awarded $10,000 eacn 
Adult children can recover in wrongful 
death actions The correct measure of 
damages is the pecuniary LOSS suffered by 
reason of the death of their father Beiford 
v Allen, 183 Oki 256, 80 P 2d 671 Gyps\ 
Oil Co v Green, S2 Okl 147, 198 P 851, 
Pressley v Incorporated Town of Sdllisaw, 
54 Okl. 747, 154 P 660 Pecuniary ioss was 
discussed in Rogers \ Worthan, Okl., 465 
P2d 431, 438-39, as follows 
Recovery in a wrongful death action is 
not contingent upon a showing that the 
claimant had been dependent, to some 
extent, upon the leceased Even great 
wealth vvould not of itself, preclude the 
recovcrv of dam uccs for ui\ pecuruarv 
benefits which a claimant might reason-
ably have expected to rective il the de-
ceased had lived 
The basic factor controlling recovery in 
such an action is not whether the claim-
ant had been dependent upon the de-
ceased for support, but is whether, m the 
circumstances disclosed by the ev idence in 
the particular case, it can reasonably be 
said that there was a probability, or a 
reasonable expectancy on the part of the 
claimant, that the decedent, except for 
his death, would ha\e contributed money, 
aid, services, or anything else that would 
have a pecuniary value to the claimant. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[32,33] Both daughters testified as to 
services, aid and money provided by dece-
dent, such as wedding, birthday and Christ-
mas gifts, assistance in moving, arranging 
for burial of a grandchild, paying for gro-
ceries, providing family barbeques and the 
boat for family recreation, giving business 
guidance, welding services, helping with 
household repairs, babysitting, co-signing 
notes and loaning money which was never 
asked to be repaid We feel sufficient evi-
dence existed that decedent contributed 
money, aid and services with pecuniary val-
ue to the daughters On appeal, it matters 
not that the appellate court might or might 
not nave reached a different conclusion as 
to the amount of damages suffered and the 
only Question which is presented is whether 
there is any competent evidence to sustain 
the verdict Battles * Janzen, Okl, 325 
P 2d 444 
[34] The jurv was properlv instructed as 
to the measure of damages, there was com-
petent evidence reasonably tending to sup-
port the verdict, and it does not appear 
from the record that the jury was swaved 
by passion or prejudice Hence, the verdict 
will not be disturbed on appeal Bel ford v. 
Allen, supra 
VIII Lse ol Prepared Board During 
Closing Argument 
During closing argument, plaintiffs' at-
torney, Mr Sellers produced \ board on 
which tigures had been placed before trial 
The board contained a damage analvsis 
used as an aid to closing argument Ac-
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cording to plaintiffs' brief, the items on the 
board were covered from view by masking 
tape until actually referred to by Mr. Sell-
ers during his argument. Atlas asserts the 
use of this board was improper and resulted 
in an excessive verdict. 
[35,36] In regard to the use of black-
boards during closing argument, the Su-
preme Court in Shuck v. Cook, Okl., 494 
P.2d 306, 312, stated: 
[W]e adhere to the rule that to grant or 
refuse the request is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court who is in the 
best position to know how error may 
creep in. 
The rule is the same whether counsel places 
figures on the blackboard prior to or during 
his argument to the jury. Fields v. Volks-
wagen of America, Inc., Okl., 555 P.2d 48, 
62. We find, under this record, no abuse of 
discretion. 
Furthermore, in Missouri-Kansas-Texas 
Railroad Co. v. Jones, Okl., 354 P.2d 415, 
420, the Supreme Court stated another test 
to determine whether the use of a black-
board was prejudicial to the defendant was 
whether it resulted in an excessive verdict. 
See also Kansas City Southern Railway Co. 
v. Black, Okl., 395 P.2d 416, 419. We have 
already determined, in part VII of this 
opinion, that the verdict was not excessive. 
Atlas asserts the trial court should have 
given a cautionary instruction or admon-
ished the jury that the board was not evi-
dence. However, neither were requested 
by Atlas. 
We find no error in the trial court's per-
mitting plaintiffs to utilize a prepared 
board during closing argument. 
IX. Prejudgment Interest 
Atlas contends in its last proposition of 
error that the trial court should not have 
awarded prejudgment interest. Prejudg-
ment interest is allowable under 12 O.S. 
1971. § 727, which provides in part: 
2. When a verdict for damages by 
reason o( personal injuries is accepted by 
the trial court, the court in rendering 
judgment shall add interest on said ver-
dict at the rate of six percent (6%) per 
annum from the date the suit was com-
menced to date of verdict. 
The trial court awarded prejudgment inter-
est in the amount of $53,987.97. The issue 
is whether prejudgment interest should be 
awarded under a survival or wrongful 
death cause of action. 
In Allen v. Hartford Accident & Indemni-
ty Co., 190 Okl. 313, 123 P.2d 252, 253, the 
Supreme Court stated: "A plaintiff in an 
action for damages for negligence, 3uch as 
one for wrongful death, may not recover 
interest prior to the entry of judgment" 
Allen is not controlling inasmuch as it was 
decided prior to the adoption of Section 727 
allowing prejudgment interest. 
[37,38] Plaintiffs' first cause of action 
was a survivorship action under 12 O.S. 
1971, § 1051, which provides, in part: 
In addition to the causes of action which 
survive at common law, causes of action 
for an injury to the person 
shall also survive: and the action may be 
brought, notwithstanding the death of 
the person entitled or liable to the same. 
Because causes of action for personal inju-
ries survive under Section 1051, prejudg-
ment interest awarded under Section 727 
"when a verdict for damages by reason of 
personal injuries is accepted" is properly 
allowable. Indeed, Atlas does not contend 
prejudgment interest can not be awarded 
under a survivorship action. Rather, Atlas 
contends under Bossert v. Douglas, Okl. 
App., 557 P.2d 1164, the prejudgment inter-
est must be included in the instructions to 
the jury and merged in the final verdict. It 
can not be computed and added to the 
jury's verdict. We find this to be an erro-
neous interpretation of Bossert Further-
more, the statute specifically requires the 
court to add the interest onto the verdict. 
[39] The remaining issue is whether pre-
judgment interest should be allowed in a 
wrongful death action. Oklahoma's wrong-
ful death statute is codified at 12 O.S.1971, 
§ 1053, which provides: 
When the death of one is caused by the 
wrongful act or omission of another, the 
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personal representative of the former 
may maintain an action therefor against 
the latter, or his personal representative 
if he is also deceased, if the former might 
have maintained an action had he lived, 
against the latter, or his representative, 
for an injury for the same act or omis-
sion The action must be commenced 
within two years The damages must 
mure to the exclusive benefit of the sur-
viving spouse and children, if any, or next 
of kin; to be distributed m the same 
manner as personal property of the de-
ceased. (Emphasis added ) 
If decedent had lived, he could maintained 
an action for his personal injuries and re-
covered prejudgment interest. 
In addition, the prejudgment interest 
statute allows the interest when a verdict is 
returned for "damages by reason of person-
al injuries " The language of the statute is 
broad enough to include a recovery for 
wrongful death by reason of personal inju-
ries when the action is, of necessity, 
brought by someone other than the person 
wno sustained the injuries Colorado allows 
prejudgment interest in wrongful death ac-
tions. Although the Colorado prejudgment 
interest statute contains the language 
"whether such injury shall have resulted 
fatally or otherwise," the Colorado Supreme 
Court m American Ins Co v Nay lor, 103 
Colo 461, 87 P2d 260, 264-65 (1939) con-
strued the phrase "in all actions brought to 
recover damages for personal injuries" as 
follows 
There is, of course, no difference in char-
acter between fatal and nonfatal injuries 
The difference is onl> in degree, from 
which it follows that the tale of the act 
of which the foregoing section is a part, 
"An Act providing for interest on dam-
ages for personal injuries," Laws 1911, p 
296, is sufficient to cover actions for dam-
ages resulting from both fatal and nonfa-
tal injuries If the injuries result fatally 
the person bringing the action will of 
necessity be some one other than the de-
ceased, which is the situation presented 
by the cases before us We think ,t 
might well be said that a person, as the 
plaintiff here, who has lost the souet\, 
companionship and services of his wife 
and Has expended money in an attempt to 
minimize or prevent such loss, has himself 
sustained a personal injury We think it 
is not necessary however so to hold in 
order to bring the instant cases within 
the statute In Muhey v Boston, 197 
Mass 178. 83 N E. 402. 14 Ann.Cas. 349, 
the court, referring to a statute of limita-
tions, said "The language of tne statute 
is not restricted to actions for injuries to 
the person of the piamtiff, and we think 
it is broad enough to include all actions of 
tort founded on injuries to .the person of 
any one m such relations to the plaintiff 
that the injury causes him damage." 
Webster's International Dictionary gives 
as one definition of the word "for," and 
the one we think applicable to the con-
struction of the statute before us, the 
following 'Indicating the cause, motive 
or occasion of an act, state or condition, 
hence, because of, on account of, in con-
sequence of, as the effect of, for the 
sake of " We think the actions brought 
to recover damages for each of these 
torts were because of, on account of, and 
in consequence of personal injuries sus-
tained bv the plaintiffs wife of such ex-
tent that they finally resulted fatally 
The cross assignments of error therefore 
must be sustained The reasoning of the 
courts in opinions rendered in the follow-
ing cases, tnough not involving statutes 
and situations identical with those under 
consideration in the cases at bar, is in 
point and supports the conclusion we 
have reacned and expressed herein Mul-
\ey \ Boston, supra, Brahan v Meridian 
Light £ Ry Co, 121 Miss 269. 83 So 467, 
8i\by v Sioux City, 184 Iowa 89, 164 
N W 641, Crapo v Syracuse, 183 N Y 
395, 76 N E. 465, Titman v Mayor, etc., 
of City of New York, 57 Hun 469, 10 
N Y S 689, Price \ National Surety Co, 
221 App Div 56, 222 N Y S 437, Crapo \ 
Syracuse, 98 App Div 376, 30 N Y S 553, 
International & G N Ry Co v Edmund-
son, Tex Civ App , 185 S W 402. 
See also Hmdel v State Farm Wut Auto 
Ins Co, 97 F 2d 777 (7th Gr 1938) (Statute 
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which provided "for the benefit of all per-
sons who may suffer personal injuries" con-
strued to cover an injury which results in 
death.); Hams v. Elliott, 277 Ala. 421, 171 
So.2d 237 (1965), citing Alabama Great 
Southern R. Co. v. Ambrose, 163 Ala. 220, 
50 So. 1030 (1909) (An action for wrongful 
death is an action for personal injuries.); 
Wetz v. Thorpe, 215 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1974) 
(Allowance of prejudgment interest in 
wrongful death is essential to accomplish 
full justice.); Brahan v. Meridian Light & 
Ry. Co., 121 Miss. 269, 83 So. 467 (1919) (The 
term personal injuries construed to mean all 
actions of tort founded on injuries to the 
person and does not refer to only those 
actions brought by the person receiving the 
physical impact.); Weiman v. Ippolito, 129 
NJ.Super. 578, 324 A.2d 582 (1974) (Pre-
judgment interest allowable in wrongful 
death action when statute stated the court 
shall "in tort actions" include prejudgment 
interest.); 43A C.J.S. Injury at p. 770 (1978) 
(The word injuries includes all injuries, 
whether fatal or not.). 
We therefore hold that the trial court 
properly awarded prejudgment interest on 
the amounts recovered under both the sur-
vivorship and wrongful death causes of ac-
tion. In view of the findings of this court 
on Atlas' nine propositions of error, the 
judgment of the trial court is accordingly 
affirmed in all respects. 
AFFIRMED. 
ROMANG and REYNOLDS, JJ., concur. 
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J. Hyrum CALL, Elizabeth H. Calf, as co-
trustees, W. W. DIHard and Essie Dillard, 
Husband and Wffe, Pfaintiffs and Counter 
Defendants-Respondents, 
v. 
Virgil A. MARLER and Alice Marler, Hus-
band and Wife, Defendants and Coun-
ter Claimants-Appellants. 
No. 9531. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
June 2o, 196.* 
Partition action wherein defendant 
sought accounting* for wheat crop. The 
District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial 
District, Caribou County, Francis J. Ras-
mussen, J., entered judgment, and defend-
ants appealed. The Supreme Court, Knud-
son, J , held, in part, that the stipulation 
entered into by the parties during the trial 
abrogated the contradictory pretrial con-
ference order provision to the effect that 
the plaintiffs' collection of rent tor certain 
\ears was barred by limitation 
Judgment modified and attirmed and 
cause remanded. 
1. Partition 0=89 
Evidence in partition action wherein 
dctendants sought accounting for wheat 
ciop established that detcnaants were en-
titled to share of crop based on $2.12 rather 
than a $1 65 per bushel figur: used by trial 
court. 
2. Trial 0=>388(l) 
Purpose of requiring findings of fact 
and conclusions of law is to aid appellate 
court bv affording* it clear understanding of 
basis ot decision of trial court 
3. Appeal and Error C=>I07I(6) 
Absence of findings would be disre-
garded by reviewing court where record 
was so clear that court did not need their 
aid for complete understanding of issues. 
4. Partition 0=89 
Burden ot est ibliblung th it an t lis v\crc 
pi\able to them for >eais 1047 through 1951 
was on defendants, in partition action 
wherein defendants sought accounting for 
wheat crop for certain years. 
5. Partition 0=89 
Evidence involving testimony of wit-
ness who was unable to staie kind, amount 
or value of crop or crops raised or produced 
during any oi years was insufficient to 
support judgment for defendants, in parti-
tion action wherein defendants sought ac-
counting for wheat crop for certain years 
6. Limitation of Actions 0=85(5) 
Since statute of limitations may ha\c 
been suspended during time plaintiff ten-
ants in common were absent from state, 
collection of rents by defendant tenants in 
common for certain years was not barred 
by statute of limitations. I.C. § 5-229. 
7. Stipulations C»«8(4) 
Stipulation entered into by parties dur-
ing trial abrogated contradictory pretrial 
conterence order provision to effect that 
parties had agreed that collection of rents 
tor certain years was barred by limitation. 
I.C. § 5-229, Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 16 
8. Stipulations 0=16 
Stipulations are ordinarily entered into 
for purpose of saving time, trouble or 
expense, and as general rule parties are 
bound therebv. 
9. Stipulations 0=13 
Court mav in its sound discretion re-
he\ e against stipulation entered into through 
mistake or misunderstanding of fact or 
entered into inadvertently, inadvisedK, or 
mipro\ idently where under all circum-
stances its enforcement would work in-
justice 
10. Partition 0=114(1) 
Each party was properly oraered to 
bear oun trial court costs m partition action 
therein defendants sought accounting for 
wheat crop, both parties prevailed, and 
defendant appellants' costs were not shown 
to have been in excess of costs incurred by 
Maintutb 1 C §§ 12-102, 12-104. 
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CALL v. MAULER 
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R. M Whit t ier and L. Kim McDonald, 
rocatcllo, for appellants. 
Jones, Pomcroy & Jones and Raci IC, 
Huntley & Olson, PocateJlo, for respond-
ents 
K X U D S O N , Justice. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, J. Hvrt tm C ill, 
Elizabeth H Call, as co-trustees, \\" W 
Dillard and Essie Di ' lard. husband and 
wife, commenced this action seeking a par-
tition or sale of 160 acres of land which they 
held as tenants in common with defendants-
appellants, Virgil H. Mai ler and -Mice 
Marler, husband and wife. Defendants 
filed their answer contending the property 
could not be paiti t ioned, and also by way 
of counterclaim «ought an accounting: of 
rents and profits allegedly received by plain-
tirfs and their predecessors in interest while 
they occupied or had the use of the land 
involved. 
The partition ot the land has been accom-
plished and it has been stipulated that any 
matters relatmg to the division oi the land 
are no longer to ue considered as an ls^ue 
on this appeal. 
The issues created by the pleadmgs in-
volve rents and profits which allegedly ac-
crued during 1947 and subsequent vears. 
Defendants acquired their undivided one-
half interest m the land under iked cxcui ted 
bv Ila/elle McDon ild and Eugene P Mc-
Donald, VVIIL and husband, dated April 1°, 
1%0 ( D e r E \ n I) Pr ior to said t ransfer 
the McDonalds and respondents \V \ \ 
Dillard and o.1 f e were owners ot die land 
as tenant'- m common Pr ior to the com-
mcicinKiit j t this action ^March 20, \%l) 
the McDonalds had filed an action against 
the Dillards in Los \ngeles Countv, C i h -
fonna, seeking to recover tor pibt due 
rentals relative ^o the propertv here con-
cerned Under date oi Tune °, 1960, Mc-
Donalds assigned rheir right, title and in-
terest in and to said cause of action to 
defendants, Marie rs 
In l°61 plaintiffs C ills entered into i 
purchase contract where 'n thev agreed to 
purchase all interest which the Dillards h id 
in the 1 ui'I and also agreed to pay anv 
mom} s due to the defendants by reason ot 
their succession to the l ights of McDonalds 
Trial was had Ix fore th^ com t sitting 
without a jurv and ]ii igment Wets entcied 
June 1°), 1964 m r\r or of defendants in the 
amount of $1880 03, together with inteicst 
and without costs. This appeal is trom 
said judgment. 
[1] Under appellants assignments of 
error Xos IV, V and VI it is contended that 
the trial court did not allow appellants com-
pensation to which *-hc> were entitled for 
their proper share ot the wheat crop raised 
on 40 acres of the land which had been 
farmed by Calls during 1961. These assign-
ments are not discussed by respondents in 
their brief 
The evidence established that 1384 83 
bushels of v*neat had been raised on said 
40 acres during 1061 and the court tound 
that 346 3 bushels constituted appellants ' 
share of such crop. The findings do not 
disclose the steps considered or method 
employed by the court in at riving at that 
figure, however it amounts to one-fourth of 
the total crop v Inch is w keeping with the 
percentage allowed each ot the owners as 
concerns the other crops prxluced during 
that vear on the land involved and consti-
tuted a t ur ana reasonable ipportionmcnt 
V e arc unable to hnd m the Tecord support 
t<>r the cnu-t s cmeiusi . n that >uch wheat 
w is wottn onlv ^1 65 ner ou>he! Plaintiffs' 
E\hit>it D discloses fh it me-halt ot that 
croo or vheat was MIKI toi $2 12 per bushel 
irul since there is no other competent CM* 
dence it -he value, ippell mts should be 
aw
 trde I S~"4 15 instead ot > ;71 40 as their 
siiaie ot said crop 
Xpoeilants contend that the court erred 
in fading to make hnd" gs ot tact and 
cone UMons ~>t law rc ' i t iv* fo appellants' 
claim *oi rents and profits tor the \ e i r s 
1047 through 1051 The court did find that 
plaintiffs' predecessors m m t e r c n the Dil-
lar Is, r< smod outside of this state during 
s i 'd pu iod , ind that *he ru i t s pavablc to 
u u \ n d mts fr their pted*. cessoi s in interest 
the McDona'ds, toi said ve u s were one and 
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pavable in this state as rents on Idaho real 
property. 
[2,3] The purpose of requiring findings 
of fact and conclusions of law is to aid the 
appellate court by affording it a clear under-
standing of the basis of the decision of the 
trial court. The absence of findings may be 
disregarded by the appellate court if the 
record is so clear that the court does not 
need their aid for a complete understanding 
of the issues. Merrill v. Merrill, S3 Idaho 
306, 362 P2d 887, \ngletou v Vnglcton, 
84 Idaho 184, 370 P2d 7S8 In view of the 
condition of the record betore us, we con-
sider this rule to be applicable herein. 
[4,5] The burden of establishing that 
rentals were payable to them for the vears 
1947 through 1951 was on appellants The 
only evidence submitted relative to said 
period was the testimony of one witness who 
was unable to state the kind, amount or 
^alue of the crop or crops raised or pro-
duced during any of said \ears The proof 
submitted was incompetent and insufficient 
to support a judgment of anv amount in 
fa\or of appellants under said claim. 
Appellants contend that the court erred 
in finding that the defendants, as tenants m 
common with plaintiffs, were nrecluded 
from recovering their share of pabt rentals 
and profits because oi the running ot the 
statute ot limitations and in tailing: to set 
aside pretrial conterenee order that had 
been erroneously ordered b> the court 
The rents and profits nuohed under 
these assignments or error were originally 
those allegedly owed from respondents Dil-
lards to the McDonalds as the latter s co-
tenant s share for the \ears 19^2 through 
1956 Appellants claim sucn rentals under 
an assignment from McDonalds and seek 
to recover them under their counterclaim. 
The record discloses that a pretrial con-
ference was had before the court on Febru-
ary 7, 1962, at which time ill of the parties 
unoiveci were repicsented by their respec-
tive attornc\s. On April 13, 1%2, a pretrial 
conference oracr was entered and filed 
which stated that the parties had stipulated 
the following quoted paragraph 6: 
"6 That $1,000 00 per year w as paid 
b\ the Calls to the Dullards for rent for 
the vears 1952, 1053, 1954, 1955, and 
1956. That the collection of these rents 
b> the defendants, Marlers. is barred 
by the Statute of Limitations " 
The order further directed that a copy 
thereof be mailed forthwith to each of the 
counsel for the parties It also ordered that 
the case be set tor tnal to commence April 
30 1962. 
On October -, 1962 the court made find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law wherein, 
at paragraph 7 thereof, it is stated that the 
court finds • 
"7. That the paities agree the col-
lection ot rents for the \cars 1952, 1953, 
1°54, 1955 and 1956 is barred bv the 
Statute of Limitations.' 
These findings were filed October 3, 1962. 
On October 17, 1°62, defendants filed 
their objections to the findings and conclu-
sions " herein it is stated that the defendants 
"object to finding: number 7 for the 
reason that the Defendants and Coun-
ter-Claimants do not agree that the 
collection of the rents tor the years 
1°^2 through 1056 is barred by the 
Statute of Limitations ' 
On "he same day defendants filed their 
motion to strike from paragraph 6 of the 
pretrial conference order the following 
quoted language 
"That the collection ot the^e rcnts ay 
the Defendants Marlers, is barred b> 
Statute ot Limitations ' 
As i part of «aid motion defendants aiso 
stated that in tne alternatne they moved 
to ha\ e the c i*e reopened and to permit 
counsel to ha\e the pretrial statements 
amended and a hearing had relating to the 
running of the statute ot limitations. This 
motion was supnotted b\ the afnda\it of 
R M Whittler attorne\ tor defendants, 
wheiein the affiant states posituelv and 
uiie'[ui\oca!l\ that the defendants did not 
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enter into a stipulation as stated in said 
paragraph 6 of the pretrial conference 
order. By order dated February 29, 1964 
and filed March 4, 1964, defendants ' said 
motions were denied on the ground that the 
motion was not timely. 
The supporting affidavit contains the fol-
lowing explanation or defendants ' delay in 
presenting such motion to s t r ike : 
"Your Affiant further states that 
Item 6 of the pre-trial conference order 
was permitted to stand without any 
mention for the reason that the Defend-
ants and Counter-Claimants, Mariers , 
and their at torney over-looked and did 
not become advised of the contents of 
Item 6 of the pre-trial order until this 
date and that it was assumed by the 
Defendants and Counter-Claimants 
that the facts were that this was an 
issue which was in accordance with the 
Defendants' pre-trial statements to the 
Court furnished at the time of the pre-
trial hearing and that this is a matter 
of oversight or excusable neglect and 
that great and irreparable harm would 
result if this order was permitted to 
stand undisturbed." 
In support oi appellants' contention that 
it is evident from the record that neither 
court nor counsel considered that such a 
•stipulation had been entered into at the 
pretrial conference, our attention is called 
to the following quoted stipulation which 
was entered into in open court during the 
trial and as a part of defendants ' case, 
to-wit: 
"'MR. W H I T T I E R : Before proceeding 
further, T wonder if counsel would stip-
ulate the fact that—in one of these 
issues is whether the statute of limita-
tions has run. I wonder if it could be 
stipulated that Mr. Dillard has been out 
of the State of Idaho for the years 1947 
through 1962. 
• T H E C O U R T : Mr. Racine. 
"MR. R A C I N E : Weil, — 
"MR. W H I T T I E R : Or do you want 
me to produce evidence on this? 
"MR. R A C I N E : No. I think n o t W e 
understand generally that he has been 
a resident of California although occa-
sionally in the State of Idaho, Your 
Honor , and we— 
" T H E C O U R T : Not as a resident in 
the State of Idaho, but as— 
"MR. R A C I N E : Not as a resident in 
Idaho. 
" T H E C O U R T : —only as a visitor. 
"MR. R A C I N E : As a visitor. 
" T H E C O U R T : The record will show 
that you gentlemen have stipulated that 
W. W. Dillard and Essie Dillard have 
been residents of California during the 
terms—times in question in the cross 
complaint." . 
The provisions of I.C. § 5-229 are per-
tinent to the foregoing stipulated facts. 
Said section provides: 
"If, when the cause of action accrues 
against a person, he is out of the state, 
the action may be commenced within 
the term herein limited, after his re turn 
to the state, and if, after the cause of 
action accrues, he departs from the 
state, the time of his absence is not 
part of the time limited for the com-
mencement of the action." 
[6] Since, the statute of limitations may 
have been suspended during the time Dil-
lards were absent from this state, it is evi-
dent from the foregoing stipulated facts that 
tiie collection of rents for the years 1952 
through 1956 was not in fact barred by the 
statute of limitations. Consequently the 
above quoted stipulation is exactly contrary 
to the stipulation stated in the pretrial con-
ference order. Obviously only one of them 
can be given effect. Appellants contend that 
the stipulation made during the trial should 
control since it is a stipulation of fact while 
the other was a stipulation of law and not 
binding on the court (John Hancock Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. v. Niell. 79 Idaho 5SD, 
319 P.2d 195), or on the parties. Cox v. 
City of Pocatello, 77 Idaho 225, 291 P.2d 
282. 
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The pretrial conference order is governed 
by I.R.C.P. Rule 16, which states in part: 
"The court shall make an order which 
recites the action taken at the confer-
ence, the amendments allowed to the 
pleadings, and the agreements made by 
the parties as to any of the matters 
considered, and which limits the issues 
for trial to those not disposed of by 
admissions or agreements of counsel; 
and such order when entered controls 
the subsequent course of the action, 
unless modified at the trial to prevent 
manifest injustice." 
[7-9] Stipulations are ordinarily entered 
into for the purpose of saving time, trouble 
or expense and as a general rule the parties 
are bound thereby. However fl, roilrt mn-y 
in its sound discretion relieve against _a 
stipulation entered into through mistake or 
misunderstanding of fact or entered into 
inadvertently, inadvisedly, or improvidentlv 
where under all the circumstances its en-
forcement would work an injustice. Brad-
ford v. Schmucker, 10 Cir., 135 F.2d 991, 
and cases cited therein. Concerning this 
subject this court, in Koepl v. Ruppert, 29 
Idaho 223, 15S P. 319, stated: 
"Furthermore, it is within the sound 
judicial discretion of a trial court, for 
good cause shown and in furtherance 
of justice, to relieve parties from stip-
ulations which they have entered into 
in the course of judicial proceedings, 
and it is its duty to do so when enforce-
ment thereof would be inequitable and 
when, as in this case, all parties to the 
action will, by vacating the stipula-
tion, be placed in exactly the same con-
dition they were in before it was 
made." 
In the instant case appellants contend 
that since the court heard evidence on the 
matter and respondents stipulated that the 
Diilards did not reside in Idaho during the 
stated years and the rental involved dur-
ing those years was recognized as an issue 
in the case, they were entirely misled by 
the court's recognition of the challenged 
portion of the order. 
I.R.C.P. 16 expressly authorizes modifi-
cation of the pretrial conference order dur-
ing the trial. Since paragraph 6 of said 
order is contrary to the stipulation entered 
into during the trial, the latter must be 
regarded as a modification of the order to 
the extent that it nullified said paragraph 
6 of the order. We therefore conclude that 
the court erred in finding "that the parties 
agreed the collection of rents for the years 
1952, 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956 is barred by 
the Statute of Limitations." 
[10] The trial court held that each par-
ty bear their own costs.4 Although error is 
assigned to this order, it is not discussed in 
respondents' brief. Appellants contend that 
since they were awarded a judgment for 
a net sum of $1,SS9.03 and interest they 
were entitled to recover their costs pur-
suant to the provisions of I.C. § 12—104. 
This action was originally concerned 
with a partition or sale of real property 
which in its nature involves title or posses-
sion of real estate. By their counterclaim 
appellants introduced the issue involving 
the recovery of money. The issues pre-
sented by both parties were tried together 
and at the same time. Respondents were 
successful in their action seeking partition 
and under I.C. § 12-102 they likewise were 
entitled to recover costs incident to their 
action. 
In the absence of a showing on the part 
of appellants that the costs which they in-
curred in the prosecution of their counter-
claim exceeded the costs allowable to re-
spondents under the judgment decreeing 
partition, appellants were not entitled to 
the relief requested. There being no such 
showing the claimed error is without merit. 
The judgment of the trial court is modi-
fied and the cause remanded with directions 
to the trial court as follows: 
(1) To strike paragraph 7 from its find-
ings of fact. 
12) To consider such evidence as has 
been introduced ami to hear and consider 
such additional evidence as the parties or 
any oi them may oiler m support of or 
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FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE 
INVESTORS and Citibank, N.A.f 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v, 
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a 
limited partnership, et aL, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE 
INVESTORS, et aL, Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
v. 
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a Unv 
ited partnership, Bland Brothers, Inc., et 
aL, Defendants and Appellant. 
Nos. 15696, 16051. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 24, 1979. 
Appeal was taken in separate but relat-
ed proceedings in the Second District Court, 
Davis County, J Duff} Palmer, J , involv-
ing allocation of priorities between mortga-
gees foreclosing against real property and 
competing hen claimants who provided 
services and matenals for improvements to 
the property The Supreme Court, Stew-
art, J , held, inter aha, that the trial court 
properly determined that the mechanics 
and materialman's hens had priority over 
the trust deed 
Affirmed and remanded 
1. Mechanics' Liens *»43 
It is not necessary to attachment of 
mechanics hen that material or labor be 
furnished solely on building structure or 
that work be performed solely on lot on 
which building is being erected, and con-
tractor should not be barred from enjoying 
benefits of mechanics hen statute where 
his work not only enhances /alue of devel-
oper s land but is also necessary to make 
residences to be built on such property hab-
itable U C A 1953, 38-1-3 
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2. Mechanics' Liens «=»35 
Contractor was entitled to mechanics' 
hen in connection with construction project 
on 44-acre subdivision for its services in 
locating existing lines and putting in pipe-
line, water and sewer systems and storm 
drains U C A 1953, 38-1-3 
3. Mechanics' Liens <s=>173 
Where mortgage loan involved blanket 
mortgage covering entire 44-acre subdivi-
sion comprising single dwelling lots and 
condominiums, and initial work of contrac-
tor in locating existing lands and putting in 
pipelines, water and sewer systems and 
storm drains related to and benefited entire 
subdivision, such work could not be charac-
terized as being "off-site" improvements 
that would not impart notice to lenders; 
therefore, mechanics' hens arising from fur-
nishing of materials and labor both on over-
all development site and on individual con-
dominium units within development related 
back to initial work done on project U C. 
A 1953, § 38-1-3 
4. Mechanics' Liens <3=»208 
To be valid and binding, waiver or re-
lease or mechanics hen by contractor 
agreement must be supported by legal con-
sideration, when contractor received cash 
and propert} in exchange for release of 
hen, its release of hen rights was therefore 
binding as to those rights accrued up to 
time of release U C A 1953, 38-1-3 
5. Mechanics' Liens <s=»166 
Where work of all other lien claimants 
on construction project was completed prior 
to date on which one claimant released its 
hen in exchange for cash and property, and 
other claimants' rights had already at-
tached, such other claimants who were not 
parties to relief and did not consent to its 
terms, were not affected bv rehef and such 
other hen claimants were entitled to same 
priority date as that originally accorded to 
releasing claimant U C A 1953 38-1-3, 
38-1-10 
6. Stipulations ®=>3 
Courts are ordinarily bound by stipula-
tions between parties, but sucn is not case 
when points of law requiring judicial deter-
mination are involved 
Appendix 'E-4' 
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7. Stipulations <s=>13, 16 
Parties are bound by their stipulations 
unless relieved therefrom by court, which 
has power to set aside stipulation entered 
into inadvertently or for justifiable cause. 
8. Appeal and Error <$=>846(5) 
Where, in proceedings involving priori-
ty of mechanics' lien claims versus claims of 
mortgagee, record contained no findings as 
to validity or effect of one claimant's stipu-
lation waiving its lien, Supreme Court 
would not consider such matter for first 
time on appeal. 
9. Stipulations $=>17(2) 
Whatever effect of stipulation by me-
chanics' lienholder concerning lien's priority 
status with reference to trust deed, other 
lien claimants who sought priority over 
trust deed were in no way bound by stipula-
tion to which they were not parties. 
10. Appeal and Error <*» 790(2) 
Appeal involving priority of mechanics' 
lien claimants with references to trust deed 
on construction project was not moot 
where, although sheriffs deed in foreclo-
sure had been issued to mortgagees, they 
had not paid amount bid into court as or-
dered and thus should not have received 
deed and lien claimants who had been ad-
judged to have first priority had not been 
paid. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
69(e)(4). 
11. Appeal and Error $=> 337(1) 
Appeal involving issue of priority of 
mechanics' lien claims with reference to lien 
of deed of trust on construction project was 
not premature, despite fact that various 
cross claims and counterclaims had not been 
resolved by trial court, where such cross 
claims and counterclaims were unrelated to 
issue of lien priority and no further judicial 
action remained to be taken with respect to 
issues of priority and sale of property. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 54(b), 72(a). 
12. Mortgages <s=»575 
In proceedings involving foreclosure 
under deed of trust, trial court retained 
jurisdiction over enforcement of its decree 
even after appeal was taken from its deter-
mination regarding lien priorities where no 
supersedeas bond was posted prior to sher-
iff's sale or before motion was made to 
have sale vacated. 
Richard H. Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants in 15696 and for 
plaintiffs and respondents in 16051. 
J. Anthony Eyre, George H. Speciale, 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr., Albert J. Colton, Rob-
ert 3. Howell, David H. Schowbe, Richard 
C. Davidson, Carvel R. Shaffer, Salt Lake-
City, George K. Fadel, Albert E. Mann, 
Bountiful, John H. Kelly, pro se., LeRoy S. 
Axland, Randy S. Ludlow, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants and respondents in 15696. 
Robert C. Cummings, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellant in 16051 and for 
defendants and respondents in 15696. 
Gordon A. Madsen, Robert F. Orton, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and appellants in 
16051. 
STEWART, Justice: 
This appeal from the district court consol-
idates two separate but related proceedings. 
These proceedings involve the allocation of 
priorities between mortgagees foreclosing 
against real property in Davis County, 
Utah, and competing lien claimants who 
provided services and materials for im-
provements to the property. 
Plaintiffs, First of Denver Mortgage In-
vestors ("FDMI") and Citibank, N.A., were 
granted a judgment against defendant 
Mountain Springs by the trial court on De-
cember 20, 1977, in the amount of $2,358,-
396.08. The amount represented $1,558,-
005.51 in outstanding principal and $800,-
390.57 in interest. The judgment was se-
cured by a lien on the Lakeview Terrace 
subdivision. The court's conclusions of law 
include the following: 
4. Plaintiffs have stipulated in open 
court that they shall bid only the sum of 
one million nine hundred thousand for 
said property [at the sheriff's sale] and 
take no deficiency judgment against the 
defendant. Mountain Springs Construe-
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tion Company, nor against any of the 
individual guarantors 
The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
states 
The priority of the mechanic's and mate-
rialmen's hens is reserved for future de-
termination and shall be set forth in a 
supplemental Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure to be entered prior to Sher-
iffs Sale. 
The Decree further provides 
that the proceeds of sale be 
applied in payment of the Sheriffs cost 
of sale and thereafter to the parties in 
accordance with the priority to be deter-
mined by the court 
The court subsequently entered its order 
awarding priority to mechanics liens 
ciaimed by eight defendants. The appeal 
from that order by plaintiffs is Case No. 
15696 in tms Court. 
In a consolidated case, No. 16051, defend-
ant Bland Brothers, Inc. ("Bland Bros.") 
appeals from the lower court's denial of its 
motion to set aside the sheriffs sale held 
pursuant to the foreclosure action and rais-
es procedural issues in connection there-
with. We shall examine first the common 
facts underlying these cases and then deal 
separately with the issues raised on appeal. 
This litigation concerns a subdivision 
which originally comprised 44 acres in 
Bountiful, Utah, known as Lakeview Ter-
race subdivision A trust deed was record-
ed as to this property on August 1, 1973, 
when plaintiff FDMI made a loan of $450,-
000 to C N Zundel and Associates, a limited 
partnership In November 1973 defendant 
Child Brothers, Inc. ("Child Bros") com-
menced the first work on the property for 
C.N Zundel The work consisted of locat-
ing existing lines and putting in pipeline, 
water and sewer systems, and storm drams 
Subsequently, the original FDMI loan was 
refinanced, and the 1973 trust deed re-
leased, with FDMI advancing $1,500,000 to 
Zundel and several limited partners This 
amount was secured by a new trust deed 
1. On June 13 1979 orders of dismissal based 
on settlements between the parties were en 
tered in this Court dismissing the following 
recorded on February 19, 1974. The con-
struction loan was for the financing of im-
provements on the 44-acre property, which 
was to comprise 54 single-family building 
sites and 69 condominium units The loan 
was due and payable on January 15, 1976. 
On August 8, 1975, Zundel conveyed the 
property to Mountain Springs Construction 
Company, whose stockholders were the 
same individuals who had been Zundel's 
limited partners Because Zundel had be-
come delinquent on the FDMI loan, FDMI 
on September 8, 1975, filed its first com-
plaint for foreclosure In-November FDMI 
concluded a supplemental loan agreement 
with Mountain Springs, the successor to 
C N. Zundel and Associates, which modified 
the construction loan so as to require repay-
ment in installments in July 1976, October 
1976, July 1977, and December 1977 
The following lien claimants first per-
formed work on the Lakeview property for 
Mountain Springs on the dates indicated 
Child Bros, November 15, 1973, Duncan 
Electric, January 22, 1975, Robert J War-
drop, December 1, 1975, Countertop Shop, 
Inc., March 9, 1976, Max D Scheel, April 
19, 1976, Ronald Graham Tile Co, March 
23, 1976, and Bland Bros , March 8 1976 
Additionally, Holt-Witmer provided wallpa-
per and linoleum under contract with Zun-
del commencing January 1, 1975 Except 
for Child Bros, the hen claimants all per-
formed labor or furnished materials on vari-
ous condominium units situated on the 
property l 
In June 1976 Child Bros, as credit in the 
approximate amount of $22,000 toward the 
sum owed by Zundel and Mountain Springs, 
accepted a check for $13,210 and a warran-
ty deed to two lots in the subdivision 
FDMI's trust deed provided that the title to 
the property deeded to Child Bros would 
revert to FDMI if the required payment 
was not made by July 1, 1976 In exchange 
for the payment in cash and property, Child 
Bros executed a release of all hens and 
parties Child Bros Duncan Electric. Counter-
top Shop and Holt Witmer 
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claims. The release was recorded on June 
22, 1976. 
Mountain Springs failed to pay the July 
1976 installment on its note to FDMI. A 
partial assignment of the promissory note 
and trust deed from FDMI to Citibank, 
N.A., was recorded on July 30, 1976, and 
FDMI and Citibank on August 2, 1976, filed 
an amended complaint seeking foreclosure 
of the property Mountain Springs answer-
ed, counter-claimed for damages, and filed 
a lis pendens against the property. One 
year later Child Bros, cross-claimed for 
money due and failure of warranty on the 
lots conveyed to it. Subsequently, the 
plaintiffs and the lien claimant defendants 
moved for summary judgment. 
Following the December 20, 1977, hear-
ing, plaintiffs were awarded a judgment 
against Mountain Springs; the question of 
lien priority was reserved for later determi-
nation. The sheriff's sale took place on 
January 19, 1978. Plaintiff FDMI bid 
$1,900,000 for the property; no higher bids 
were received. On January 24, the court 
entered a Memorandum Decision awarding 
the lien claimants first priority over the 
plaintiffs. That ruling involved total liens 
in the undisputed amount of $37,397.42. In 
making its ruling, the court in effect reject-
ed a stipulation signed by attorneys for 
Child Bros, and FDMI on January 11, 1978, 
that Child Bros.' lien was junior to the trust 
deed. The provisions of the Memorandum 
Decision were embodied in the court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment and Order 
Amending Certificate of Sale on February 
1, 1978. Pursuant to this order, the sher-
iffs certificate of sale was amended to 
change plaintiffs bid to $1,937,397.42. On 
February 16, 1978, following the entry of a 
summary judgment in favor of lien claim-
ant Holt-Witmer, the court entered another 
order requiring "that the sheriffs certifi-
cate of sale shall be amended to show that 
plaintiffs bid for the property is the sum of 
$1,944,732.86." 
Child Bros.' cross-claim and counterclaims 
against Zundel, Mountain Springs, and 
plaintiffs were dismissed following a tnai 
on February 1, 1978. Child Bros.' counsel 
was not present at the trial for reasons set 
out in an affidavit filed with Child Bros.' 
appellate brief. 
On these facts, the plaintiffs FDMI and 
Citibank in Case No 15696 seek reversal of 
the summary judgment dated February 1, 
1978, awarding the named lien claimants 
priority over plaintiffs' trust deed. 
Plaintiffs contend that liens for materials 
furnished for construction in Lakeview Ter-
race could not relate back to the date of the 
first work commenced on Novemoer 15, 
1973, by Child Bros, for two basic reasons. 
First, plaintiffs characterize Child Bros.' 
work as "off-site improvements" and argue 
that liens arising subsequent to such im-
provements and after the recording of 
plaintiffs' trust deed which relate to specif-
ic structures cannot relate back to the date 
of the commencement of Child Bros.' work. 
Second, plaintiffs rely on Child Bros.' re-
lease of its claims to a lien for wcrk per-
formed prwr to June 17, 1976. Plaintiffs 
further argue that the work done in Octo-
ber 1976 by Child Bros, was not under the 
same contract as work done previously by 
Child Bros, on Lakeview Terrace and was 
therefore, as stipulated by Child Bros., jun-
ior and subordinate to plaintiffs' trust deed. 
Whether the lower court decided the 
question of hen priority properly depends 
on a consideration of several propositions of 
law underlying plaintiffs' contentions. 
The first issue is whether the improve-
ments by Child Bros, met the general statu-
tory requirements under Utah law for the 
attachment of mechanics' liens. The Utah 
lien statute, § 38-1-3,2 lists the following 
persons among those entitled to a mechan-
ics' hen: "Contractors, subcontractors and 
all persons performing any services or fur-
nishing any materials used in the construc-
tion, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to 
any premises in any manner 
uThe purpose of the lien statutes is to 
protect those who have added directly to 
the value of property by performng labor 
2. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
FIRST OF DENVER MORTG. INVESTORS v. 
Cite as 600 P 2d 521 
C. N. ZUNDEL Utah 525 
or furnishing materials upon it," Stanton 
Transportation Co v Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 
187, 341 P2d 207, 209 (1959) The broad 
language, "improvement to any premises in 
any manner," encompasses the instant case 
where sewer and water systems were in-
stalled on the subject property 
[1,2] It is not necessary to the attach-
ment of a mechanics' hen that the material 
or labor be furnished solely on a building 
structure or that the work be performed 
solely on the lot on which a building is 
being erected. We agree with the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, which stated in J R. 
Christ Construction Co v Willete Assocs., 
47 NJ. 473, 221 A 2d 538 (1966), that a 
contractor should not be barred from enjoy-
ing the benefits of the mechanics' hen stat-
ute where his work not only enhances the 
value of the developer's land, but is also 
necessary to make residences to be built on 
such property habitable. The court held 
that where a developer engages the con-
tractor to install a sewer system for a sub-
division project, the contractor, if he com-
plies with required statutory procedures, is 
entitled to a mechanics' lien against the 
developer's property for the cost of labor 
and materials furnished The New Jersey 
Court cited Ladue Contracting Co v Land 
Development Co, 337 S W 2d 578 (Mo App 
1960), in emphasizing the fact that water 
and sewer systems are essential to the com-
fortable and convenient use of dwellings 
and that it would be "turning] the clock 
back to another century' to hold that 3uch 
improvements are outside the terms of the 
lien statute. (Id at 585) 
The second issue is whether the priority 
of materialmen's hens is different with re-
spect to a blanket construction loan for a 
subdivision comprising single dwelling lots 
and condominiums as compared with a con-
struction loan for a single dwelling in a 
subdivision where there may have been 
'off-site" improvements that would not im-
part notice to lenders of the latter type of 
loan Plaintiffs rely on this Court's deci-
sion in Western Mortgage Loan Corp v 
Cottonwood Construction Co, 18 Utah 2d 
409, 424 P2d 437 (1967), to support their 
argument that our mechanics' hen statute 
provides that hens are to date back only to 
the time each individual structure was com-
menced 
Western Mortgage involved the relative 
priorities of mechanics' liens and a construc-
tion mortgage on a single lot in a subdivi-
sion. The question was whether hen claim-
ants who had furnished labor or materials 
that went into the construction of the house 
on that single lot were entitled to tack for 
priority purposes to work comprising "off-
site improvements," i e., the laying out the 
subdivision and the installation of water 
lines, sewer, curb and gutter, and street 
paving done earlier in connection with the 
subdivision as a whole. The lien claimants 
cited § 38-1-5, which reads in part as fol-
lows* 
Priority—Over otner encumbrances — 
The hens herein provided for shall relate 
back to, and take effect as of, the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish 
materials on the ground for the structure 
or improvement, and shall have priority 
over any lien, mortgage or other encum-
brance which may have attached subse-
quently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was com-
menced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground 
This Court held that the recorded construc-
tion mortgage took pnont over the me-
chanics' hens because in that case the liens 
could not relate back to the date of com-
mencement of off-site imorovements. The 
decision rested on the issue of notice The 
Court stated, 18 Utah 2d at 412, 424 P2d at 
439 
The presence of materials on the build-
ing 3ite or evidence on the ground that 
work has commenced on a structure or 
preparatory thereto is notice to all the 
world that hens may have attached. 
However, the off-site construction in de-
veloping the subdivision for ouilding sites 
would not necessarily bring to the atten-
tion of a lender that someone is claiming 
a hen on a particular lot in the subdivi-
sion This is especially true as in this 
case, where the lender advanced money 
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to build a home long after the subdivision 
had been laid out and developed. 
[3] The instant case, however, is distin-
guishable from Western Mortgage. Here 
we are not dealing with a lender who made 
a loan on a single lot within a subdivision 
and who had no reason to be on notice as to 
the existence of prior work. In this case, 
the initial work performed by Child Bros, 
related to and benefited the entire subdivi-
sion. The mortgage loan in question was a 
blanket mortgage covering the entire subdi-
vision. Because the initial work was per-
formed over substantial portions of the 
property involved, it could not properly be 
characterized as being "off-site" as were 
the improvements in Western Mortgage in 
relation to the property that was the sub-
ject of the construction loan. Furthermore, 
the claimant of the mechanics' lien in West-
ern Mortgage performed the labor on a lot 
entirely separate from the initial work. In 
the present case the claimants performed 
their work on the same site, i. e., the 44 
acres covered by FDMI's construction loan. 
Plaintiffs also cite Aladdin Heating Corp. 
v. Trustees of Cent. States, Nevada, 563 
P.2d 82 (1977), in which the court refused to 
relate mechanics' liens back to pre-construc-
tion architectural, soil testing, and survey 
work. The court in Aladdin required "visi-
ble signs of construction to inform prospec-
tive lenders [who inspected] the premises 
that liens had attached," and the work per-
formed in that case and others cited therein 
resulted in nothing that would put a lender 
on notice because of the visibility of the 
work. In the instant case Child Bros, laid 
water line and sewer pipe for the subdivi-
sion, commencing its first work on Novem-
ber 15, 1973. The trial court made no spe-
cific findings as to the visibility of Child 
Bros.' work at the time the loan agreement 
was entered into, and this issue was not 
raised or argued by plaintiffs. The work 
done by Child Bros., however was conceded-
ly more suDstantiai than that done in A/ad-
din. Accordingly, Aladdin is distinguisha-
ble from the present case. 
Based on our statute and the issues sub-
mitted by the parties, the materialmen with 
valid liens stand, in this case, on equal 
footing in dating their liens from the time 
work commenced. We therefore hold that 
the mechanics' liens arising from the fur- • 
nishing of materials and labor both on the 
overall development site and on individual 
condominium units within the development 
relate back to the initial work done on the 
project by Child Bros. 
A third issue involves the effect of Child 
Bros.' execution in June 1976 of a document 
titled "Release of All Liens and Claims" 
pertaining to the Lakeview property. The 
notarized release document recited that for 
a valuable consideration Child Brothers, 
Inc., by its president, Eugene Child, who 
signed the document, "release[d] and dis-
charge^]" Mountain Springs, FDMI, Zun-
del, and the Lakeview subdivision property, 
from any and all liens, claims, demands, 
damages, actions at law or in equity 
arising out of any contractual or other 
relationship and/or claims of 
liens, arising or accruing on or before 
[date omitted], or existing on that 
date and all matters involved 
in any and all claims of liens for all labor 
performed upon, and ail materials fur-
nished to [the Lakeview subdivision prop-
erty] arising on or before, or existing on, 
the date specified above, by the under-
signed, and by all agents, employees, sup-
pliers, [etc.] all of whom the 
undersigned hereby warrants have beer 
fuily paid, and none of whom has an\ 
further claim or hen against such reai 
estate as of the date specified above. . 
That the parties hereto intend herebj 
that this Release of All Liens and Claims 
shall be a final and complete release and 
discharge of [Mountain Springs, FDMI, 
Zundel, and the Lakeview subdivision] by 
the undersigned, [his heirs, assigns, 
agents, employees, etc.], and all other per-
sons performing labor upon or furnishing 
materials as of the date speci-
fied above, at the instance of the under-
signed. 
The document was dated June 17, 1976; it 
was recorded on June 22, 1976. 
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As this Court stated in upholding the 
waiver of lien rights in Dwyer v Salt Lake 
City Copper Mfg Co., 14 Utah 339, 344, 47 
P 311, 312 (1896), "A mechanic's hen is a 
privilege conferred by statute, and ordinari-
ly may be waived by express agreement of 
the party in whose favor it exists.'* The 
legitimacy of a release of lien rights was 
also recognized in G Chicoine Contractors, 
Inc. v John Marshal Bldg Corp., 77 111. 
App.2d 437, 222 NE2d 712, 714 (1966), 
where the court stated, "One right the lien 
claimant has is to execute his full and gen-
eral waiver releasing his rights to a me-
chanic's lien against the property" The 
court then quoted the following language 
from Decatur Lumber and Mfg. Co. v Crail, 
350 111. 319, 324, 183 N E. 228, 230 (1932): 
While a waiver of hen for a clearly ex-
pressed special purpose will be confined 
by the courts to the purpose intended, 
yet, where a general waiver is executed, 
and there is nothing in the context to 
show a contrary intention, there is noth-
ing left for the court to do but enforce 
the contract as the parties have made it. 
[4] To be valid and binding a waiver or 
release of a mechanics' hen by contract or 
agreement must be supported by a legal 
consideration Kelly v Johnson, 251 111. 
135, 95 N E. 1068 (1911); Skidmore v Eby, 
57 NM. 669, 262 P2d 370 (1953) Child 
Bros., received cash and property in ex-
change for the release Its release of hen 
rights is therefore binding as to those rights 
accrued up to the time of the release, at 
least as to it. 
[5] As to the hen claimants left in the 
case, all their work on the project was com-
pleted prior to the date of Child Bros' 
release Their hen rights had already at-
tached. These henholders were not parties 
to the release, did not consent to its terms, 
and are not in the category of subcontrac-
tors or materialmen performing labor or 
furnishing materials at the instance of 
Child Bros, and therefore the release does 
not affect their status as henholders. They 
are entitled to the same priority date as 
that originally accorded Child Bros , whose 
work was the first done on the project, in 
accordance with U C A. § 38-1-10, which 
provides: 
The hens for work and labor done or 
material furnished as provided m this 
chapter shall be upon an equal footing, 
regardless of date of filing the notice and 
claim of lien and regardless of the time of 
performing such work and labor or fur-
nishing such matenat 
A final issue relating to hen priority in 
this case is whether the stipulation that 
Child's hen was junior to plaintiffs' had any 
binding legal effect The stipulation was 
signed by attorneys for f DMI and Child 
Bros, on the 11th of January, 1978. It 
states that Child Bros released its hen 
against the Lakeview property and that 
Child Bros was the grantee in a warranty 
deed recorded June 22, 1976, covering Lots 
59 and 60, Lakeview Terrace. The second 
paragraph states 
Said parties hereby stipulate that the 
warranty deed is junior and subordinate 
to the lien or [sic] plaintiffs Trust Deed 
and tiiat defendant Child Bros Inc has a 
lien m the sum of $13,450 52 which hen is 
junior and subordinate to plaintiffs Trust 
Deed [Emphasis added ] 
[6,7] Ordinarily, courts are bound by 
stipulations between parties, Koron v 
Myers, 87 Idaho 567, 394 P2d 634 (1964), 
Rwrdan v Commercial Travelers Mut Ins 
Co, 11 Wash App 707, 525 P 2d 804 (1974) 
Such is not the case, however, when points 
of law requiring judicial determination are 
involved, Mobile Acres, Inc v Kurata, 211 
Kan. 833, 508 P 2d 889 (1973), In Re Estate 
of Maguire, 204 Kan 686, 466 P 2d 358, 
modified 206 Kan 1, 476 P2d 618 (1970), 
Cox v City of Pocatello, 11 Idaho 225, 291 
P 2d 282 (1955) Parties are bound bv their 
stipulations unless relievpci therefrom bv 
the court, which has the power to ^et aside 
a stipulation entered li^ to inadvertently or 
tor justifiable cause, Klein i &7ein, Ltah, 
544 P 2d 472 (1975), Johnson v Peoples 
Finance & Thrift Co, 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 
P2d 171 (1954), Guard v County of Man-
copa, 14 AnzAop 187, 481 P 2d 873 (1971), 
Higby v Higby, Colo App, 538 P2d 493 
(1975), Thompson v Turner, 98 Idaho 110, 
558 P 2d 1071 (1977) 
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[8, 9] In the present case, the trial court 
apparently disregarded the stipulation of 
FDMI and Child Bros as to lien priority 
The record contains no findings as to the 
validity or effect of the stipulation, and this 
Court will not consider this matter for the 
first time on appeal Whatever the effect 
of the stipulation upon Child Bros priority 
status, the other hen claimants who sought 
priority over FDMFs trust deed are in no 
way bound by a stipulation to which they 
were not parties, Thomas v State, 57 Haw 
639, 562 P 2d 425 (1977) 
[10] Bland Bros, also a defendant in 
Case No 15696, raises the further issues 
that this appeal is both moot and prema-
ture Mootness is claimed because plaintiff 
FDMI has bid $1,944,732 86 3 for the proper-
ty at the sheriff's sale and is thus required 
to pay that amount to the sheriff pursuant 
to Rule 69(e)(4), which states that every bid 
shall be deemed an irrevocable offer and 
that the purchaser is liable on such bid 
Because the amount bid would batisfy fully 
the claims of the lienors, as wetl as plain-
tiffs, defendants claim that the plaintiffs 
have no grounds for bringing an appeal 
Plaintiffs conceded that should someone 
pav the amount of $1,944,732 86 during the 
redemption period, the hen claimants would 
receive $44 732 86 and the appeal would 
become moot Otherwise plaintiffs argue 
that this Court should determine the lien 
claimants to be junior and subordinate to 
their trust deed Bland Brob claims that 
the redemption period cannot expire where 
no payment has been made pursuant to the 
order of sale 
The record shows that plaintiffs them-
selves stipulated to the amount to be bid 
and moved the trial court on the 11th day 
of February, 1978, fo amend fhe Sheriffs 
Certificate of Sale to provide that the rotal 
amount to be paid was $1 944 732 $6, m the 
event that hen claimant Holt-Witmer Arab 
granted first priority An order was signed 
by the court so amending fhe certificate of 
sale Plaintiffs objections at this point are 
3. Since this case is to be remanded to the trial 
court vve leave to that court the determination 
of what effect the settlements made during the 
more a change of mind than a justifiable 
claim of error on the part of the trial court 
Although a sheriffs deed was issued to the 
plaintiffs, they have not paid the amount 
bid into the courr as ordered and thus 
should not have received a deed The hen 
claimants who had been adjudged to have 
first priority have not been paid The is-
sues raised herein are not moot 
[11] Defendant Bland Bros also argues 
that this appeal is premature because vari-
ous cross-claims and counterclaims have not 
been resolved Unless an appeal may be 
taken pursuant to Rule 54(b), U R.C P , or 
our interlocutory appeal procedure, only 'fi-
nal orders ' are appealable to this Court, see 
Rule 72(a), U R C P Bland Bros claims 
that there was no final order until hen 
claimant Holt-Witmer s priority status was 
adjudicated on February 22, 1978 
The order of February 22, 1918, was an 
amendment to the order dated February 1 
1978 4ithough the notice of appeal states 
that it is the February 1 order that is 
appealed, we deem that order to incorporate 
by amendment the order of February 22 
since it was entered prior to the filing of 
the notice of appeal Nonetheless, it is 
clear that certain cross-claims and counter-
claims unrelated to the issue of 1 en priority 
remain to be adjudicated 
Whether an order is deemed i 'final or-
der" is not necessarily dependent in all in-
stances upon whether all issues in a ^awsuit 
have been adjudicated The test to be ap-
plied is a pragmatic test See Brown Shoe 
Co v United States 370 U S 294, 82 S Ct 
1502, 8 L Ed 2d 510 (1962), Wright Federal 
Courts 505 (3rd ed ) In the msi ant case no 
further judicial action remains to be taken 
with respect to ^he issues of pnontv and 
the sale of the property and, but for the 
appeal sale of the property and disburse-
ment of the proceeds would oc:ur To re-
quire the appeal to abide <-he determination 
of pending unrelated claims wojld make an 
appeal on the is^ue ot priorities moot Un-
less an appeal mav be taken at this point 
pendencv of the appeal (see Footnote 1) shouid 
make with respect to plaintiffs t id 
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substantial property interests may be de-
stroyed since the sheriffs sale would pro-
ceed and the money would be disbursed on 
the basis of the priorities determined by the 
trial court With the issuance of a sheriffs 
deed and the disbursement of monies, the 
legal rights and obligations of the parties 
are finally established \ccordmgly, under 
a pragmatic view of the test of finality, the 
order appealed in this case is final 
Consolidated with the appeal of FDMI 
and Citibank in Case No 15696 is an appeal 
by Bland Bros, Case No 16051, which chal-
lenges the refusal of the trial court to set 
aside the sheriffs sale held pursuant to the 
foreclosure order The facts pertaining to 
this appeal may be set out briefly The 
Lakeview Terrace property was offered at 
a sheriffs sale on January 19, 1978 FDML 
pursuant to its agreement, bid the sum (as 
amended) of $1 944 732 86 and subsequently 
received the sheriffs deed to the property 
Before the deed was issued, and wnen the 
normal six-month redemption period was 
about to expire Bland Bros moved the 
lower court to vacate the sale because plain-
tiff FDMI had failed to pay the amount of 
its bid into the court as had been ordered 
The trial court in an order dated August 15, 
1978 denied the motion stating that its 
jurisdiction was lost wnen the appeal re-
garding hen priorities was taken to the 
Supreme Court The court on its own mo-
tion ordered FDMI to post a supersedeas 
bond in the amount of the claims of the 
mechanics lienholders who had been ad-
judged lo have tirst prioritv 
[12] Bland Bros argues that the lower 
court retained jurisdiction over the enforce-
ment of its decree inasmuch is no superse-
deas bond was posted prior to the sheriffs 
sale or betore Bland Bros motion to have 
the sale vacated This position s correct 
and is sustained bv this Courts opinion in 
Skeen v Pratt *7 Utah 121 at 125 48 P 2d 
457 at 458 (1935) which stated 
As an incident to the authority remaining 
in the trial court to enforce a decree of 
toreclosure where an *\ppe d is had with-
out a supersedeas bond or stay is the 
authority to compel compliance with the 
600 P2d—t2 
law with respect to the execution of proc-
ess, and if for anv reason such process is 
improperly executed, then and in such 
case to vacate the improper proceeding 
had pursuant to the process, and order 
the issuance of another in lieu thereof 
The court below was in error in holding 
that it was without jurisdiction to hear 
and determine the motion to vacate the 
order of sale 
Bland Bros also points out a detect m the 
publication of notice of the sheriffs sale, 
namely that there was no publication m a 
Davis Count> newspaper ;n the week imme-
diately preceding the sale as required by 
Rule 69(e)(1), (3), U R C P Since this issue 
should be considered b> the trial court in 
connection with the determination as to the 
validity of the sheriffs sale, we decline to 
deal with it here 
Our decision regarding the pnontv issue 
makes it unnecessary to rule on additional 
matters argued by the parties herein It is 
the opinion of this Court that the lower 
court was correct in granting priority to the 
mechanics hen claimants inasmuch as the 
initial work bv Child Bros established the 
priority date for all who provided labor and 
services on the Lakeview Terrace subdivi-
sion The action of *he trial court as to the 
setting ot priorities is therefore atfirmed as 
it pertains to the lien claimants who remain 
as parties to this appeal 
We affirm the trial court s determination 
that the mechanics and materialmen s hens 
of the defendants whose appeal has not 
been dismissed have priority over FDMIs 
trust deed We remand for anv necessary 
consideration of the issues raised with re-
spect to the sheriffs sale 
Costs to defendants 
CROCKETT C I and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and HALL, J J concur 
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HARSH BUILDING COMPANY, an Oregon 
Corporation, Harsh Investment Corpora-
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J. Schnitzer, Appellants, 
v, 
Sam BIALAG, Jerry Bialac, James 1", Bialac, 
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After case, which had originally been 
removed to federal court, had been re-
manded to state court for lack of federal 
jurisdiction, the Superior Court, Maricopa 
County, Cause Xo. Cl%753, Howard F. 
Thompson, J , set aside certain stipulations 
entered into between the parties in federal 
district court and dismissed defendants' 
counterclaims based thereon and defend-
ants appealed. The Court of Appeals, Ste-
vens, J., held that where the stipulations 
specifically stated that they were entered 
into in view of directed verdicts granted in 
federal district court against plaintiffs and 
were entered into without prejudice to 
plaintiffs' right to challenge federal juris-
diction, state trial court properly refused to 
enforce the stipulations once the case was 
remanded to state court and properly dis-
missed the counterclaims based thereon; 
and that, in view of duress w«hich was oc-
casioned by the directed verdicts, no con-
tract between the parties was entered into 
iO that piamtiffs were entitled to return 
amounts received pursuant to the terms of 
the stipulations and to seek to avoid the 
stipulations. 
Affirmed. 
1. Stipulations C»I3, 17(1) 
Generally, parties are bound by their 
stipulations unless relieved therefrom by 
the court. 
52« p 2d—75 
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2. Stipulations C=l 
"Stipulation" is an agreement, admis-
sion or concession made in a judicial pro-
ceeding by the parties thereto or their at-
torneys, in respect to some matter incident 
thereto, for the purpose, ordinarily, of 
avoiding delay, trouble and expense. 
See publication Words and Plirases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Stipulations 3=>!4(l) 
In construing stipulations, primary 
rule is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intention of the parties and the stipulation 
must be construed in the light of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the parties and in 
view of the result which they were at-
tempting to accomplish. 
4. Stipulations 0=^13, 19 
Where stipulation for judgment was 
entered into in federal district court after 
court had directed verdicts against plain-
tiffs on all but one claim and where plain-
tiffs reserved the right to contest jurisdic-
tion of the federal court, state court, after 
federal court had been found to be without 
jurisdiction and case had been remanded to 
state court, properly refused to enforce the 
stipulations and properly dismissed them in 
the form of defendants' counterclaims. 
5. Stipulations C»I3 
Court, in exercise of its own discre-
tion, may set aside a stipulation entered 
into through inadvertence, excusable ne-
glect, fraud, or mistake of fact or law, or 
where the facts stipulated have changed or 
there has been a change in underlying con-
ditions that could not have been anticipat-
ed, or where special circumstances exist 
rendering it unjust to enforce the stipula-
tion. 
6. Contracts C=»I5 
To find the existence of a contract, 
court must find that the two parties freely 
consented to make a contract. 
7. Stipulations C=M3 
Where stipulations provided that they 
were entered into on part of plaintiffs be-
cause oi federal district court's action in 
A p p e n d i x 
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directing verdicts against plaintiffs, the 
stipulations were obtained under the duress 
of the directed verdicts and no contract 
was entered into between the parties so 
that plaintiffs, after tederai court was 
found not to have jurisdiction and case 
was remanded to state court, could return 
amounts received under the terms of the 
stipulations and have the stipulations set 
aside. 
Evans, Kitchel & fenckes, P C, by New-
man R. Porter and F Pendleton Gaines, 
III, Phoenix, for appellants 
Lewis & Roca b\ John P Frank, Gerald 
K. Smith and Richard N Goldsmith, and 
Flynn, Kimerer, Thmnes & Galbraith by 
John J. Flynn, Phoenix, for appellees 
OPINION 
STEVENS, Judge 
This appeal is to review the decision of 
the trial court not to accept two stipula-
tions entered into between the parties 
while litigating their case in federal court 
Harsh Building Companv and the other ap-
pellants (Harsh Bunding) were the de-
fendants in an action commenced in the 
State court on 31 January 1967 On 3 
February 1967, the case was removed to 
the United States District Court tor the 
District ot \nzona on the basis of diversi-
ty of citizenship Following MX years ot 
federal court proceedings which included a 
trial and two appeals, the case was re-
manded to the State court tor lack of ted-
erai jurisdiction, see Bialac v Harsh 
Building Co, 463 F i d 1185 Qfh O r 
1972) On 31 May 1973, Harsh Building 
tiled an answer and counterclaim* in the 
Superior Court ot \rizona ror Maricopa 
Count) Sam Bialac and the other appel-
lees (Bialacs) made a motion to dismiss 
several counterclaims ot Harsh Bunding 
In a judgment entered S \oni 1(>74 the 
trial court dismissed counterclaims V md 
I. The record ot proceedings in the tederai i 
Court upon remand 
B The trial court made an express find-
ing that there is no just reason for delay 
and expressly directed the entry of judg-
ment, thereby making this judgment a fi-
nal, appealable judgment. Rule 54(b), 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S 
The detailed recitation of the facts of 
this dispute is not necessary to our decision 
and, especially due to the incompleteness of 
the record be tore us,1 we quote appellants' 
brief for a short statement ot facts 
"The parties' disputes center around a 
large apartment complex and adjacent 
shopping center located in Phoenix \t 
one time, the property was owned b> a 
corporation controlled by plaintiffs (re-
ferred to hereinafter simply as the Bia-
lacs'). This complex litigation arises 
from the Bialacs' desire and etforts to 
convert the rental apartments into FHA 
234' condominium units during the peri-
od from 1965 through 1967 \\ lthout 
unnecessary detail, it is sufficient to note 
that the complicated, intricate series of 
contractual arrangements between die 
parties arose trom the Bialacs' wish to 
avoid being taxed on the proceeds of the 
condominium conversion at ordinary-in-
come rates. The Bialacs sought to 
achieve ravorable capital gains treatment 
of the sales and proceeds and it the 
same time preserve the benefits of FHA 
financing " 
The case was pending in* the tederai court 
for several vears while both parties filed 
numerous pleadings, motions and engaged 
in extensive discovery In May and June, 
1971, «-he litigants participated in a five-
week jury trial Towards the end ot their 
case, che Bialacs made an oral motion to 
remand the case to the State court based 
on an incomplete diversity of citizenship 
alleging that Harsh Building, an Oregon 
corporation had its principal place ot busi-
ness in \nzona. The motion to remand 
was denied The Court, a tew dav<= later, 
directed verdicts in tavor ot Harsh Build-
ng on seven ot eight counts ot the Bia-
irt has not been transmitted to the Superior 
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lacs' complaint. The case was in this pos-
ture when the parties entered into and 
filed a second stipulation entitled "Stipula-
tion for Judgment, Dismissal and Other 
Disposition of Certain Claims." This stip-
ulation settled the major portion of the 
case and it settled and disposed of the re-
maining count of the Bialacs' complaint as 
well as Harsh Building's counterclaims. 
This stipulation incorporated by reference 
a 13 March 1970 stipulation entitled "Stip-
ulation and Order Re Disposition of Cer-
tain Claims." 
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals determined that the federal court 
lacked jurisdiction and remanded with 
directions to send the case back to the 
State court. Once in the Maricopa County 
Superior Court, Harsh Building sought the 
enforcement of the two stipulations by in-
corporating them as counterclaims A and 
B in their answer. Upon the motion of 
the Bialacs, the trial court dismissed coun-
terclaims A and B. Harsh Building ap-
pealed this decision. The question for re-
view is: As a matter of law, is an agree-
ment to settle claims in litigation rendered 
invalid because the agreement is evidenced 
by a stipulation filed m a court later deter-
mined to lack jurisdiction? 
[1] The general rule is that the parties 
are bound by their stipulations unless re-
lieved therefrom by the court. Higgins v. 
Guenn, 74 Ariz. 187, 245 P 2d 956 (1952) ; 
Guard v. County Of Maricopa, 14 Ariz. 
App. 187, 481 P.2d 873 (1971). The par-
ties could not direct us to any, case directly 
on point nor did our research reveal any. 
We must find the general rules and apply 
them to the present dispute to find a solu-
tion. 
[2,3] UA stipulation is an agreement, 
idmission or concession made in a judicial 
proceeding by the parties thereto or their 
attorneys, in respect to some matter inci-
dent thereto, for the purpose, ordinarily, of 
avoiding delay, trouble and expense." Be-
kins Van & Storage Company v. The In-
dustrial Commission Of Arizona, 4 Ariz. 
App. 569, 570, 422 P.2d 4oO, 401 (1967). 
In some cases, it is also a wise trial strate-
gy to enter into a stipulation to save what 
may be saved when one party seems to be 
prevailing in the dispute. In construing 
stipulations, the primary rule is to ascer-
tain and give effect to the intention of the 
parties and the stipulation must be con-
strued in light of the circumstances sur-
rounding the parties and in view of the re-
sult which they were attempting to accom-
plish. Gear v. City Of Phoentx, 93 Ariz. 
260, 379 P.2d 972 (1963). 
[4] As we have stated, the second stipu-
lation, dated 15 June 1971, incorporated the 
first stipulation of 13 March 1970. We 
now quote paragraph seven of the second 
stipulation which states the reason for, as 
well as provides an insight of the intent of 
the parties in entering the stipulation. 
"7. This stipulation is prepared and en-
tered into in light of the fact that the 
Court has directed verdicts against the 
plaintiffs on all but one of the claims 
contained in the Fourth Amended Com-
plaint. Plaintiffs reserve, without preju-
dice of any kind, the right to appeal 
from the judgment as to each of these 
claims (except as to the stipulated dis-
missal of Count Five) and to contest by 
appropriate means, whether appeal or 
otherwise, the jurisdiction of this Court." 
The above quote, we believe, clearly re-
flects the Bialacs' reason for agreeing to 
the stipulation. The District Court direct-
ed verdicts against them on all but one of 
their claims. This is a persuasive and 
compelling reason for entering a stipula-
tion to make the best of a seemingly hope-
less situation. Their reason for wanting to 
nullify the stipulation is also evident. The 
Bialacs are back in the State court and are 
presented with an opportunity to pursue 
their claims anew. A stipulation is an 
agreement between the parties and ordi-
narily, we would not hesitate to enforce a 
stipulation regardless of whether it was 
made while the parties were litigating in 
the federal or state court. The stipulations 
in question were clearly entered into in 
view or the posture of the case as it then 
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existed and it would be inappropriate to 
hold the parties to these stipulation* now, 
when the partieb are back in the position 
from wnence they started. 
[5] The Bialacs also reserved the right 
to contest the jurisdiction of the tederai 
court. If this stipulation was to have ef-
fect in any other court, it would have been 
an idle gesture to reserve the right to con-
test the jurisdiction of the court It would 
have made little, if any, difference as to 
which court would enter a consent judg-
ment based on a set of stipulations that set 
out in detail the amount ot the judgment 
For these two reasons, we tind that the 
trial court had adequate cause tor refusing 
to en tore? the stipulations and dismissing 
them in the torm ot counterclaims A. and 
B 
TTIhe court, in the exercise of its 
sound discretion, may bet abide a btipula-
tion entered into through inadvertence, 
excusable neglect, traud, mistake ot tact 
or law, where the facts stipulated have 
changed or there has been a change m 
the underlying conditions, tnat could not 
have been anticipated, or where special 
circumstances exist rendering it imjust 
to entorce the stipulation " Los \ngeleb 
City s^h Dist v Landier Management 
Co, 177 CalApp2d 744, 2 Cal Rptr 662, 
665-666 (1960) 
The effect ot the motions to dismiss coun-
terclaims A and B was a request by the 
Bialacs to be relieved of their stipulations 
in view ot the drastic change ot the cir-
cumstances By the granting ot trie mo-
tions the Superior Court Judge ruled that 
under the circumstances the Bialacs should 
be so relieved. We find no abuse ot dis-
cretion in this ruling. 
Harsh Building asserts that these stipu-
lation* are in the nature ot i contract and 
bhould be enforced as such The> point to 
the tact that Harsh Building made a ^a^h 
payment ot SIUXK) to the Bialacs as con-
sideration under the terms of the stipula-
tion The Bialacs atter the dttermination 
ot the appeal, attempted to return the 
$13,000 paid to them but Harsh Buildn^ 
refused to accept it. 
[6,7] To tind the exisience of a con-
tract, we must tind that the two parties 
freely consented to make a contract. It 
would be hard to argue that the Bialacs. 
faced with the directed verdicts againfj 
them in all but one claim, freely consented 
to the contract. We believe that the Bia-
lacs' consent to the stipulation was ob-
tained under the duress of the directed 
verdicts This is evidenced by paragraph 
seven of the stipulation where the Bialacs 
reserved the right to appeal trom the judg-
ments and to contest the jurisdiction of the 
court We cannot, in good conscience, en-
torce the stipulation as a contract 
The decision ot the trial court to dismiss 
counterclaimb A and B is based upon good 
cause. It is affirmed. 
OGG, P J , Department A, and DOX-
OFRIO, J , concur 
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Workman, whose bem fits tor lett in-
guinal herniab buttered in lanuarv 1971 
and <n lanuary 1972 had jeen terminated, 
Lhim \o> 1 0-07-^7 and 2/0-27-37 peti-
tioned ror certiorari to review the In-
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Gerald E. HI0LE1 and Ruth J Higley, 
husband and wife, Plaintiffs 
md Appellants, 
A. Cardon McDONALD and Doilie 
McDonald, husband and wife, 
Defendants ind Respondents. 
No. 18755. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
April 27, 1984 
Plaintiffs brought action n ejectment 
to secure removal of defendants' mobile 
home from real property allegedly owned 
by plaintiffs The Seventh District Court, 
Carbon County, Boyd Bunnell, J , entered 
judgment of no cause of action against 
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs appealed The Su-
preme Court, Hall, C J , held that parties' 
stipulation that deed survey depicted ap-
proximate location of the mobile home did 
not bind trial court to apply measurements 
and calculations on the deed survey m de-
termining location of disputed boundary 
Affirmed. 
1. Stipulations e»17(l) 
Stipulations are conclusive and binding 
on parties unless, upon timely notice and 
for good cause shown, relief is granted 
therefrom 
2. Stipulations «»17(3) 
In action in ejectment to secure remov-
al of detendants mobile home from real 
property allegedly owned by plaintiff par-
ties stipulation that deed survey depicted 
approximate location of the mobile nome 
did not bind trial court to apply measure-
ments and calculations on the deed survey 
m determining location of disputed bound-
ary 
James W Guthrie, Hansen, Thompson & 
Dewsnup, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and 
appellants 
Duane A Frandsen, Michael R Jensen, 
Frandsen, Keller & Jensen, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants and respondents 
HALL, Chief Justice 
Plaintiffs brought this action in eject-
ment to secure the removal of defendants' 
mobile home and other personal propertv 
from real property allegedly owned by 
plaintiffs The district court sitting with-
out a jury, entered judgment of no cause of 
action against plaintiffs We affirm 
In 1951, Arthur Bolotas (hereinafter 'Bo-
lotas ') purchased a tract of mountain land 
located along the eastern shoreline of Sco-
field Reservoir m Carbon County, Utah In 
terms of its legal description, the property 
is situated within the southeast quarter of 
Section 4, Township 12 South, Range 7 
East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian 
In 1960, Bolotas hired John Bene (herein-
after 'Bene'), a licensed surveyor, to sur-
vey and plat out a portion of the shoreline 
property for development as a mountain 
home subdivision Bene surveved the land 
into lots and blocks and set survey markers 
(drill steel) at the corners of the lots He 
tied his survey to a point established by 
him as the northeast corner of the south-
east quarter of the southeast quarter of 
Section 4 This point was determined by 
locating the survey markers representing 
the northeast corner and the east quarter 
corner of Section 4 and then, through the 
use of survev equipment, by extending an 
imaginary line through those two points 
and to the south thereof a distance of 1,320 
feet (standard 40-acre distance) A steel 
pin was placed at this point by Bene as a 
survey marker 
Bene testified in respect to the northeast 
corner and east quarter corner reference 
points that he found the former point 
marked, as most sectional corners typically 
are by an authentic brass cap placed bv 
government surveyors, while the latter 
point was marked by a 3/4-inch bent steel 
rod, which was shown to him by an adjoin-
ing landowner Justice Seelev This latter 
point has been denominated the 'Seeley 
Corner " 
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After completing his survey of the Bolo-
tas property, Bene prepared a subdivision 
plat (hereinafter "Bolotas Plat") from the 
data obtained in the survey. Bolotas post-
poned recording the plat until the remain-
ing portion of his property could be sur-
veyed and included in the plat. However, 
the remainder of the property was never 
surveyed and subdivided, and thus the plat 
was never recorded. 
In 1969, plaintiffs Gerald and Ruth Hig-
ley and defendants Cardon and Dollie Mc-
Donald (hereinafter referred to in the sin-
gular as plaintiff and defendant) purchased 
two adjoining lots in the Bolotas Subdivi-
sion. The lot-purchased by plaintiff was 
designated on the Bolotas Plat as Lot 26 
Block 1 and was situated to the south of 
defendant's lot, which was designated as 
Lot 27 Block 1. 
At the time the parties negotiated the 
purchase of their respective lots, the only 
descriptions they had of the lots were the 
"lot and block" descriptions indicated on 
the Bolotas Plat. Aside from that, the 
parties could see the physical monuments 
at the corners of the lots (set previously by 
Bene) and could determine therefrom the 
sizes and locations of the lots. There ap-
pears to be no inconsistency between the 
lot dimensions and locations as depicted on 
the Bolotas Plat and as represented by the 
physical monuments. 
The deeds to Lots 26 and 27 were prepar-
ed by attorney Luke Pappas (hereinafter 
"Pappas"). Inasmuch as the Bolotas Plat 
was not of record at the time the deeds 
were prepared, Pappas described the sub-
ject lots by metes and bounds descriptions. 
However, in anticipation that the plat 
would be recorded in the future and to 
facilitate future references to specific lots 
in the subdivision, Pappas included with the 
metes and bounds descriptions the lot and 
block numbers as set forth on the plat. 
Pappas testified that the metes and 
bounds descriptions contained in plaintiffs 
and defendant's deeds were calculated 
from the dimensions on the Bolotas Plat. 
Notwithstanding, he also testified that the 
metes and bounds descriptions were at var-
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lance with the lot and block dimensions on 
the Bolotas Plat in that the former repre-
sented the location of the lots to be 40 feet 
farther to the north than the latter. This 
discrepancy, according to Pappas, resulted 
from the circumstances described hereaf-
ter: Following a conveyance from Bolotas 
to one Jouflas of four lots located in the 
same block (Block 1) as, and just south of, 
Lots 26 and 27, Bolotas informed Pappas 
that he (Bolotas) had measured (apparently 
onsite) a section of Block 1 and had found 
that approximately 40 feet more land exist-
ed in that block than was included in the 
plat dimensions. Based on this measure-
ment, Pappas drew up a description extend-
ing the northern boundary of Block 1 an 
additional 40 feet. He subsequently used 
that description as a reference in preparing 
the metes and bounds descriptions on plain-
tiffs and defendant's deeds. Sometime 
thereafter, Pappas made an on-site meas-
urement himself and discovered that the 
additional 40 feet did not exist and that the 
actual dimensions of Block 1 and the lots 
included therein were precisely as they are 
recorded on the Bolotas Plat. He therefore 
concluded that the metes and bounds de-
scriptions in plaintiffs and defendant's 
deeds, containing the additional 40 feet of 
land, were in error. Unfortunately, this 
error was never corrected, or even re-
vealed, prior to the institution of this law-
suit. 
In 1970, plaintiff Gerald Higley, with the 
assistance of defendant Cardon McDonald, 
surveyed the north-south boundary line be-
tween their respective properties and set 
stakes along that line in preparation of 
moving their mobile homes onto their lots. 
Shortly thereafter, the parties moved their 
mobile homes onto their lots, positioning 
them within the staked areas. 
In 1971, plaintiff informed defendant 
that defendant's mobile home was en-
croaching onto plaintiffs lot due to an er-
ror they had made in their 1970 survey. 
Defendant responded by contacting Bene 
and requesting his services in settling the 
dispute. In 1972, Bene surveyed the 
boundary between the two lots, using as 
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reference points the drill steel survey 
markers he had set at the corners of the 
lots in his ongmal 1960 survey, and deter-
mined that defendant's mobile home was 
overlapping the boundary line and en-
croaching 10 to 12 feet onto plaintiffs lot. 
Thereafter (during that same year), defend-
ant moved his mobile home a distance of 10 
to 15 feet to the north. Plaintiff witnessed 
the moving of the trailer and expressly 
conceded to the adequacy thereof. 
After defendant's mobile home had been 
relocated, Bene again made an on-site in-
spection and survey of defendant's lot and 
determined therefrom that defendant's mo-
bile home was no longer encroaching on 
plaintiffs lot and that said mobile home 
was positioned entirely within the bounds 
of defendant's lot. as that lot was estab-
lished by Bene in his original (1960) survey 
and as it appears on the Bolotas Plat. 
Since the 1972 reestablishment of the 
boundary line between Lots 26 and 27, the 
parties have planted trees along that line, 
and the power company has placed a utility 
pole on the same 
In 1977, plaintiff once again informed 
defendant that his (defendant's) mobile 
home was encroaching on plaintiffs prop-
erty Plaintiffs claim was purportedly 
based upon a survey performed by a Mr 
Spensko in 1974 or 1975 Defendant reject-
ed this claim and refused to move his mo-
bile home again. This action ensued. 
The trial court observed that the metes 
and bounds descriptions included in the 
deeds to Lots 26 and 27 were inconsistent 
with the lot and block descriptions also 
included therein. The court ruled that the 
inclusion of inconsistent legal descriptions 
within the subject deeds rendered those 
deeds ambiguous. As a result, parol evi-
dence was allowed to clarify the intent of 
the parties and their common grantor (Bo-
Iotas) as to the dimensions of the two lots 
in question, as well as the location thereof. 
At the conclusion of the presentation of 
evidence, the trial court ruled that the par-
ties intended to purchase Lots 26 and 27, 
and Bolotas intended to convey the same, 
in accordance with the lot and block dimen-
sions on the Bolotas Plat. In addition, the 
court found that the lots occupied and pos-
sessed by the parties at that time had the 
same dimensions (square footage) and were 
in the approximate location as the lots d e., 
Lots 26 and 27) depicted on the Bolotas 
Plat. It was therefore concluded that de-
fendant's mobile home was not encroaching 
on plaintiffs lot, but was situated within 
the boundaries of defendant's own lot 
Plaintiffs sole contention on appeal is 
that the measurements and calculations in-
dicated on the Bolotas Plat relative to Lots 
26 and 27 'do not support the foregoing 
conclusion. He maintains that he proved at 
trial by stipulated evidence that defend-
ant's mobile home encroaches approximate-
ly 30 feet onto his (plaintiffs) land as calcu-
lated and measured from the Bolotas Plat. 
The stipulated evidence referred to by 
plaintiff is a diagram of Lots 26 and 27 
produced by Bene in 1981, during the pend-
ency of this lawsuit. Said diagram (herein-
after referred to as the "deed survey") 
illustrates the location of defendant's mo-
bile home in relation to Lots 26 and 27, 
using the metes and bounds descriptions 
contained in plaintiffs and defendant's 
deeds According to the deed survey, de-
fendant's mobile home encroaches across 
the full 40- to 45-foot north-south width of 
plaintiffs lot (i.e , Lot 26). 
Plaintiff does not, however claim that 
the encroachment extends the full 40 co 45 
feet indicated on the deed survey He ob-
serves that the metes and bounds descrip-
tions in the deeds erroneously represent 
the location of the disputed boundary line 
as being 15 feet farther to the north than it 
actually measures on the Bolotas Plat. 
From this observation, he concludes that 
the southern boundary of defendant's lot is 
actually located 15 feet farther to the south 
than is shown on the deed survey, and thus 
the encroachment measures only 30 feet 
rather than the full 45 feet (i.e., 45 less 15). 
The premise for plaintiffs argument that 
the measurements on the Bolotas Plat es-
tablish a 30-foot encroachment is the belief 
that the metes and bounds descriptions on 
HIGLEY v. 
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the deeds, from which the deed survey was 
taken, are consistent with the lot and block 
measurements on the Bolotas Plat. This 
premise, however, is false. The inconsist-
ency between the metes and bounds de-
scriptions and the Bolotas Plat measure-
ments has heretofore been shown through 
the testimony of the attorney who prepared 
the metes and bounds descriptions, namely 
Luke Pappas. Pappas testified that he in-
cluded in the metes and bounds descrip-
tions an extra 40 feet of ground that did 
not appear on the Bolotas Plat and that he 
later determined to be in error. It was his 
opinion that the 40-foot overage had been 
incorporated into the deed survey and was 
therefore responsible for the encroachment 
shown on that survey. 
The testimony of Luke Pappas with re-
spect to the 40-foot overage was corrobo-
rated by a draftsman named Martin Smart, 
who was commissioned during the penden-
cy of this action to sketch the various lots 
in Block 1, including Lots 26 and and 27, 
according to the metes and bounds descrip-
tions m the respective deeds His survey 
confirms the conclusion drawn by Pappas 
that an approximate 40-foot discrepancy ex-
ists between the representations on the Bo-
lotas Plat of the location of the Block 1 lots 
and the representations in the metes and 
bounds descriptions of the same. 
The evidence in this case, particularly 
that discussed above, supports the trial 
court's determination that the measure-
ments and dimensions on the Bolotas Plat 
relative to Lots 26 and 27 establish the 
location of defendant's mobile home as be-
ing entirely within the boundaries of de-
fendant's lot and therefore not encroaching 
on plaintiffs lot. 
Furthermore, as to plaintiffs observa-
tion that only a 15-foot variance exists be-
tween the metes and bounds dimensions 
and the Bolotas Plat dimensions, the evi-
dence stated above supports the conclusion 
that the variance was more than just 15 
feet and that it was approximately 40 feet. 
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[1] Having considered the evidence (i.e , 
deed survey) alleged to nave been entered 
upon stipulation by the parties, we now 
turn our attention to the merits of the 
stipulation itself In his appellate brief, 
plaintiffs version of this stipulation is as 
follows* 
The parties stipulated that the sur-
vey [deed survey] accurately represented 
the location of the appellants and re-
spondents' property as described in the 
respective deeds, and that respondents' 
60-foot mobile home is accurately depict-
ed on the survey in relation to the deed 
descriptions, and that it is actually locat-
ed on the face of the earth »n the place 
depicted in Exhibit 3 [deed survey]. 
He points out that the well-settled rule 
with respect to stipulations such as this is 
that they are conclusive and binding on the 
parties unless, upon timely notice and for 
good cause shown, relief <s granted there-
from. He further indicates that the ruie 
precludes the adoption of findings in con-
flict with stipulated facts l 
[2] While plaintiff accurately cites the 
rules in this regard, we do not adopt his 
characterization of the stipulation. Accord-
ing to the record, the extent to which the 
parties stipulated respecting the deed sur-
vey was that it could be admitted into 
evidence and that it depicts the "approxi-
mate ' location of defendant's mobile home. 
We cannot agree that the effect of this 
stipulation was to bind or obligate the trial 
court to apply the measurements and calcu-
lations on the deed survey in determining 
the location of the disputed boundary 
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate error. 
Affirmed. Costs to defendant. 
OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ , and J. 
DENNIS FREDERICK, District Judge, 
concur. 
STEWART, J , does not participate here-
in; FREDERICK, District Judge, sat. 
1. First of Denver Mortgage ln\estors \ CN Zun-
del&Assocs, Utah. 600 P 2d 521 (1979), State v 
Bailey 3 Utah 2d 254 282 P 2d 339 (1955). 
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conclusion that the minimal terms of a 
contract, under the lazv, were present here. 
There is nothing here indicating the 
amount of material agreed upon, the time 
within or during which performance is re-
quired. It was as compatible with perpetu-
ity, as with a definitive hour-glass mea-
surement. The provision here as to per-
formance "if and when the option is exer-
cised," is vulnerable to a similar contrac-
tual deficiency. the provision that 'This 
option is for the purpose oi establishing 
the price," seems meaningless without a 
recitation of the amount of material agreed 
upon,—absent here, or, again, a recitation 
of the time for payment. The "special 
conditions affecting the availability" of the 
materials,—unresolved but seemingly deter-
minable in futuro, almost reaches the as-
sumption that it is an agreement to agree, 
failing which, none exists. The statement 
that the agreement shall not be construed 
as a sole or prior right to the materials 
leads one to conclude that Ogden could 
have sold not only the "materials" but the 
fee at any time before a firm contract was 
born,—which certainly was no fait accom-
pli here, the provisions about arrange-
ments to be made for occupancy or remov-
al and stipulations for work areas and 
'any other pertinent agreements" ^hall be 
made before entry to remove material is 
accomplished in futuro, surely does not 
lend itself to the basic concept under obli-
gation of contract's principles that the 
terms must be certain. 
As to the facts recited, those mentioned 
in plaintiffs brief are accurate enough, but 
by and large, are most favorable to plain-
tiff's contention Other believable facts ei-
ther discount some that are stated in favor 
of plaintitf or lead to a reasonable refuta-
tion, or at least to an entirely different 
scenario They would appear to be of the 
type looking to the supplvmg of terms 
found missing m the instrument,—not m 
explaining confused terms contained there-
in. Such procedure would seem to be un-
acceptable in evidentiary areas. 
We believe that on top of the correct-
ness of the trial court's analysis of the 
terms of the 'option," there is ample, be-
lievable, competent and admissible evidence 
that if believed by the court, as seems to 
be the case here, make inescapable the re-
quirement that we do anything else but af-
firm under the accepted rules. 
Since we conclude that the trial judge 
was correct in his deliberation both as to 
the law and the facts, to the effect there 
was no binding contract, we believe and 
conclude that tjie other points on appeal— 
II, as to estoppel, III, IV and V re 
breach and VI, relating to damages—are 
moot and that VII, to the effect that the 
Court failed to make certain findings and 
those made were insufficient to support the 
judgment, is without merit, and that VIII, 
with respect to the matter of filing for 
costs, may be determined by the lower 
court. 
ELLETT, CROCKETT, TLTCKETT 
and MAUGHAN, JJM concur. 
O I KfcT HUM8IR SrST£»1 
Robert 0. KLEIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mary Avalon KLEIN, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 13994. 
Sup romp Court of Utah. 
TVe 16 197." 
From supplemental decree of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, G. 
Hal Tavlor, [, adjusting financial and 
property interest of parties to divorce pro-
ceeding, husband appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Crockett, J , held that entry of Mich 
a supplemental decree after original decree 
in divorce proceeding had been affirmed 
Appendix "E-7" 
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was proper, that issue whether husband 
had agreed to and should be bound by stip-
ulation with regard to division oi property 
was for District Court and that even if 
husband did not understand and/or was 
subject to duress m agreeing to stipulation 
or if his agreement to stipulation was time-
ly and properly withdrawn, an award in 
accordance with stipulation was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., dissented and tiled opin-
ion. 
1. Oivorce <S»I72 
Under usual circumstances, same mat-
ters cannot be litigated anew subsequent to 
a definite and final judgment and decree 
in a divorce action. 
2. Divorce C=*254 
Entry of supplemental decree adjust-
ing financial and property interest of par-
ties after original decree in divorce pro-
ceeding had been affirmed was oroper 
where original decree contained the reser-
vation that 'The court further retains lim-
ited jurisdiction if within one year either 
party proves to he suffering serious finan-
cial distress because of this decree based 
on decisions and ensuing development aris-
ing therefrom not capable of e\ahiation 
and etfect at this time, the court will re-
view its ruling" and where case involved 
substantial propert) interests and complex 
financial situation. 
3, Stipulations <£=>I3 
Same rules apply to binding parties to 
stipulation as applv to an> other igree-
ment; if there is any justification in law 
or equity for avoiding or repudiating stipu-
lation, and party timely does so, he is enti-
tled to be relieved from it, otherwise not. 
4, Divorce <§»286(l) 
In divorce proceeding in which supple-
mental decree adjusted financial and prop-
erty interests of parties, in accordance 
with stipulation, issue whether husband 
had agreed to and should be bound b> stip-
ulation was for trial court. 
544 P 2d—30Va 
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5. Divorce 0249(2), 297 
Though a stipulation pertaining to 
matters of divorce, custodv and property 
rights therein is adv isorv on court and will 
usually be followed, such a stipulation is 
not necessarily binding on court, it is only 
a recommendation to be adhered to if court 
believes it to be fair and reasonable. 
6. Divorce C=»249(2) 
Even if divorced husband did not un-
derstand and/or was subjected to duress in 
agreeing to stipulation with regard to divi-
sion of spouses' financial and property 
interests or if his agreement to stipula-
tion was timely and properly withdrawn, 
trial court could have considered that which 
was proposed as a stipulation and that 
which was said b> spouses and their coun-
sel about the stipulation, as part of total 
facts and circumstances on which to fash-
ion a just and equitable decree. 
7. Divorce C=>252 
Even if divorced husband did not un-
derstand and/or was subjected to duress in 
agreeing to stipulation with regard to divi-
sion of spouses' financial and propert} in-
terests or if his agreement to stipulation 
was timely and properly withdrawn, an 
award in accordance with stipulation was 
not an abuse of discretion where, under 
such award, husnand received about 
$200,000 more than he would have received 
under trial court's rndgment under which 
property with net value or $931,602.03 and 
$743,387.35 would have been awarded to 
husband and wne respectively 
Orrin G. Hatch, of Hatch & Plumb, 
Salt Lake City, tor plaintiff-appellant. 
Robert S. CampbeU, J r , and James P. 
Cowle>, of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake 
City, for detendant-respondent 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
This appeal is sequel to Klein v. Klein, 
30 L':ah 2d 1, 511 P 2d 1284. It attacks a 
supplemental decree of the district court 
which adjusted the financial and property 
interests of the parties. 
4 7 4 Utah 544 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
[1,2] The plaintiff's tirst line ot attack 
is that the district court having rendered 
its judgment m May 1972 and that judg-
ment having been affirmed b> this court in 
July 1973, it became final and absolute 
and that the trial court could not properly 
change or modity that decree except for 
subsequent change in circumstances The 
correctness ot that proposition under usual 
circumstances and as applied to a detinue 
and tinal judgment and decree in a duorce 
action, to the end that the same matters 
cannot be litigated anew, is acknowledged l 
However, from what is said below, it will 
be seen that that is not the type ot decree 
we are concerned with here 
Other basic facts are set forth in the 
prior decision It is material here to recite 
only that these parties were married in 
1953 that they became the parents of 
three children, that the plaintiff has a net 
income of about $24 000 per year that the 
defendant has an earning capacity ot about 
$3 600 per >ear but is presentlv unem-
ployed and that the court awarded $30o 
per month alimony and $100 support money 
tor each child 
None of the foregoing facts is in contro-
versy here. The dispute is over division ot 
\er> substantial assets and property which 
had been built up during: the marriage 
In the original divorce case the trial 
judge found their total ne*" worth to be 
$225,000 and attempted to award defend-
ant about one half bv giving her the family 
home, \alumg it at $103,000 plus a Chev-
rolet, and the proceeds from the sale of 
four lots, valued at about $6,000 But it is 
apparent from the findings and decree that 
the court was not entirelv satisfied with 
the arrangement arrived at So instead of 
making a definite and final disposition 
thereof he included this somewhat unusual 
provision as the (mal paragraph ot the dc 
crce 
The court further retains limited juris-
diction it within one year either party 
I 0*//i//s i Ovtiut, 114 I nli 2U> l()s r j d 
3*3. Gate i Qalc 123 t tali 277. J3^ P Jd 
986. 
proves to be suffering serious financial 
distress because ot this decree based on 
decisions and ensuing de\elopments aris-
ing therefrom not capable of ezaluation 
and effect at this tune the court mil re-
zieii its filling and determine whether 
modification should be made 
On review of the case on appeai, this 
court also had apprehensions about the val-
uation ot the propertv and the allocation 
thereof but decided not to wrestle with 
that controversy because ot the reservation 
in the decree just recited, which would 
give the trial court a further opportunity 
to deal with that situation This is shown 
by the following language from the deci-
sion 
The fudge who tned this case has re-
tired and another Judge will hear any 
future matters 
If the Decree causes financial distress, 
the ruling made can be reviewed it with-
in one year alter una) judgment either 
party requests it 
\nother possible reason ror having the 
matter looked at within a year is the dis-
tribution ot the assets 
The decision ot the Court ZLUS based 
upon an assumption that the net value of 
the assets ot the plaintiff was $225 000-
00 
Having confidence in the integrity ot 
our trial courts and the ability ot the 
nidge to review the matter it oresented 
to them Ttr affnm the judgment ren-
dered and Late it to the lozicr court to 
aetetmine if a modification should be 
made 
\ t ter the remand the defendant, on Oc-
tober 25 1°73 tiled a ' Petition tor Review 
ot Economic Matters and Modification ot 
the Decree' supported by affidavits and 
protter ot proof Tn connection with an 
order to show cause issued thereon the 
trial court3 indicated his view that under 
the prior decree and the decision ot this 
2 This )u\or w is Mifprnl b\ Hon Tnnifs 
M \ \ 1\ l M1(I tlu» s u b s t q U t l U I»NW»P4»<hiii;s »ml 
the imended decree ippealed from were han-
dled bv Hon. G. Hal Tutor 
KLEIN 7. KLEIN 
r i t e as r>44 V 2d 172 
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court it was his conclusion that "serious fi-
nancial distress is a relative matter" and 
that whether the defendant was so distress-
ed could not be determined without review- ' 
ing the whole economic situation of these 
parties. 
If we look at the total situation, includ-
ing the substantial property interests and 
the complex financial situation of these 
parties, together with the facts that the 
original decree did not purport to make the 
usual final disposition thereof, but con-
tained the reservation recited above, we 
see nothing unreasonable or improper in 
the just stated conclusion of the trial court. 
The circumstances here distinguish this 
case from those relied on by plaintiff 
which hold that a final decree cannot be 
modified except for a change of circum-
stances. Moreover, in this situation we see 
no reason why the court in its effort to do 
equity between these parties could not 
make whatever corrections or adjustments 
in the decree it deemed necessary to carry 
out that purpose. 
Consistent with that objective, there fol-
lowed extensive discovery procedures, and 
a hearing of several days' duration, at 
which both parties presented extensive evi-
dence and the testimony of experts on val-
uations; and thereafter submitted their re-
spective memorandums and proposals as to 
the disposition to be made of their finan-
cial affairs. Consequent thereto, the trial 
court on November 11, 1974, made find-
ings that the value of the assets was 
52,037,535.63, less liabilities of $288,725.65, 
with a resulting net worth of $1,748,809.98. 
Of this it awarded to the plaintiff proper-
ties valued at $1,121,471.63, required him to 
discharge obligations of $189,869, thus giv-
ing him properties of net value $931,602.63. 
To the defendant he awarded properties 
valued at $842,144, required her to dis-
charge obligations of $98,856.65, a net 
award to her of $743,387.35. 
Four days after the November 11, 1974, 
supplemental decree, plaintiff filed his 
objections thereto and motions for other 
relief and/or a new trial. A hearing on 
these motions began on Friday, December 
6, 1974, and continued on Monday, Decem-
ber 9. During the noon recess respective 
counsel engaged in discussions and appar-
ently arrived at terms of settlement based 
on an offer of the defendant. When court 
convened at 2:00 p. m. defendant's counsel 
orally stated into the record the terms 
thereof, which involved reference to cer-
tain paragraphs of the November 11, 1974, 
judgment. 
Inasmuch as it is the position oi the 
plaintiff that he repudiates the stipulation, 
the following is noteworthy. A part of the 
record, relied upon by him in support of 
his position, is; 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Klein, 
you have heard your counsel read into 
the record, part of it by reference to 
paragraphs. I don't know whether you 
have been able to follow it or not. 
MR. KLEIN: I haven't followed it, 
Your Honor. 
THE COL'RT: Do you understand 
i t ? 
MR. KLEIN: 1 am relying on my 
counsel. At this point, I haven't been 
able to read it. 
As opposed to the foregoing, a part oi the 
record upon which the defendant places re-
liance is the following response of the 
plaintiff which occurred later: 
By way of the record, I accept the 
stipulation and I so understand. Spoken 
by Robert D. Klein. 
Speaking in generality, the offer made 
on the defendant's behalf which was then 
agreed to by the plaintiff and his counsel 
reduced the properties being awarded to 
the defendant in the amount of about 
$200,000 and increased the value of proper-
ties being awarded to the plaintiff in that 
amount. Subsequent thereto, on December 
18, 1974, the trial court made further find-
ings and entered a decree in conformity 
with the stipulation, and from which this 
appeal is taken. 
Plaintiff's arguments that he should not 
be bound by the stipulation are: that he 
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did not understand the goings-on at the 
tune it was presented to the court that it 
was his impression that he was obliged to 
indicate agreement so that negotiations 
could continue and that the stipulation 
would be reduced to writing tor his exami-
nation before it was confirmed and relied 
on but that the next day, when he real-
ized what had been done, he immediately 
notified his counsel, who in turn notified 
opposing counsel *nd the trial court that 
he would not so agree and that this was 
done betore the amended order was en-
tered. 
[3] Plaintiff advances the proposition 
that it would be neither fair nor proper to 
enter a "consent decree purporting to be 
based on the agreement ot a partv who 
does not agree thereto at the time ot final 
submission to the court This appears to 
be a sound proposition when applied to ap-
propriate circumstances •* But it is also 
true that tht same rules apply to binding 
parties to such an agreement as ippl> to 
an> other agreement. If there is am jus-
tification in law or equity tor avoiding or. 
repudiating a stipulation, and he timely 
goes so, ne is entitled to be relieved irom 
it, otherwise not 
[4] Proceeding beyond what has mst 
been said, we make several observations 
about this stipulation the tirst is tnat the 
issue as to whether plamtitf agreed to and 
should be bound by the stipulation was one 
of tact for the trial court to determine 
and it was not convinced that the plaintirt 
did not understand and voluntarily agree to 
the stipulation 
[5 6] This would seem to sutficientl> 
settle the issue But even if it be assumed, 
as the plaintift contends, that he either did 
not understand and/or was subjected to 
3 see fiurnaman \ Htaimx 1~>0 Tex °>33 210 
X\V2d 2SS Van Don acinar t * an Donse 
laar 249 Ioua 504. S7 X W 2d 311 {l'>"iM 
4 Open*haw » Opcmhair 102 I t ill 22 120 
P2d 1008 CalliHter i CalhsUr 1 L rah 2d 
34, 2G1 P 2d 944 
duress m agreeing to the stipulation, or 
that his agreement was timely and properly 
withdrawn, these further observations are 
applicable It is the established rule that a 
stipulation pertaining to matters of di-
vorce custody and property rights therein, 
though advisory upon the court and would 
usually be followed unless the court 
thought it untair or unreasonable, is not 
necessarily binding on the court an>way 
It is onl> a recommendation to be adhered 
to if the court believes it to be fair and 
reasonable 4 fn addition to all of the fore-
going, there is* no reason that the trial 
court cannot consider what was proposed 
by the parties as a stipulation, and what 
was said by them or their counsel about it, 
as part of the total facts and circumstances 
upon which to fashion what in his judg-
ment is a just and equitable decree 
[7] Under the circumstances shown, 
particularlv the fact that upon his anahsis 
ot the total circumstances the court indi-
cated in his udgment ot November 11, 
1074 that the detendant should have 
^200 000 more in assets than the present 
decree gives her and the plaintiff $200 000 
less it is obvious that the trial court did 
not regard this latter allocation of assets 
as m an> degree unjust or inequitable to 
the plamtitf Consistent with the latitude 
of discretion necessarily allowed to the 
trial judges in dealing with problems ot 
the character here involved, we are not 
persuaded that we should disturb the 
decree 5 ( Ml emphasis herein added ) 
\ t t irmed Costs to defendant (respon-
dent) 
HENRIOD C I, CLLETT, and 
TLCKETT If concur 
MAUGH \X, Justice (dissenting). 
5 s<t> P mon i Pinion (>2 I tali 255 07 P2d 
20T> MarDnnald i UacDonald 120 t tah 
">73 230 P 2d K*>0 Wieie i W tese, 24 t tah 
2d 230 4<>9 P 2d 504. 
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4. Divorce <£»30l 
Divorce decree permitting visitation 
by defendant father and permitting him to 
take young children from custody of moth-
er periodically should be supported by clear, 
affirmative and guaranteeing evidence that 
welfare of children will not be jeopardized 
by execution of order. 
Wife's action for divorce, wherein 
parties stipulated for $30 per month support 
money for each child and $1,000 cash in lieu 
5. Divorce <§=>3I2.7 
Where divorce decree permitting de-
fendant father to take children of tender 
of alimony. From a decree of the First years from custody of mother once each 
Judicial District Court, Cache County, Lew-
is Jones, J., awarding $25 per month for 
each child and one-half interest in about 
fifty acres of land instead of the agreed 
$1,000 cash, the wife appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Henriod, J., held that the 
month for two days was not supported by 
evidence as to how children would be 
clothed, housed, fed and otherwise taken 
care of or treated at such times, case would 
be remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with view that such decree should 
trial court's departure from the provisions be supported by clear, affirmative and guar-
of the stipulation was not, under circum- anteeing evidence that welfare of children 
stances of the case, such an abuse of dis-
cretion as to warrant reversal. 
Remanded for proceedings consistent 
with opinion. 
Worthen, J., dissented in part. 
1. Stipulations C=3l7(3) 
Trial court in divorce matters, wherein 
state is interested party, need not necessa-
rily abide with terms of litigants' stipula-
tions but such stipulations should be re-
spected and great weight given thereto.1 
2. Divorce <§»286, 312.6(4) 
Alimony and support money provisions 
of trial court's divorce decree could not 
be disturbed on review in absence of clear 
abuse of discretion.2 
3. Divorce <§=>236, 297 
Under circumstances shown in divorce 
case, trial court's award of $25 per month 
support money for each of three children 
and of one-half interest in about fifty 
acres of land as alimony, in lieu of $30 
per month for each child and $1,000 cash 
as alimony as provided by stipulation of 
parties, was not such abuse of discretion 
as to warrant reversal. 
I. Barrnclousrh v. Barraclou^h, 100 Utah 
196. I l l P.2d 702; Cailister v. Callister, 
1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 044. 
would not be jeopardized. 
Perry & Perry, Logan, for appellant. 
C. Preston Allen, Woodrow D. White, 
Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice. 
Appeal from those portions of a divorce 
decree which award property in lieu of 
alimony and the right of visitation with 
the children. Affirmed in part, reversed in 
part and remanded, with instructions. No 
costs awarded. 
[1-3] The parties married on July 22, 
1949, and had 2 children during the 2i/2 
years they lived together. On January 5, 
1952, plaintiff filed for divorce. A third 
child was born to the parties shortly there-
after. The case dragged on through a 
number of hearings until December 1953, 
nearly 2 years later, when a decree was 
entered awarding plaintiff a divorce. $25 
per month support money for each child, 
custody of the children, subject to a right 
of visitation 3 times each month for 12 
hours, and once a month for 2 days, with 
those children who had attained the age of 
2. Allen v. Allen, 100 Utah 99, 165 P.2d 
872; Treinajne v. Tremayae, 116 Utah 
4.S3. 211 P.2d 452. 
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36 months, defendant being allowed to 
take them from plaintiffs presence duung 
such periods, and a one-half interest in a 
parcel of property owned by defendant 
During the protracted litigation, the par-
ties and their counsel had stipulated that it 
would be agreeabte if the court awarded 
$1,000 cash in lieu of alimony, payable in 6 
months, and $30 per month as support mon-
ey for each child. Such stipulation appar-
ently lulled plaintiff into a false sense 
of security, sufficient to impel her to not 
proffer any evidence as to her ability to 
and need for support of the children. In 
so assuming she erred, since the trial court, 
in divorce matters, where the state is an 
interested party, need not abide, neces-
sarily, with the terms of the litigants' stip-
ulations,1 although such stipulations should 
be respected and great weight given there-
to. Plaintiff's only complaint in this re-
spect, would be, not tftat the court was 
dutv bound and erroneously refused to car-
ry out the terms agreed upon, but that it 
abused its discretion by entering an in-
equitable decree,2 a matter we must de-
termine on revitw Unless there is a clear 
abuse of discretion, we cannot disturb the 
trial court on such matters, and we believe 
that the $25 per month awarded instead of 
the stipulated $30, and the one-half in-
terest in about 50 acres of land instead of 
the agreed $1 000 cash, under the facts of 
this case, whose voluminous record cmnot 
be detailed here, but where, howe\er, there 
is evidence to *ho\v considerable self-sut-
ficiency on the part oi plaintiff, and a 
ph>sical ailment on the part ot defendant 
which was at least a Hireat to his earning 
capacity, was not sucn an abuse ot discre-
tion contemplated by the authorities as to 
warrant reversal. 
[4 5] As to the award of visitirg rights 
to the detendant, we are raced vvith a 
decidedly different problem—a smiting 
around which might affect the ph>sical, 
moral and social wellare ot 3 tots :>f render 
years, even more than a detendant's tailure 
to pay support money There is no evi-
dence in the record that shows any lack 
!. Birrtcloush v Biriiclou^h 100 Utih 
1% 111 P2d 792 Ciihster v Cdlnster, 
1 I tab 2d 34, 261 P 2d 944 
of affection by either spouse and none to 
show that the defendant would harm, or 
that the children's welfare would be im-
paired, by the carrying out of the quite 
unusual order for visitation entered her* 
On the other hand there is no evidence 
to show how these children would be 
housed when their father came and tock 
them away, by whom they would be clothed, 
fed and otherwise taken care of, or other-
wise how they might be treated. In cases 
where little children's welfare hangs in the 
balance, we cannot gamole it on an absence 
of evidence or on an> presumption that 
tender care will be giv'en by the natural 
parent. There should be clear, affirmative 
and guaranteeing evidence that the welfare 
of children such as these would not be 
jeopardized by execution of the order. No-
such evidence appears m this record, and 
we are compelled to remand the case with 
instructions to proceed n accordance with 
the views herein expressed as to ngnts 
of visitation. 
MCDONOUGH, C J , and CROCKETT 
and WADE, J J , concur 
WORTHEN, Justice (concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) 
I agree with Mr Justice Hennod that 
this case must be remanded. I believe, 
however, that the court was in error in 
failing to award ?30 per month support 
monev tor each child 
In the case of Calhster v Calhster, 261 
P2d 944, this Court at page 946, alter 
quoting Sec 30-3-5, UCA1953 , said 
"This court has neld that, b> reason 
of the statute, an agreement or stipu-
lation between parties to a divorce si it 
as to alimony or payments for support 
of children is not binding upon the 
court in entering a divorce decree, 
but serves only as a recommendation, 
and t the court adopts the suggesfon 
of the parties it does not thereby lose 
the nght to make such modification or 
change thereafter as may be requested 
by cither party, based upon change of 
2. Allen v Ulen 100 Utih 99 16*5 P 2d 
b~2 md cisc^ eitpd therein Tremav le 
v Tremayne, 116 Ltah 463, 211 P 2d 4o2 
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circumstances warranting such modifi-
cation." (Emphasis ours ) 
The statement is salutory and intended 
to permit the trial court to look behind 
the stipulation and prevent fraud or coer-
cion by one party upon the other, and to 
safeguard the interest and welfare of the 
children. 
The father of three minor children had 
agreed that the court award to each child 
$30 per month support money For reasons 
not readily apparent the tnal court cut the 
azia)d for each child to $25 per month. 
The court m finding of fact No. 6 found 
,as follows. 
V "That the defendant is receiving 
from the U S Government as payment 
for partial disability incurred in the 
military service of the United States 
the sum of $102 00 per month, and he 
is also employed in Las Vegas, Neva-
da, and is earning $70 00 per week." 
It was suggested that the court may have 
been influenced in its action by the de-
fendant's disaoiut), but if that disability 
makes it impossible tor him to continue 
to earn the $70 per week he is earning, 
then the court could reduce the amount 
if the changed condition warrants a re-
MADSEN 
P 2 d 017 
Utah oio 
duction But if the award of $25 per child 
(per month) is permitted to stand, then 
no additional award may be made without 
showing either increased earnings by de-
tendant or greater need on the part of 
plaintiff 
However, while defendant has an income 
of approximately $400 per month, I am 
unwilling to approve an award of $75 for 
the support of his three children leaving 
him $325 with which to make four trips 
per month from Las Vegas to Cache 
Countv to visit his children More money 
even at the expense of fewer visits will 
in my opinion promote the best interest of 
the children. 
The rule announced in the case of Cal-
hster v Callister, supra, that stipulations 
are recommendations only, should not be 
permitted to make a father s duty to his 
minor children less than he admits it should 
be Such an unconscionable award onl> 
tends to add to the public expense for the 
care ot dependent children 
The trial court should be directed to 
increase the lua rd for the children from 
$25 to $30 per month per child unkss 
changed conditions are shown after turther 
hearing justifying the award of only $25 
per child. 
RUNYON v. CITY < 
Cite as, Kan.Af 
Pearl B. RUNYON and George 
Rosenquist et al., Appellees, 
v. 
CITY OF NEOSHO RAPIDS, Kansas, 
et al., Appellants. 
No. 49129. 
Court of Appeals of Kansas. 
Nov. 3, 1978. 
Electors of city brought mandamus ac-
tion against city and its governing body to 
require city to comply with statute requir-
ing city to conduct audit upon petition by 
20% or more of city's voters. The Lyon 
District Court, R. E. Miller, J., entered 
amended order requiring audit and award-
ing attorney fees to plaintiffs, and defend-
ants appealed. The Court of Appeals, Foth, 
C. J., held that: (1) since city's concept of 
what was required of it by stipulation en-
tered into by the parties and approved by 
court was entirely different from concept 
entertained by plaintiffs and trial court, 
court was authorized to vacate its original 
order based upon stipulation and to replace 
it with one which clearly expressed parties' 
true obligations, and (2) evidence concern-
ing city's delay in conducting audit and 
absence of excuse for city's nonaction sup-
ported award of attorney fees. 
As modified, affirmed. 
1. Stipulations <s=»13 
Parties may be relieved of their stipu-
lations for mistake, accident, surprise, inad-
vertence or improvidence. 
2. Stipulations ®=*IZ 
Where defendants' concept of what 
was required of them by stipulation entered 
into by parties and approved by court was 
totally different from that of plaintiffs and 
court which approved stipulation, court was 
authorized to vacate its original order based 
upon stipulation and to replace it with one 
which clearly expressed parties' true obliga-
tions. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b), 
K.S.A. 60-260(b). 
F NEOSHO RAPIDS Kan. 1069 
>.. 385 P2d 1069 
3. Mandamus c=»177 
Attorney fees are allowable as damages 
in mandamus where there has been unrea-
sonable refusal to perform duty imposed by 
law. 
4. Mandamus @=»177 
In mandamus action brought by 
electors of city of the third class to compel 
city to order audit of its books pursuant to 
statute requiring such audit upon written 
petition of 20% or more of city's voters, 
evidence concerning city's delay in face of 
request for audit and absence of excuse for 
city's nonaction was sufficient to support 
award of attorney fees to plaintiffs on 
ground of unreasonable refusal to perform 
duty imposed by law. K.S.A 75-1125. 
Syllabus by the Court 
1. Under K.S.A. 75-1125, when a 
proper petition is presented to the govern-
ing body of any municipality not required 
by law to have an annual audit, it is the 
duty of the governing body to order the 
audit requested in the petition. The statute 
is mandatory, and compliance may be com-
pelled by mandamus. 
2. Parties may be relieved of their 
stipulations for mistake, accident, surprise 
or inadvertence. The same kinds of factors 
are grounds for vacating a judgment under 
K.S.A. 60-260(6 )(1). 
3. Where the construction put on 
court-approved stipulation by one party is 
totally different from that of the other 
party and the court which approved it, the 
court is authorized to relieve the other par-
ty of the stipulation and to modify its order 
based thereon so as to clearly express the 
parties' true obligations. 
4. Attorney fees are allowable as 
damages in mandamus where there has 
been an unreasonable refusal to perform a 
duty imposed by law 
5. In a mandamus action to compel a 
city of the third class to order an audit of 
its books it is held the trial court did not err 
in amending its original order or in allow-
ing attorney fees. 
A p p e n d i x • •£ l -^ -
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Duane D. Guy, Emporia, for appellants. 
Mark L. Yates and Gerald D. Lasswell, of 
Stinson, Wisdom & Lasswell, of Wichita, for 
appellees. 
Before FOTH, C. J., and SPENCER and 
MEYER, JJ. 
FOTH, Chief Judge: 
This is an appeal by the defendants, the 
City of Neosho Rapids and its governing 
body, from an order in mandamus requiring 
an audit of the city's books and an order 
allowing attorney fees to the plaintiffs. 
On January 12, 1976, plaintiffs, electors 
of the city, filed a petition with the govern-
ing body requesting an audit of the city's 
finances for the preceding six year period. 
Neosho Rapids being a city of the third 
class a regular annual audit is not required 
by statute, but the city is governed by 
K.S.A. 75-1125 (Weeks 1969), and particu-
larly the relevant proviso: 
"Provided, That upon a written petition 
filed with the governing body of any such 
municipality not provided for by section 
12 [75-1122] of this act by 20% or more of 
the voters of said municipality who voted 
at the last election for officers of such 
municipality it shall be the duty of said 
governing body to employ a licensed mu-
nicipal public accountant or accountants 
or certified public accountant or account-
ants to examine and audit the accounts of 
such municipality for such period of time 
as may be set out in the petition of the 
voters.'* (Emphasis added.) 
The petition filed contained sufficient 
signatures, and under the statute it there-
upon became "the duty of [the] governing 
body" to order the audit requested. When 
this governing body failed to act for three 
months, plaintiffs commenced this action on 
April 6, 1976, to compel compliance with the 
statute. 
The litigation dragged on until Decem-
ber, when the parties entered into a stipula-
tion designed to settle the controversy. 
Under the stipulation the city was to order 
an audit by designated auditors, to cover 
the years 1970 through 1973, and to include 
a verification of all expenditures. The stip-
ulation contained the following conditions; 
"D. No damages shall be awarded or 
paid to Plaintiffs other than reasonable 
attorney's fees as may hereinafteir be 
stipulated to between the parties op or-
dered by the Court. 
"E. This agreement, the performance 
hereunder by the Defendants and per-
formance of Defendants by reason of any 
order of mandamus issued by the District 
Court of Lyon County, Kansas, pursuant 
to this agreement, shall be subject to 
authority granted by the Board of Tax 
Appeals of the State of Kansas to the 
Defendants to issue no-fund warrants in 
the amount sufficient to cover the costs 
and expenses of litigation between the 
parties and the costs of the audit" 
The stipulation was submitted to and ap-
proved by the trial court, which entered an 
order on December 16, 1976, incorporating 
the substance of the stipulation in its de-
cree, including the conditional language of 
paragraph UE" above. 
The city proceeded with its pending appli-
cation to the Board of Tax Appeals for 
authority to issue no-fund warrants,. That 
body, after a hearing, denied the applica-
tion, whereupon the city took the position 
that its entire obligation in the matter was 
ended. Plaintiffs, however, returned to the 
trial court with motions for attorney fees, 
to vacate the December order, and for a 
contempt citation. The trial court awarded 
attorney fees and in May, 1977, conducted a 
hearing on the other matters raised. 
The primary issue before the trial court 
was whether the action of the Board of Tax 
Appeals relieved the city of its statutory 
duty because of the wording of the original 
stipulation and order of December 16, 1976. 
The court found that the provisions of 
K.S.A. 75-1125 are mandatory and that the 
Board of Tax Appeals has no authority to 
relieve the governing body of its statutory 
duty. Most importantly, the trial court 
found that its order of December 16 had not 
been intended to make compliance totally 
dependent on the action of the Board, but 
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only that the time of compliance would 
depend on the Board's order. 
[1,2] Based on this finding, and relying 
on its authority to vacate judgments under 
K.S.A. 60-260(6), the court modified the 
crucial decretal paragraph of its original 
mandamus order tVom: 
"IT IS FURTHER BY THE COURT 
ORDERED that performance by Defend-
ants of this order of mandamus shall be 
subject to authority granted by the Board 
of Tax Appeals of the State of Kansas to 
the City of Neosho Rapids, Kansas, to 
issue no-fund warrants in an amount suf-
ficient to pay the expenses of litigation 
and the expenses of preparation of the 
audit." 
to read: 
"IT IS FURTHER BY THE COURT 
ORDERED that performance by defend-
ant of the order of mandamus shall be 
subject to the further order of the court 
as to the time of performance and de-
fendant's (sic) shall have a reasonable 
time in which to secure funds for such 
purpose and in the necessary sum to pay 
costs of audit and litigation. The Court 
will thereupon set the date for com-
mencement of the audit, the same to be 
within a reasonable time. Defendants 
are ordered to advise the Court of the 
costs forthwith." 
It is from this amended order that defend-
ants appeal. The city argues first that the 
court had no authority to modify its order 
because it was based on a stipulation of the 
parties. However, par tes may he relieved 
of their stipulations for mistaKe. accident, 
surprise, inadvertence or imorovidence. 
Morrison v. Hurst Drilling Co., 212 Kan. 
706, 512 P.2d 438 (1973); Bodle v. Balch, 185 
Kan. 711, 347 P.2d 378 (1959). Those fac-
tors closely parallel the grounds for vacat-
ing a judgment under K.S.A. 6O-260(b )(1). 
The trial court found that the stipulation 
and its order both contemplated that the 
Board of Tax Appeals would grant no-fund 
warrant authority as a matter of routine, 
based on the city's good faith application. 
In fact, the court found, the city's agents 
made it clear to the Board that they did not 
really want the authority they nominally 
sought, and the Board's denial was the nat-
ural result of the presentation made to the 
Board. The court's finding that the de-
fendants did not act in good faith in 
presenting the application is amply sup-
ported by the record. It is apparent that 
the city's concept of what was required of it 
by the stipulation and order was entirely 
different from the concept entertained by 
the plaintiffs and the trial ccurt. (It is 
clear that if the court had thought it meant 
what the city claimed it would never have 
approved the stipulation.) That difference 
was sufficient ground for the court to va-
cate its original order and replace it with 
one which clearly expressed the parties true 
obligations. The motion to vacate was ad-
dressed to the trial court's discretion. Bak-
er v. Baker, 217 Kan. 319, 320, 537 P.2d 171 
(1975), and cases cited therein. We are 
unable to find an abuse of discretion here. 
As to attorney fees, the original stipula-
tion called for them to be determined by 
later agreement or by the court. There was 
apparently an agreement at one time, but it 
seems to have foundered in the Board of 
Tax Appeals hearing. Under the stipula-
tion it thereupon fell to the court to fix 
them, and defendants are not in a position 
to complain. 
[3,4] In addition, fees are allowable as 
damages in mandamus where there has 
been an unreasonable refusal to perform a 
duty imposed by law. Barten v. Turkey 
Creek Watershed Joint District No. 32, 200 
Kan. 489, 438 P.2d 732 (1968). Although no 
evidence on this issue was presented at the 
special hearing devoted to attorney fees, 
the court had before it the three month 
delay between the request for an audit and 
the commencement of the action, and the 
absence of any excuse for the city's non-ac-
tion. Those facts were enough to make a 
prima facie case of unreasonableness. The 
city even now offers no reason for its fail-
ure to act beyond a suggestion that the 
statute may be unconstitutional because it 
contains no limit on the time to be covered 
by the audit. We conclude that the award 
of attorney fees is supported by the record. 
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The other issue raised—the impoundment 
of certain books—was conceded by the city 
at oral argument not to be properly before 
us and we need not consider it. 
Plaintiffs have requested additional at-
torney fees for services on appeal. Con-
sidering the nature of the case and the fact 
that these fees are to be paid from public 
funds, it is this court's opinion that the 
$3,300 allowed below should be sufficient to 
cover services in this court as well. We do 
allow expenses as itemized in the amount of 
$259 82, and the judgment below is modi-
fied to that extent. 
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. 
( o I KEYNUM8£RSYSTEM> 
In the Interest of Kathleen PENN, 
a minor. 
No. 49431. 
Court of Appeals of Kansas. 
Nov 3, 1978. 
Biological parents appealed from an or-
der of the Wyandotte District Court, Dean 
J Smith, J., permanently severing their pa-
rental rights. The Court of Appeals, Parks, 
J , held that evidence was sufficient to &up-
port trial court's finding of uniitness and 
its order of parental severance. 
Affirmed. 
1. Infants <*» 16.15 
In reviewing sufficiency of evidence to 
support a finding of parental unfitness, evi-
dence is viewed from the aspect most lavor-
abie to findings made by trial court. 
2. Infants §=>16.8 
Parent will not be permanently de-
prived of parental rights with respect to a 
dependent and neglected child unless there 
is clear and convincing evidence 
3. Infants c==>16.3 
As applied to the relation of rational 
parents to their child, the word "unfit" 
usually, although not necessarily, Imports 
something of moral delinquency; incapacity 
to appreciate and perform the obligations 
resting upon parents might render them 
unfit, apart from any other defects. K.S.A. 
38-824(c) 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Infants c=»16.3 
Inherent mental and emotional inca-
pacity to perform parental obligations can 
constitute such breach of parental duty as 
to make the parents unfit to be entrusted 
with custody of their child. K.S.A. 38-
824(c). 
5. Infants o=>16.8 
Evidence in proceeding for term nation 
of parental rights was sufficient to support 
trial court's finding of unfitness and its 
order of parental severance. K.S.A. 38-
824(c). 
Syllalws by the Court 
1. Inherent mental and emotional in-
capacity to perform parental obligations 
can constitute such breach of parental duty 
as to make the parents unfit to be entrust-
ed with custody of their child under K.S.A. 
1977 Supp 38-824(c) 
2. In a proceeding for permanent dep-
rivation ol parental rights in a dependent 
and neglected child, the record is examined 
and it is held that the trial court's finding 
of parental unfitness and the severance or-
der are supported by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
George W Thomas and Steven D Alex-
ander, Kansas City, for appellants. 
Muriel Andreopoulos, Asst. Dist. Atty, 
Curt T. Schneider, Atty Gen., and Nick A. 
Tomasic, Dist. Atty, for appellee. 
Before PARKS, P J., and SWINEHART 
and MEYER, JJ 
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the road "as now constructed and in use." 
The Reynolds argue that this language lim-
its the right-of-way to the types of uses 
extant in 1962, and that the Keenes had not 
previously used the road to haul timber. 
Thus, Mrs. Reynolds argued, she had a right 
to prevent attempts to haul timber over the 
road. 
In its memorandum opinion, designated 
to constitute findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and final judgment, the court refused 
to hold Mrs. Reynolds in contempt. After 
discussing various other issues not relevant 
to this appeal, the court addressed the de-
fense raised by Mrs. Reynolds that the 
Keenes had no right to haul timber over the 
road. The opinion declares: " * * * it is 
the conclusion of the Court that the decreed 
right-of-way in 1963 was a right-of way for 
a road for all purposes." Plaintiffs-appel-
lants appeal from that part of the opinion 
concluding that the 1963 right-of-way was 
for all purposes, claiming that it substan-
tially and improperly alters the 1963 decree 
to their detriment. 
The contumacious conduct complained of 
consisted of alleged violations of the 1963 
order that the Reynolds not interfere with 
the use of the right-of-way by the Keenes. 
In determining whether Mrs. Reynolds vio-
lated that order, it was necessary for the 
court to determine the extent of the 
Keenes' right to use the road, with the 
ultimate purpose of determining whether 
they were using the road in a manner which 
was protected from interference by the 
1963 decree. 
[2] It cannot be said that the meaning 
attributed to the 1963 order by the district 
court was incorrect. That part of that de-
cree declaring a right-of-way "as now con-
structed and in use * * *," does seem 
somehow to limit the Keenes' right; how-
ever, the meaning of that language is far 
from clear. Language in that decree also 
prohibits interference by the Reynolds of 
any use of the road for "either business or 
pleasure purposes," which seems to imply 
that a less limited right was found. Fur-
ther support for the limitation urged by 
appellants is not found in the record, as the 
v. TURNER Idaho 1071 
P.2d 1071 
parties waived findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law in 1963. Thus, it cannot be 
said that the district court erred here m 
concluding that the existing right-of-way 
was declared in 1963 to be for all purposes. 
The order of the district court is af-
firmed. Costs to respondents. 
DONALDSON, SHEPARD and BAKES, 
JJ., and SCOGGIN, D. J., concur. 
(O I KEYMUMBH£STEM> 
98 Idaho 110 
Wesley B. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Paul TURNER, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 12066. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Jan. 20, 1977. 
Vendor brought action against purchas-
er in which vendor sought, on theory that 
conveyance of real property was void due to 
fraud and lack of consideration, to have 
conveyance set aside, to quiet title and to 
obtain money judgment for portions of 
loans converted by purchaser to his own 
use. The District Court, Seventh Judicial 
District, Bonneville County, Boyd R. Thom-
as, J., granted vendor's motions for a 
change of venue and for consolidation, and 
denied motion to dismiss, and purchaser ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Donaldson, J., 
held that appeal could not be taken from 
orders granting motion for consolidation 
and denying motion to dismiss; that denial 
of prior motion by vendor for change of 
venue was not res judicata in regard to his 
subsequent motion for change of venue; 
that trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in granting the subsequent motion for 
change of venue back to county in which 
action was originally filed and in thus re-
lieving vendor of a stipulation to the initial 
change of venue; that statute, which pro-
vides that specified actions relating to real 
A p p e n d i x " E - I O " 
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property "must be tried in the county in 
which the subject of the action or some part 
thereof is situated, subject to the power of 
the court to change the place of trial," does 
not limit subject matter jurisdiction of low-
er courts. 
Order granting motion for change of 
venue affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <&=>85, 105 
Appeal could not be taken from orders 
granting motion for consolidation of actions 
and denying motion to dismiss. I.C. § 13-
201. 
2. Venue <s=>78 
Denial of plaintiffs motion for change 
of venue was not res judicata in regard to 
plaintiffs subsequent motion for change of 
venue. 
3. Stipulations ®=*\Z 
It is within sound discretion of a trial 
court, for good cause shown and in further-
ance of justice, to relieve a party from a 
stipulation. 
4. Venue e=>82 
In vendor's action against purchaser to 
have conveyance of real property set aside, 
to quiet title and to obtain money judgment 
for portions of loans converted by purchaser 
to his own use, trial court did not abuse its 
discretion, in granting vendor's motion for 
change of venue back to county in which 
action was originally filed and in thus re-
lieving vendor of a stipulation to the initial 
change of venue, where the motion was 
granted for purpose of permitting the ac-
tion to be consolidated with two other cases 
which involved same property and in which 
vendor and purchaser were defendants. 
I.C. § 5-401. 
5. Venue c=>5.3(l) 
Statute, which provides that specified 
actions relating to real property umust be 
tried in the county in which the subject of 
the action or some part thereof is situated, 
subject to the power of the court to change 
the place of trial," does not limit subject 
matter jurisdiction of lower courts; over-
ruling Banbury v. Bradford, 158 P 2d 826. 
I.C. §§ 5-401, 5-406, 5-409. 
Reginald R. Reeves, of Denman, Reeves 
& Ohman, Idaho Falls, for defendant-appel-
lant. 
W. Joe Anderson, of Sharp, Anderson & 
Bush, Idaho Falls, Sherman F. Furey, Jr., 
Salmon, for plaintiff-respondent. 
DONALDSON, Justice. 
The central issue presented by this appeal 
is whether it is an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to grant a motion changing 
venue back to the county from which the 
case had been transferred by stipulation of 
the parties. Under the facts of this case, 
we hold that it was not. 
On April 6, 1972, plaintiff-respondent 
Wesley B. Thompson conveyed certain real 
property located in Lemhi County to de-
fendant-appellant Paul Turner. Shortly af-
ter the conveyance, appellant Turner 
obtained a $200,000 loan from Mutual Life 
Insurance Company (hereinafter Mutual) 
which was secured by a mortgage on the 
property. He later obtained another $200,-
000 loan from Valley Bank, Inc., (herein-
after Valley) which was also secured by a 
mortgage on the real property. 
On April 15, 1974, respondent Thompson 
instituted this action against appellant 
alleging the conveyance was void due to 
fraud and lack of consideration. He sought 
to set the conveyance aside, to quiet his 
title in the real property, and to obtain a 
money judgment for the portions of the 
loans which were converted by appellant 
Turner to his own use. The action was 
originally filod in Lemhi County but was 
transferred to Bonneville County pursuant 
to stipulation of the parties. Subsequent to 
the initiation of this action, both Mutual 
and Valley began proceedings in Lemhi 
County to foreclose their mortgages. In 
each action respondent Thompson asserted 
a cross-claim against appellant seeking the 
same relief requested in this action. On 
July 30, 1975, upon motion by respondent, 
the court ordered that the venue of this 
action be changed from Bonneville back to 
Lemhi County, and that this action be con-
THOMPSON 
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solidated with the foreclosure proceedings 
begun by Mutual and Valley. 
[1] Appellant assigns as error the orders 
of the trial court granting respondent's mo-
tions for a change of venue and for consoli-
dation, and denying his motion to dismiss. 
We will consider only the order granting 
the change of venue since appeal from the 
latter two orders is not authorized. I.C. 
§ 13-201; Wilson v. DeBoard, 94 Idaho 562, 
494 P.2d 566 (1972). 
Appellant contends that the trial court 
should have denied the motion for two rea-
sons: (1) its denial of a previous motion by 
respondent for a change of venue was res 
judicata and (2) the parties stipulated to the 
original change from Lemhi to Bonneville 
County. Respondent counters that under 
Banbury v. Brailsford, 66 Idaho 262, 158 
P.2d 826 (1945), the Court was required to 
grant the motion because it lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to try the case. 
[2] Appellant's argument based upon 
the doctrine of res judicata must fail. An 
order denying a motion for a change of 
venue is not a judgment subject to that 
doctrine. As to the stipulation, the trial 
court decided that the proper venue for this 
action was Lemhi County since it is an 
action for the determination of an interest 
in real property. I.C. § 5-401. Therefore, 
the question is whether it erred in relieving 
respondent of the stipulation and transfer-
ring the case back to Lemhi County. 
[3, 4] It iajxnthi^ rhft annnH }\\(\iri'A\ dis-
cretion of a trial court, for g-oorj oflii^p 
shown and m furtherance of justice, to re-
1 leve a party from a stipulation. Loughrey 
v. Weitzel, 94 Idaho 833, 498 P.2d 1306 
(1972); Call v. Marler, 89 Idaho 120, 403 
P.2d 588 (1965). The trial court granted the 
change of venue so that this case could be 
consolidated with those instituted by Mutu-
l. "5-401 Actions relating to real property — 
Actions ror the following causes must be tried 
in the county in which the subject ot the action 
or some part thereof is situated, subject to the 
power of the court to change the place or trial. 
as provided in this code 
1 For the recovery ot real property, or of 
an estate or interest therein, or ror the determi-
558 P 2d—68 
v. TURNER Idaho 1073 
P.2d 1071 
al and Valley. All three cases involve the 
same real estate, and both appellant and 
respondent are defendants in the other two 
cases. The trial court determined that con-
solidating the cases would reduce costs and 
delay, that it would be more convenient for 
the parties and witnesses, and that it would 
be in the best interests of justice. Under 
the circumstances, we cannot say that it 
abused its discretion in relieving respondent 
of the stipulation and in granting the mo-
tion to change venue back to Lemhi County. 
[5] Although we uphold the action of 
the trial court, we do not do so for the 
reason urged by respondent. The Court in 
Banbury v. Brailsford, supra, stated that in 
enacting I.C. § 5-401,l the legislature in-
tended to limit the jurisdiction of the lower 
courts. Only a court in the county in which 
real property is located has subject-matter 
jurisdiction to try an action affecting the 
title to or possession of that reai property. 
After reviewing the decision, however, we 
find the dissent of Justice Givens to be 
persuasive. For the following reasons we 
hold that the Banbury Court was incorrect 
insofar as it stated that I.C. § 5-401 limits 
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the lower 
courts. 
Idaho Code § 5-401 was originally enact-
ed in 1881 as § 205 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. On its face it states that its 
provisions as to proper venue are "subject 
to the power of the court to change the 
place of trial." Section 210 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure permitted a change of ven-
ue in certain instances. It made no distinc-
tion between actions affecting real property 
and other types of actions. Section 213 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure expressly rec-
ognized that an action affecting the title to 
or possession of reai estate could be brought 
in or transferred to a court of a county 
nation in any form of such right or interest and 
for injuries to reai property 
2. For the partition ot real property 
3 For the foreclosure of a mortgage ot real 
property Where the real property is situated 
partly in one county and partly in another, the 
plaintiff may select either of the counties, and 
the countv i»o selected is the proper county for 
the trial of such action." 
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other than the county in which the real 
estate or some portion thereof was situated. 
The section provided that in such cases a 
copy of the final judgment would be trans-
mitted to the clerk of the court of the 
county in which the real estate was situat-
ed.2 It is obvious that had the legislature 
intended I.C. § 5-401 to limit the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the lower courts, 
§ 213 of the Code of Civil Procedure would 
have been a meaningless enactment. 
2. Section 210 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
was last compiled in I C § 5-406, and $ 213 is 
compiled in I C § 5-409 Idaho Code $ 5-406 
was repealed as a procedural statute in conflict 
The order of the district court granting 
the motion for a change of venue is af-
firmed. Costs to respondents. 
McFADDEN, C. J., and SHEPARD, 
BAKES and BISTLINE, JJ., concur. 
rw 
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with or covered by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure Ch 242, § i [1975] Idaho Sess. 
Laws 651 
B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINiS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v, : 
BRYANT JEROME BROWN, : Civil No. D79-3802 
Defendant. : Judge Sawaya 
oooOooo 
Defendant's Motion for an Order enforcing the 
provisions of an agreement entered into between the parties 
on the 5th of June, 1984, rame on reeularly for hearing on 
Monday, the 15th jay of April, 1985, at the hour of 2:00 o'e 
P.T. . Defendant ac Dear in z in person and by his attorney B. r . 
Dart, c\r\d plaintiff appealing in Derson anj by her attorney 
David A. McPhie, md the Court bavins heaM th irguments mi 
proffers of r<spi-vtive attorneys and having reviewed the f i U* 
and be i tig fully acHised, hereby makes the following: 
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Appendix "F" 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Following the filing of plaintiff's Petition for 
Modification and defendant's Counter Petition, there was 
extensive discovery carried out between the parties following 
which the parties engaged in extensive negotiation through their 
respective attorneys. 
2. On the 5th day of June, 1984, the parties appeared 
at a proceeding before a court reporter for the purpose of 
setting forth the terms of a settlement agreement which had been 
reached between the parties, and with both parties in attendance 
with their attorneys the terms of the agreement were read into 
the record with input provided by attorneys for both of the 
parties. At that time all issues were considered and an 
agreement was struck and entered on the record and all the 
parties and counsels consented to the terms either affirmatively 
or impliedly by not objecting to any of the terms of the 
Stipulation. 
3. For a period from the 5th of June, 1984, until the 
30th of November, 1984, plaintiff made no objection to the 
Stipulation which had been reached on the record and had been 
reduced to a written Stipulation and presented to her for her 
signature. During this period of time she received the 
additional financial benefits under the terms of the Stipulation 
which included an increase in the amounts paid by defendant to 
2 £00 
plaintiff of $200 per month. 
4. Plaintiff by her conduct is estopped from denying 
this agreement and defendant has relied to his detriment on 
plaintiff's acceptance of the benefits and equity dictates that 
the sanctity of that agreement should be preserved and should 
prevail. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's Motion for an Order appproving and 
enforcing the settlement agreement is hereby granted. 
2. The Stipulation of the parties is accepted by the 
Court and the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this action 
may be modified in accordance with that Stipulation as more fully 
hereinafter set forth. 
3. The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that 
plaintiff's award of alimony shall be reduced from the amount of 
$900 a month to the amount of $500 a month commencing with the 
month of July, 1984, and continuing thereafter for a period of 
two years or until plaintiff remarries whichever occurs first. 
Upon the happening of either event, alimony will terminate. 
Defendant's payment of alimony shall be due on or before the 5th 
day of each month. 
3 
So long as defendant has an obligation for alimony, 
he is ordered to maintain plaintiff as a named insured on a 
currently existing life insurance policy in the face amount of 
$50,000. Defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with evidence 
that this life insurance is currently in force. 
4. The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that 
defendant's obligation to plaintiff for support shall be 
increased from a sum of $300 per month to a sum of $500 per month 
per child for each of the three minor children of the parties 
commencing with the month of July, 1984. Payments of support are 
due on or before the 5th day of each month and defendant's 
obligation for support shall continue to age 21 for any child who 
shall elect to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or shall 
elect to attend a college or university. For any such child over 
the age of 18 not living at home, the payment of support shall be 
paid by defendant directly to said child. If payment of support 
is not paid to said child by defendant, plaintiff shall retain 
the right for enforcement of collection. 
As an additional obligation of support, defendant 
is ordered to pay for orthodontia treatment which has been 
provided to this time by Dr. Gary Stephens and to pay for any 
orthodontia and dentist expenses for any child so long as there 
is an obligation for the payment of support for said child. 
Defendant is further ordered to continue to maintain the children 
on his health and accident insurance which has a $100 per child 
deductible* Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant all 
medical, dental and orthodontia bills within a reasonable amount 
of time not to exceed 30 days of when they are received. Any 
medical expenses not described or covered by insurance will be 
the responsibility of plaintiff. 
As a further obligation for support, defendant is 
ordered to maintain in force his currently existing: life 
insurance with the children named thereon as beneficiaries so 
long as defendant has an obligation for support. This life 
insurance policy has a $50,000 death benefit. So long as the 
life insurance policy is in force, if defendant's obligation to 
pay support for any child terminates, plaintiff will have the 
right to notify defendant of her desire to elect that the policy 
have the name or names of the non-supported child or children 
removed from the policy so that it retains only the supported 
children as named beneficiaries. Unless such an election is made 
by plaintiff, defendant shall retain all children as named 
beneficiaries on the life insurance policy until his obligation 
to support the last child is terminated. 
5. Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant the 
account numbers of the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus 
Branch, and Draper Bank accounts that are the accounts for the 
children awarded in the Decree of Divorce to be transferred to 
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plaintiff. Upon receipt of these account numbers, defendant is 
ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to have his name 
removed from the accounts so that plaintiff's name can be placed 
upon the accounts. 
6. The Decree of Divorce should be modified to 
provide, in addition to what other rights of visitation the 
parties may in the future mutually agree upon, the folLowing: 
a* Defendant shall have the right to have the 
children with him on alternate weekends from Friday evening at 
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
b. Plaintiff is ordered not to schedule any 
activities for the children which will in any way conflict with 
defendant's visitation time without first consulting with 
defendant and in the event the parties are not able to agree on 
such an activity being scheduled for defendant's visitation time, 
then either party will have the right to bring the matter before 
the Court for determination. In the event activities are 
scheduled as agreed upon or determined by the Court during 
defendant's visitation time, defendant is ordered to do whatever 
is necessary to see the children participate in that activity. 
c. Plaintiff is ordered to provide defendant with 
a reasonable advance notice of any of the activities in which the 
children are involved and that there will be as much notice as 
possible of any of the activities of the children in which they 
are performing in a competitive activity or in which they are 
participating or performing in front of an audience that includes 
other adults or parents. 
d. Except for Christmas, defendant shall have 
the right to have the children on alternate holidays, and when 
those holidays are Monday holidays which come on the weekend 
defendant has visitation, he shall have the full weekend for 
three days including Monday, and on those weekends visitation 
shall be from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p.m. 
e. Each Christmas holiday, defendant shall have 
the right to have the children commencing on Christmas Day at 
1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the Christmas vacation until the 
commencement of school, unless there are less than five days of 
Christmas vacation before Christmas, in which event the parties 
agree time will be worked out so that plaintiff has the children 
with her at least five days during the Christmas break. 
f. Defendant will have the right to have the 
children with him each summer for a month. During summer visitation 
while the children are in town, plaintiff will have the right to 
contact the children by telephone and they will have the right to 
contact her by telephone, and plaintiff shall be entitled to 
have one visit with them during that time. 
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon 
between the parties. Commencing in 1986 defendant shall notify 
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plaintiff at least 60 days in advance of when he would like to have 
the month of visitation, and at the same time, the parties will reac 
an agreement as to the one day during the month of summer visitatioi 
that plaintiff will have the right to visit. 
The parties are ordered to consult with each 
other at least 90 days before the beginning of the summer of 
their anticipated schedules to be sure there are no conflicts and 
to try and resolve potential conflicts that might exist. If 
there is a conflict as to when defendant's summer visitation 
should occur, either party will have the right to ask the Court 
to resolve the conflict if they are not able to do so. 
If the children are offered an opportunity to 
register for a summer activity that requires an early 
registration, plaintiff is ordered to notify defendant so that he 
can let plaintiff know whether this might conflict with his plans 
in the hope of avoiding a conflict. 
g. Defendant will have the right to visit with 
the children frequently at times other than those outlined 
provided the visitation does not conflict with important 
activities in which the children are involved. 
h. Either defendant or his present wife shall 
have the right to pick up and return the children. In the event 
defendant's current wife is picking up the children, she will 
honk for the children in the driveway. If the children do not 
gPo 
come or she is not notified when the children will be there, then 
after waiting five minutes, she will have the right to go to the 
door to get that information. 
i. At any time defendant is exercising 
visitation and will be taking the children out of town, defendant 
is ordered to provide plaintiff an itinerary so that she will 
know where the children are. Plaintiff is ordered whenever she 
takes the children out of town, to provide defendant with an 
itinerary so that he will know where the children are. 
7. Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $1,500 
toward plaintiff's attorney's fees which shall be paid by 
defendant within 30 days of billing by plaintiff's attorney. 
DATED this / day of /P^t^Y, 1,985, 
BY T 
By< 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HiNDLEY 
Clerk 
DlsftTridt Judge 
flWPL?WS CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of April, 1985, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to: 
David A. McPhie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
147 North 200 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
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A t to rney fo r Defendant 
310 South Main 
S u i t e 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
v. : 
BRYANT JEROME BROWN, : Civil No. D79-3SC2 
Defendant. : Judge Sawaya 
oooOooo 
Defendant's Motion for an Order enforcing the 
provisions of an agreement entered into between the parties 
on the 5th of June, 1984, came on regularlv for hearing: on 
Monday, the 15th day of April. 1985, a~ th^ hour of 2:')0 o'c\^ 
n.m. Defendant apoearing in person and \v his attorney p. !. 
Dart, a.nc\ plaint iff appearing ;n person and by her attorney 
David A. McPhio, dn6 the Court having heard the argument an^ 
proffers of respective attorneys and having reviewed the f i U-
and having made and entered if,s Findings of Fart drd Cone 1 -<^  i f-n^  
ot Liw, now therefore, 
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Appendix "G" 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendants Motion for an Order appproving and 
enforcing the settlement agreement is hereby granted, 
2. The Stipulation of the parties is accepted by the 
Court and the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this action 
is hereby stipulated in accordance with that Stipulation as more 
fully hereinafter set forth. 
3. The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that 
plaintiff's award of alimony shall be reduced from the amount of 
$900 a month to the amount of $500 a month commencing with the 
month of July, 1984, and continuing thereafter for a period of 
two years or until plaintiff remarries whichever occurs first. 
Upon the happening of either event, alimony will terminate. 
Defendant's payment of alimony shall be due on or before the 5th 
day of each month. 
So long as defendant has an obligation for alimony, 
he is ordered to maintain plaintiff as a named insured on a 
currently existing life insurance policy in the face amount of 
$50,000. Defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with evidence 
that this life insurance is currently in force. 
4. The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that 
defendants obligation to plaintiff for support shall be 
increased from a sum of $300 per month to a sum of $500 per month 
per child for each of the three minor children of the parties 
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commencing with the month of July, 1984, Payments of support are 
due on or before the 5th day of each month and defendant's 
obligation for support shall continue to age 21 for any child who 
shall elect to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or shall 
elect to attend a college or university. For any such child over 
the age of 18 not living at home, the payment of support shall be 
paid by defendant directly to said child. If payment of support 
is not paid to said child by defendant, plaintiff shall retain 
the right for enforcement of collection. 
As an additional obligation of support, defendant 
is ordered to pay for orthodontia treatment which has been 
provided to this time by Dr. Gary Stephens and to pay for any 
orthodontia and dentist expenses for any child so long as there 
is an obligation for the payment of support for said child. 
Defendant is further ordered to continue to maintain the children 
on his health and accident insurance which has a $100 per child 
deductible. Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant all 
medical, dental and orthodontia bills within a reasonable amount 
of time not to exceed 30 days of when they are received. Any 
medical expenses not described or covered by insurance will be 
the responsibility of plaintiff. 
As a further obligation for support, defendant is 
ordered to maintain in force his currently existing life 
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insurance with the children named thereon as beneficiaries so 
long as defendant has an obligation for support. This life 
insurance policy has a $50,000 death benefit. So long as the 
life insurance policy is in force, if defendant's obligation to 
pay support for any child terminates, plaintiff will have the 
right to notify defendant of her desire to elect that the policy 
have the name or names of the non-supported child or children 
removed from the policy so that it retains only the supported 
children as named beneficiaries. Unless such an election is made 
by plaintiff, defendant shall retain all children as named 
beneficiaries on the life insurance policy until his obligation 
to support the last child is terminated. 
5. Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant the 
account numbers of the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus 
Branch, and Draper Bank accounts that are the accounts for the 
children awarded in the Decree of Divorce to be transferred to 
plaintiff. Upon receipt of these account numbers, defendant is 
ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to have his name 
removed from the accounts so that plaintiff's name can be placed 
upon the accounts. 
6. The Decree of Divorce is hereby modified to 
provide, in addition to what other rights of visitation the 
parties may in the future mutually agree upon, the following: 
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a. Defendant shall have the right to have the 
children with him on alternate weekends from Friday evening at 
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
b. Plaintiff is ordered not to schedule any 
activities for the children which will in any way conflict with 
defendants visitation time without first consulting with 
defendant and in the event the parties are not able to agree on 
such an activity being scheduled for defendant's visitation time, 
then either party will have the right to bring the matter before 
the Court for determination. In the event activities are 
scheduled as agreed upon or determined by the Court during 
defendant's visitation time, defendant is ordered to do whatever 
is necessary to see the children participate in that activity. 
c. Plaintiff is ordered to provide defendant with 
a reasonable advance notice of any of the activities in which the 
children are involved and that there will be as much notice as 
possible of any of the activities of the children in which they 
are performing in a competitive activity or in which they are 
participating or performing in front of an audience that includes 
other adults or parents. 
d. Except for Christmas, defendant shall have 
the right to have the children on alternate holidays, and when 
those holidays are Monday holidays which come on the weekend 
defendant has visitation, he shall have the full weekend for 
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three days including Monday, and on those weekends visitation 
shall be from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p.m. 
e. Each Christmas holiday, defendant shall have 
the right to have the children commencing on Christmas Day at 
1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the Christmas vacation until the 
commencement of school, unless there are less than five days of 
Christmas vacation before Christmas, in which event the parties 
agree time will be worked out so that plaintiff has the children 
with her at least five days during the Christmas break. 
f. Defendant will have the right to have the 
children with him each summer for a month. During summer visitatio 
while the children are in town, plaintiff will have the right to 
contact the children by telephone and they will have the right to 
contact her by telephone, and plaintiff shall be entitled to 
have one visit with them during that time. 
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon 
between the parties. Commencing in 1986 defendant shall notify 
plaintiff at least 60 days in advance of when he would like to have 
the month of visitation, and at the same time, the parties will rea 
an agreement as to the one day during the month of summer visitatic 
that plaintiff will have the right to visit. 
The parties are ordered to consult with each 
other at least 90 days before the beginning of the summer of 
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their anticipated schedules to be sure there are no conflicts and 
to try and resolve potential conflicts that might exist. If 
there is a conflict as to when defendants summer visitation 
should occur, either party will have the right to ask the Court 
to resolve the conflict if they are not able to do so. 
If the children are offered an opportunity to 
register for a summer activity that requires an early 
registration, plaintiff is ordered to notify defendant so that he 
can let plaintiff know whether this might conflict with his plans 
in the hope of avoiding: a conflict. 
g. Defendant will have the right to visit with 
the children frequently at times other than those outlined 
provided the visitation does not conflict with important 
activities in which the children are involved. 
h. Either defendant or his present wife shall 
have the right to pick up and return the children. In the event 
defendant's current wife is picking up the children, she will 
honk for the children in the driveway. If the children do not 
come or she is not notified when the children will be there, then 
after waiting five minutes, she will have the right to go to the 
door to get that information. 
i. At any time defendant is exercising 
visitation and will be taking the children out of town, defendant 
is ordered to provide plaintiff an itinerary so that she will 
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know where the children are* Plaintiff is ordered whenever she 
takes the children out of town, to provide defendant with an 
itinerary so that he will know where the children are, 
7. Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $1,500 
toward plaintiff's attorney's fees which shall be paid by 
defendant within 30 days of billing by plaintiff's attorney. 
DATED this / day of /?P/jt^/^ , 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
District Judge R ^ - ' - , w 7^  A i r -y 
MAIL^'tf&frlFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of April, 1985, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to: 
David A. McPhie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
147 North 200 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
¥r £*«!&( Al^t^j z 
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ItJ l'HE DISTRICT COURT OV HIE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
114 AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAVE Or UTAH 
CAROL ANN 3ARKER BROWN 
Plalntlff, 
vs. 
BRYVJT JEROHE BROWN 
D f ndant. 
I'HL ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER MIIIH on for hearing oefor^ 
tn abov— ntitlea Court on the 2nd day of January, 19SO. 
i\\ ilonoraoj - Chnstm j Durham Distract Jucg*, pr-sid J. 
I'h- Plaiitiff appeared in person ana through her ittornjv, 
E^rl S. s juffora. L'h - Court heard -vioe'K" in suuoor*- of 
PlditiLift'a Complaint anJ now being fully iuvisea in the 
or ru s s, having heretofore -nt^r^d its Einuincrs of Tact 
ara Conclusions of Law, and for good cause aooearing there-
fore, 
11 IS HERESY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Deer '»- of Divorce 
from the Defendant, dissolving the bonds of matrimony 
h^r to for- -xistmg b* tv»-~n the parti »s. Said Decree shall 
b~~onv f.nuL forthwith. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the minor children of the 
parties suoj-ct to reasonable rights of visii-jvion by the 
D'>nudnt, w-hi^ h rights of visitation should include the folLowi^a: 
fa) D f-naant's visiting prav-»l-g«*s shall include 
a minimum of >v-ry other w^ek-nd, not to int rf^re with the 
EARL S. SP\rFORD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4 31 Soum Thxra East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I'diUhon : 5 31-8020 
DECREE or DTVORCE 
ClVJl No. '-" '- HO " 
Appendix "H" 
children's regularly scheduled activities, such as Sunday 
Scnool. It is contemplated that the children will spend 
Friday evening and Saturday with the defendant, and oe 
returned to the plaintiff by Saturday evening. 
(b) Defendant shall be able to have the children 
in his home on alternate holidays, with the exception that 
Christmas mornings, the children shall be with the plaintiff. 
Defendant may be able to visit with the children in his home, 
Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, or as agreed mutually by the 
parties. 
(c) Defendant's visiting privileges shall not be 
limited to the above situations if the parties mutually agree 
upon visiting privileges at other reasonable and convenient 
times. 
(d) Defendant may have certain time during the summer 
months where he would be able to take the children on a 
vacation for a week or two. It is reasonable that the defendant 
be able to take the children on such a vacation if the olaintiff 
defendant's and the children's schedule can accommodate said 
vacation time. 
(e) It is reasonable that the plaintiff and defendant 
cooperate with respect to notifying each other of their 
respective schedules and the intended visits. 
3. During the marriage but prior to the separation 
of the parties the parties have incurred miscellaneous debts 
and obligations which the Defendant should be required 
to pay, except the home mortgage which plaintiff should pay. 
4. That the property of the parties should be divided. 
5. The residence of the parties located at 31^5 South 
2794 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, to the plaintiff with the 
understanding and provision that the plaintiff shall assume and 
make the mortgage payments, tax payments, insurance payments, 
ana otner payments associated with said house. Defendant shall 
provide the plaintiff with a Quit-Claim deed at the time of 
the signing of the Decreee of Divorce. The home furnishings, 
including the grand piano and grandfather clock, to the 
plaintiff with the exception of the antiques which belonged 
to the defendant's grandmother and the stereo speakers be 
awarded to the defendant. The dinner ring to the plaintiff. 
6. It is reasonable that the defendant pay child support 
in the amount of $300.00 per child ($900.00 per month for all 
children) per month to continue until the child shall reach the 
age of eighteen (18) ; the child shall marry; or t:he child shall 
oecome self-supporting. Said child support shall be continued 
to age twenty-one (21) if a child shall elect to serve a mission 
for the LDS Church or if a child shall elect to attend college 
or university. 
DATED this f ' t \ day of January, 1980. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ '<* U sU"*,,* / / I 
XJDGE 
